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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the part gambling plays in an urban setting in Highland Papua New Guinea. 
Gambling did not exist in (what is now) Goroka Town before European contact, nor Papua New 
Guinea more broadly, but when I conducted fieldwork in 2009-2010 it was an inescapable part 
of everyday life. One card game proliferated into a multitude of games for different situations 
and participants, and was supplemented with slot machines, sports betting, darts, and bingo 
and lottery games.  
 
One could well imagine gambling becoming popular in societies new to it, especially coming on 
the back of money, wage-work and towns. Yet the popularity of gambling in the region is 
surprising to social scientists because the peoples now so enamoured by gambling are famous 
for their love of competitively giving things away, not competing for them. Gambling spread 
while gifting remained a central part of the way people did transactions. This thesis resists 
juxtaposing gifting and selfish acquisition. It shows how their opposition is false; that gambling 
is instead a new analytic technique for manipulating the value of gifts and acquisitions alike, 
through the medium of money. 
 
Too often gambling takes a familiar form in analyses: as the sharp end of capitalism, or the 
benign, chance-led redistributor of wealth in egalitarian societies. The thesis builds an 
ethnographic understanding of gambling, and uses it to interrogate theories of gambling, 
money, and Melanesian anthropology. In so doing, the thesis speaks to a trend in Melanesian 
anthropology to debate whether monetisation and urbanisation has brought about a radical 
split in peoples’ understandings of the world. Dealing with some of the most starkly ‘modern’ 
material I find a process of inclusive indigenous materialism that consumes the old and the 
new alike, turning them into a model for action in a dynamic money-led world. 
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A Note on Orthography 
 
 
 
 
Tok Pisin is the lingua franca of the Highlands region of Papua New Guinea. In this thesis Tok 
Pisin words are written in roman script and italicised. Spelling is phonetic, following convention 
and The Jacaranda Dictionary and Grammar of Melanesian Pidgin (Mihalic 1971). Translations 
are given in single inverted commas. For a full description see Mihalic (1971); for the purposes 
of this thesis one should know the following: 
 
i is pronounced as in ‘kit’; e as in ‘met’; u as in ‘put’; a as in ‘fat’; o as in ‘tot’.  
 
There is no letter ‘c’ in Tok Pisin, it is replaced by k, which is pronounced as in the ‘c’ in ‘cat’.  
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Prologue 
 
Cardography 
 
 
One day mid-2009 I ambled South-westwards, away from the Town area of Goroka with my 
friend and later field assistant Loui, bachelor string bags slung from shoulders. We were 
leaving the pre-planned core of the town, whose buildings have remained largely unchanged 
since Papua New Guinea achieved independence in 1975. Wide roads separated double and 
triple story buildings: trade stores, the electricity company, food bars, banks, a bookie, and a 
bowling club. Those living inside enjoyed the remnants of Australian-built Public Housing, now 
almost all privately owned. As we made the short walk from administrative and commercial 
centre through a grid of permanent residences into the settlement where Loui lived, the 
ground under foot broke into finer and finer components, from sealed tarmac to potholed 
loose shingle to dusty-brown or viscous dirt. Increasingly composite roadways intermingled 
with refuse that had swiftly composted, leaving rich soil and little archaeology. House replaced 
office, street vendor displaced shop; three stories became two, two became one. The steeper 
slopes within the Town boundary were home to illegal and legal (both planned and unplanned) 
settlements, while customary and parcelled freehold land just beyond the boundary supported 
an assortment of local landowners, rented plots and properties as well as individual plots 
bought freehold. In practice it was hard to spot differences between these areas and the 
Town’s official settlements; and I can therefore only estimate that above two thirds of 
residents live outside of Public Housing but within the immediate vicinity of Goroka Town. 
 
I was well aware of another correspondence: as you took this route you saw more and more 
playing cards strewn over the ground, mixing as best they could into the matter. First the odd 
card sat in a gutter, battered, deformed, half buried with last week’s mud or washed down and 
caught on the lips of drainage ducts. At a few houses or in some of the markets, there were 
pockets of card abundance, oases of gambling activity in a tarmac desert. These havens were 
major sites for my enquiries. Further out, large collections of playing cards were found 
spanning street corners or gathered around street-sellers’ stalls: fifteen, thirty; smeared with 
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dried betel nut spittle and parched mud from the last few days; more research. Finally, in the 
settlements where I spent most time, amid gelatinous camel humps above the more liquid 
sludge, cards added a continual pictorial or patterned tinge, teaming with betel nut husks, 
plastic bottles and lone flip flops to hold the ground steady like a half-hearted mosaic. Some 
were ripped in half, acting as a relic of some past frustration; others fragmented further, 
shredded to cover bingo numbers and left holding the secret of their user’s fortunes. I soon 
understood that the fast fermenting throwaways in their various concentrations told much 
about where we trod. 
 
We were in Goroka, the capital of Eastern Highlands Province, the seventh largest of twenty 
provincial capitals in Papua New Guinea and second to Hagen in the Highlands region. 
Amongst other things Highlanders were known nationwide for their propensity to gamble (see 
maps 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 below), outsiders citing their lust for money, rich resources, and love of 
giving things away (paradoxically, it seemed to me at the time), and that was why I was there. 
Money matters; the primary source has been coffee ever since the indigenously-led planting 
boom of the 1950’s and 1960’s, when Gorokans stunned the Australian colonisers with their 
ready grasp of the value of money, their industry and ‘materialism’1. At 1,573m above sea 
level, with maximum temperature 26°C, minimum 15°C, and little seasonal variation, the 
Gorokan climate is ideal for growing premium coffee. The soil profiles for this altitude tell of 
deep organic topsoils overlaying yellowish-brown clay, excellent physical properties and a high 
potential for cultivation of subsistence crops as well (Purari 2010). Fifty years or so since the 
planting boom, Gorokans were disappointed with their income. They coveted the promise and 
pain of large-scale resource extraction and the accompanying explosion of capital investment 
seen elsewhere. The soil was yet to yield great mineral wealth and consequently the Goroka 
valley that cups the town was promising without being super-productive. By contrast their 
coffee trees produced drudgingly, flourishing once a year sometime between March and July 
(at the start of the dry season), depending on the altitude. The 2000 census put urban 
unemployment for the Eastern Highlands at 17%2. In Goroka the most frequent occupations 
                                                 
1
 Colonial Report by E.R. Johnson 1958 of Kamanuntina/Gafutina Census Division (on money); Colonial 
Report by R.D.M. Cleland 1956 of Watabung Census Division (on materialism); see also Finney 1973. 
2
 The labour force was defined as those over ten years of age, with employment including subsistence 
activities (Papua New Guinea National Statistics Office 2002). 
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were agricultural, animal and fisheries workers (19%) and elementary occupations (23%)3. 
According to a survey I conducted in 2009-20104 mean income was K41 a week (approximately 
£11 at the time), with an average of 1 wage-earner per household of 6. 70% of households 
marketed to supplement their income. Without the advantage of mineral wealth, it is little 
wonder Gorokans thought that people further up the Highlands Highway (that neglected 
lifeline to the region) – with their mines and forestry – could gamble for bigger money, a 
(morally questionable) index of carefree success.  
 
With such a fertile base, it is perhaps unsurprising that Goroka the town (as opposed to the 
valley or the district) makes up a measly 19,523 (5%) of the 432,972 people in Eastern 
Highlands Province5. The rural Highlands remained for a long time a paradox of overcrowding 
as small-scale societies with stone-age technology go (see Sahlins 1972), yet net urban 
migration to Highlands towns has been modest given this latent ‘population pressure’. Good 
local road and aviation infrastructure by Papua New Guinean standards meant Goroka was 
always awash with visitors from the surrounding districts and its westerly neighbour Simbu 
Province. Built around an airstrip from 1941 as the first town in the Highlands, it was 
designated regional capital in 1945, a title now lost; during my fieldwork it was more of a 
stopping point between Hagen and Lae.  
 
Colonial intervention and the establishment of a town had to contend with and alienate land 
from an extremely diverse population: localised groups at high density who were constantly at 
war with certain neighbours (see Read 1965). The fortified, palisaded and nucleated villages 
that predate Goroka Town were home to highly corporate groups of (principally but not 
exclusively) agnatically connected men, their wives, children, and men who for one reason or 
another decided to live uxorilocally, as well as displaced peoples from other groups who had 
been given leave to reside with them or had been fully incorporated6. They practised pig 
                                                 
3
 Defined as simple and routine tasks which mainly require the use of hand-held tools and often some 
physical effort (International Labour Organisation 2012). 
4
 All statistics were collated from a series of surveys of different groups based on residential location or 
employment, totalling 563 households, by the aforementioned Loui Ipatu and I in 2009-2010. 
5
 Papua New Guinea National Statistics Office 2002. 
6
 Such fluid notions of corporation in the region at large led to a long debate in Melanesian anthropology 
(see Wagner 1974) and the rise of the term ‘cognatic’ as a mode of description. I use ‘local groups’ as a 
shorthand in dealing with a number of different peoples as a means to express that people self-identify 
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exchange, but not of the bombastic incremental kind made further up the Highlands, usually 
killing the pigs prior to giving7, and setting more store on initiation and warfare (see Read 
1965; Newman 1962), contributing further to their fracturing identities.  
 
 
Figure 0.1: Map of Goroka Town and surrounding local ‘groups’’ land ownership. The Goroka area in red 
was alienated from these ‘groups’ before and after World War II. The thick black line running north to 
south and bisecting the town represents the Okuk or Highlands Highway, the only road connecting the 
Highlands to the Coast and its ports, completed in the 1950’s. Source: Purari 2010.  
  
 
Local people whose labour helped to make Goroka a reality, and who had previously lived 
primarily on ridges surrounding the valley floor, abandoned warfare and moved closer, making 
their claims for ancestral ownership of the tall grasslands below. The extraordinarily dense yet 
                                                                                                                                               
with and distinguish between others at various scales, though I am conscious of the term’s shortcomings 
(See Wagner 1991). 
7
 See chapter five. 
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fractured – almost already metropolitan – population standards of the Highlands meant that 
even in this relatively small town diversity was intense. In a sense one could say the Highlands 
have always been somewhat urban. Goroka has been a meeting and unification point for social 
others of varying degrees of distance since its inception. Eastern Highlands urban areas8 are 
dominated by migrants (70% of all males, 67% of females), 58% of whom come from outside 
the province (Papua New Guinea National Statistics Office 2000). In my own survey of a range 
of households and employers one of the questions was to identify where respondents’ 
households were from (allowing two locations if they identified them): 347 (62%) said Eastern 
Highlands (78 (14%) of whom claimed to be local land owners), 114 (20%) held they were from 
neighbouring Simbu Province, and other provinces together totalled 98 households (17%). 
Towns present a problem for some anthropologists because of their scale and the origin of 
their occupants (see Hannerz 1980; Amin and Thrift 2002), and Goroka is a good example of 
urban diversity. I have responded in this thesis by looking at gambling, an activity that belongs 
to Goroka and actively creates relations among participants from various locations (e.g. 
settlement visitors, mobile betel nut traders, coffee and fresh produce sellers). I discuss my 
strategy in detail below. 
 
With activities like gambling spurring them on, patterns of group formation flourished in 
Goroka Town. A great many migrants assumed local landowning and proprietorship rights as 
they became related to one another, while alienated state land was recolonised by illegal or 
planned settlements creating complex webs of relatedness and more or less new social forms. 
Newfound mobility on the back of roads, aeroplanes, pacification and wage labour meant that 
residents of Goroka came from far and wide, but particularly from Simbu. For an example of 
innovative relation-making I was adopted by a prominent local leader who, like many, refers to 
himself as Simbu blo Goroka (lit. ‘Simbu belonging to Goroka’). That people can be both from 
Simbu and recognise the deep obligations of belonging to Goroka, is testimony to the novel 
social forms developing in Twenty-first Century Highlands life9. My father was a big time 
gambler, and the history of gambling is an account of bridging transactions. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Comprised of Goroka and Eastern Highlands’ second town Kainantu. 
9
 The –blo formation is extensible to anthropologists and mirrors the object of ethnographic study; people 
were concerned to make me aware of my growing England –blo Goroka and/or –blo Simbu status. 
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Gambling: Contemporary of the Gift 
 
There is no evidence that gambling existed in Papua New Guinea before colonisation. The 
Commonwealth administration of Papua (the southern half of the country) became stridently 
against gambling and alcohol consumption by locals, because “neither card-playing nor 
drinking were native customs” (Murray 1925: 71). Penalties were sometimes severe; Section 
78 of the Native Regulations stated: 
 
Any native who plays cards for money or money’s worth, or who gambles in any way may be 
punished. Punishments. The first time he is caught he may be fined up to two pounds, or may be 
put in gaol for four months… If a man is caught gambling a second time he will get a heavier 
punishment. He will certainly be fined one pound or put in gaol for one month; and he may be 
fined as much as five pound or put in gaol for six months. (Papuan Villager 2 [March 1930]: 2-3; 
see Kituai 1998: 252-253) 
 
Lieutenant Governor and Chief Judicial Officer of Papua Sir Hubert Murray’s attitude was that 
those who were accustomed to European ways were more inculcated than those whose 
crimes were consistent with customary beliefs (Dinnen 2001: 21). Their first prosecution 
occurred near Port Moresby in 190710. Countermanding prohibitionary action, colonial 
plantations, police barracks, and wage work actually acted like incubators, gambling returning 
with labourers and policemen to far-flung sites. Convictions in Papua rose to 104 in 1911-211, 
at which point war curtailed statistics gathering.  
 
Figures began to emerge from the area that includes Goroka after Australia wrested control of 
New Guinea from Germany during the Great War, beginning 1929-30: 
 
                                                 
10
 Commonwealth of Australia Annual Report of the Territory of Papua 1906-7. 
11
 Commonwealth of Australia Annual Report of the Territory of Papua 1911-2. 
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Year 1929
-30 
1930
-1 
1931
-2 
1932
-3 
1933
-4 
1934
-5 
1935
-6 
1936
-7 
1937-
8 
1939
-40 
Convict-
ions 
2 22 11 27 19 9 5 79 256 846 
Table 0.1: Gambling convictions in New Guinea for the period 1929-1940
12
. 
 
This period coincided with a progressive colonisation of New Guinea’s interior. WWII 
interrupted the statistics once more from 1940 to 1946, after which gambling convictions 
continued rising: 
 
Year 1946-7 1947-8 1948-9 1949-
50 
1950-1 1951-2 1953-4 1955-6 1956-7 
Convic
-tions 
49 197 226 274 334 422 629 401 989 
1957-8 1959-
60 
1960-1 1961-2 1962-3 1963-4 1964-5 1965-6 1966-7 1967-8 
614 1166 1858 2018 1352 2080 2124 2216 1597 1427 
Table 0.2: Gambling convictions in New Guinea for the period 1946-1968
13
. 
                                                 
12
 Commonwealth of Australia Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 
the Territory of New Guinea, 1929-30; 1930-1; 1931-2; 1932-3; 1932-3; 1933-4; 1934-5; 1935-6; 1936-7; 
1937-8; 1939-40. 
13
 Commonwealth of Australia Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 
the Territory of New Guinea, 1946-7; 1947-8; 1948-9; 1949-50; 1950-1; 1951-2; 1953-4; 1955-6; 1956-7; 
1957-8; 1959-60; 1960-1; 1961-2; 1962-3; 1963-4; 1964-5; 1965-6; 1966-7; 1967-8. 
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Maps 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 below show first academic mention of gambling in different locations14, 
and in map 0.2 (in accordance with local perceptions), the reader will note the concentration 
of references in a central belt: the Papua New Guinea Highlands. The following maps are 
progressive magnifications toward Goroka, firstly of the Highlands region and then north 
Eastern Highlands and west Simbu provinces together.  
 
                                                 
14
 For the sake of clarity, the references are confined to literary sources, and do not include colonial 
reports, in which references to gambling are very numerous. In addition my investigation of colonial 
reports largely centred on the Eastern Highlands, and would serve to over-distort the pattern that emerges 
from literary sources. 
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Figure 0.2: Instances of gambling that appear in the ethnographic literature on Papua New Guinea. Dates are for fieldwork, not publication; see Appendix for 
references related to these instances. 
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Figure 0.3: Instances of gambling that appear in the ethnographic literature on the Highlands region of Papua New Guinea. Dates are for fieldwork, not publication; see 
Appendix for references related to these instances. 
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Figure 0.4: Instances of gambling that appear in the ethnographic literature on the north Eastern Highlands Province and north-east Simbu Province. Dates are for 
fieldwork, not publication; see Appendix for references related to these instances. 
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What is remarkable given these data is that gambling was spreading at the same time as the 
‘efflorescence’ of gift exchange (A. Strathern 1979a: 532) that helped make Melanesia a 
prominent region anthropologically. Such famously gift-centred peoples as the Melpa (A. 
Strathern 1984), Mae Enga (Meggitt 1979) and Siane (Salisbury 1962), who were experiencing 
extreme inflation of their ‘gift-economies’, also simultaneously allowed gambling to infiltrate 
transaction practices. This appears to present something of a paradox, where ethnographers 
keen on emphasising the gift-centeredness of Highland people and their resistance to 
‘commodification’ also saw people simultaneously taking up competitive acquisition minus 
gifting. My informants on the other hand often cited their love of giving as a reason for profuse 
gambling, so the paradox only seems to exist at the level of anthropological analysis. As I shall 
now describe, the historical record likewise shows no evidence of qualms from Highlanders 
when incorporating gambling into their transactional repertoires. 
 
The initial spread of gambling was predominantly through cards (along with dice), and for the 
first seventy years of gambling in Papua New Guinea, the card game called laki (lit. ‘lucky’) 
ruled. It infiltrated Highland life after the region was opened up as a labour frontier by the 
Australian colonial regime following WWII. Donald Laycock postulated that the game became 
nationally popular when people learnt what they called laki from American and/or Australian 
G.I.s based in Papua New Guinea during WWII, who were partial to Baccarat and/or Chemin de 
Fer (but their game of choice was Three Card Brag (Lepper pers. comm.), which resembles laki 
more closely than the others). Laycock floated this idea (1972: p476), probably on the 
assumption that the true origins of the game could never be known. Goroka had its own 
military presence and saw heavy bombing in 1943, suggesting that it served as a nodal point in 
this transmission from G.I.s to locals; yet I found no evidence to support the hypothesis 
because gambling makes no appearance in colonial reports of the Highlands until considerably 
after the military left. There is also hard evidence that coastal New Guineans were gambling 
with cards long before the War (see above; also Kituai 1998: 252-253). 
 
Actually Goroka district has the most complete records for the transmission of gambling 
anywhere in New Guinea, partly thanks to pioneering anthropologists Kenneth Read and 
Richard Salisbury, both of whom worked nearby Goroka at the time of cards’ invasion. Kenneth 
Read’s first fieldwork was in 1950-52 among the Guhuku Gama, who occupy Nagamiufa and 
Asariufa portions of map 0.1, and own parts of what is now Goroka, including some notorious 
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gambling dens (see below). These peoples were among the very first to volunteer as 
indentured labourers, and their proximity to the emerging Town meant ready access to cards. 
Read recalled his exasperation in 1952 with his “boys” (those young men employed to take 
care of his domestic duties) playing “interminable games of cards” whenever he went out 
(Read 1965: 21). Gambling took only slightly longer to catch on elsewhere. 
 
Richard Salisbury’s fieldwork on social and economic change was among Siane people of the 
Upper Asaro area (just a few miles North of Goroka) in 1952-53. He encountered the return of 
only the second crop of Siane indentured labourers from the coast. Salisbury reported that 
these young men had watched “more sophisticated natives playing guitars and harmonicas, 
gambling with cards at laki” (1962: 127), but makes no mention of these adventurers bringing 
the cards back home with them. Salisbury therefore likely captured the historical moment of 
transmission of new knowledge by migrant workers’ who nevertheless still lacked the 
materials (card, ink and sufficient money) to replicate gaming in their home communities. 
Responding to that lack, in 1977 (fieldwork 1967) Salisbury & Salisbury note that some Siane 
migrants made a living in Port Moresby by daring to illegally smuggle in cards from passing 
ships (1977: 227). Still, it seems unlikely that cards found their way to outlying areas by this 
method in the early 1950’s. Besides, gambling was illegal and cards were banned outright in 
August 1966, extending the bar on New Guineans possessing cards; colonial officers also had 
to smuggle decks of cards in their socks to avoid detection (Wilkinson pers. comm.). Very few 
decks were likely to have leaked out to locals outside of the Town itself - at least at first. 
 
In my time in Goroka (2009-10) older people described how, some years after gambling 
became popular, they found cardboard boxes, cut them into squares and drew playing card 
symbols on them if they couldn’t get their hands on manufactured cards15. Homemade cards 
are inevitably more susceptible to manipulation, so they were a last resort. Nevertheless, 
these are the lengths that newly avid players went to for a game. On top of lacking the 
necessary materials, it seems gambling was further hampered by newly-introduced money, 
which had triggered an initial rampage of saving. The Trust Territory’s Treasury Department is 
reported to have regularly asked: “Where does all the money go in the Eastern Highlands?” 
(Cleland 1955: 3)16 Such was the hoarding of cash. Patrol reports from the Goroka Sub District 
                                                 
15
 This also occurred north east of Goroka in Gende territory (Tamakoshi pers. comm.) 
16
 Cadet Patrol Officer R.D.M. Cleland; see also Howlett 1962. 
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for the following four years moan about locals sitting on their money, refusing to spend it, 
while petitioning for better marketing opportunities with which to obtain more (see also 
Howlett 1962).  
 
After four years of familiarisation and accumulation, money surfaced when gambling was first 
officially documented in the Goroka sub-district on 7th February 1958. Patrol Officer Allan 
Cottle convicted nine Korfena people for playing, each getting two months with hard labour 
(Cottle 1958)17. Korfena is the name given to the grouping who owned the northwest portion 
of land that was alienated to build Goroka Town. One subgroup, the Asariufa (who were 
among Kenneth Read’s informants18) own and run the three largest gambling dens in Goroka 
today. The ethnographic record of Gorokan gambling flowers beyond mere mention in early 
1959 with Phillip Newman’s work, conducted about 5 years after the return of Salisbury’s 
gambling-frustrated labourers. When Newman conducted his doctoral research a few miles 
northwest of Korfena among the Gururumba, he was impressed by the “young sophisticates 
who have learned a card game called “Lucky” while away at work” (1962: 238; see also 
Howlett 1962). Newman describes vividly the zeal of young players, some of whom had 
become “full-time gamblers. They travel from one place to another devoting their full time to 
this occupation” (1962: 239). Newman observed the seed of gambling’s rapid spread through 
the Eastern Highlands and with it new transactive possibilities. Korfena and Gururumba young 
men were both among the first and keenest to work on the coast, where they enjoyed novel 
transactions as they were paid in money for the first time, and had their first flutter. Their 
enthusiasm was writ large in the myriad forms and prodigious scale that gambling later took 
among their descendants back home.  
 
By the early 1960’s patrol officers in the region were making convictions for gambling 
practically every patrol, and among those indigenous groups, playing cards seemed 
unproblematic except when they got caught19. This seems to correlate with the second spike in 
                                                 
17
 Ironically prisons were and are one of the major sites of gambling (see Reed 2003: 92, 105). 
18
 There was some fluidity in names and boundaries ascribed to ‘social groups’ by colonisers and 
anthropologists at this time, as one would expect from the group-formation practices described above and 
the colonial desire for rigidity. 
19
 E.g. Report by M.A. Lynch 1960 of Watabung Census Division; Report by P.V. Dwyer 1961 of Upper 
Asaro Census Division; Report by R. Allmark 1962 of Tairora Census Division. 
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gambling convictions beginning 1959 and levelling out from 1964 (see table 0.2). Convictions 
for gambling spread up through the Highlands in a westerly direction from the late 1950’s 
through the early 1960’s along the ‘labour frontier’, becoming common in Kundiawa in Simbu 
Province in 196420. Andrew Strathern found gambling a common past time in 1964 Mt Hagen 
(further West still), and terms like “gambling win” were in daily use by 1971 (A. Strathern 
1979b: 98; see also 1979c; 1979d; 1984: 102-3). Around each government post and growing 
town (where indentured labourers were recruited in greater numbers), gambling appeared 
and then radiated swiftly. Patrol officers commonly thought that their Native Constables and 
interpreters played cards whenever they rested and some even trained their ‘masters’ 
(Wilkinson, pers. comm.), providing a good model for the ‘full-time gamblers’ to emulate. 
Indigenous police officers sometimes stopped gambling themselves to arrest a civilian who 
was playing nearby, and then simply returned to their own game after the culprit had been 
fined or locked up (Kituai 1998: 252; see also A. Strathern 1984: 103). In the face of an 
overwhelming demand to play and thus for manufactured cards which reduced the risk of 
cheating, later patrol and police officers turned a blind eye to their sale in retail outlets21. 
 
It is an extraordinary story. Card gaming crossed deep historical divides in a short period of 
time, coming fast on the back of money, and spreading in the face of condemnation by colonial 
officials. Yet more extraordinary is the fact that widespread gambling commanded so little 
attention when it happened under the noses of outstanding ethnographers, their gift-centred 
manuscripts capturing the imagination of wider anthropology. In part this thesis is an 
examination of why gambling pulls off such feats. It is also an account of why gambling became 
an important activity for Highland peoples, while being largely unremarked upon by gift-
centred ethnographies. It is clear from the many short references littering the ethnographic 
record22 that anthropologists generally assumed they knew what gambling was; it was a small-
scale symptom of creeping commodification, usually overshadowed in their ethnographies by 
large scale gifting, for example: 
 
Coffee planting has been enthusiastically adopted, and the trees are now beginning to 
bear. This brings in a partial money economy. The money is used for purchases from 
                                                 
20
 Report by P.H. Hardy of Kundiawa Area Study. 
21
 Peter Salmon, ex-patrol officer, pers. comm. 
22
 See maps 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4. 
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other natives and from trade stores, for gambling, occasionally to hire labour for a 
month or two, and, most importantly, in exchanges. (Brown & Brookfield 1959: 3) 
 
One of these games, called “Lucky” may develop into real gambling. The game 
remains harmless as long as the boys, as they often do, play with sticks only. (Nilles 
1953: 12) 
 
An unestimated amount of money changes hands through gambling, and a similarly 
incalculable amount is simply hoarded by individuals who have no immediate use for 
it. Progress towards the establishment of a commercial economy cannot be achieved 
without fairly full and continuous circulation of money, and there is scope for greater 
education in this respect. (Howlett 1962: 268) 
 
In order to tease out a more nuanced appreciation than these short references, I need to ask: 
what calculations and ideas cross these landscapes exactly? Does gambling remain a 
monolithic act when it is taken up or is it transformed? After outlining my fieldwork, I give an 
example of the complex forms that appropriation of gambling throws up, as an introduction to 
why the role of gambling cannot be taken for granted. It comes in the form of the continued 
and intensified preference for certain manufactured cards, and shows that gambling is one of 
the activities that unify Goroka, making it understandable as a single place by residents, and as 
a unit of analysis for anthropology. 
 
 
 
Goroka (Plus One) Gambling 
 
Today Goroka is Papua New Guinea’s self-confessed gambling capital: 73% of over-sixteen’s 
gamble; 45% play cards in their local residential area, 25% go further afield; 11% play in the 
vibrant but volatile betel nut markets; 4.6% play when they are in residential areas other than 
their own; 3.1% prefer local markets to the central betel nut markets, and 1% admit to playing 
secretly at work; 3.5% confess to regularly playing at the five high stakes slot machine joints 
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dotted around the centre of Town; 3.8% frequent the horse-racing bookies23. There are a 
further four large-scale gambling events per year: the three-game State of Origin rugby league 
series and the Melbourne Cup horserace; all happen in Australia but excite prodigious interest 
in Goroka and Papua New Guinea at large. About half the townsfolk have a bet on at least one 
of these occasions, and luxury cars are among the prestige items rumoured to change hands. I 
arrived only a few months after a crackdown excised an extremely popular numbers game 
called hi-lo on the back of intense public pressure from local church groups and police. So 
while gambling may, or may not, involve higher stakes further up the Highlands, residents of 
Goroka are seen as particularly ardent players. 
 
From April 2009 to June 2010 I lived at the National Sports Institute, on land once owned by 
Kama people, interrupted by two months renting a room from Loui’s family in Kaunsil Kem (lit. 
‘Council Camp’) settlement (on Faniufa land) when my work there became more intense (see 
figure 0.1). From there I set out daily and/or nightly to get involved in gambling activities and 
other aspects of town life. Gambling is still illegal in Papua New Guinea outside of betting 
shops and pokie joints, so I am unable to give the exact location of some gambling sites. I shall 
keep to the rule of only relaying publicly available information on sites and people involved in 
gambling. If one residential area could be called my field-site it would be Banana Blok (lit. 
‘Banana Block’) settlement, a subdivision of Kaunsil Kem; I knew the people there best. 
Nonetheless gambling took me all over Goroka (see figure 0.5): there were four regular card 
gambling sites outside or underneath houses in the formal residential areas where they would 
remember me, three in West Goroka, and one high stakes card site in a more central location. I 
spent time with one group of colleagues who played cards in secret at their workplace. It is an 
open secret that gambling is rife in the two betel nut markets: Kakaruk (lit. ‘Chicken’, because 
it used to sell them) and Chuave (named after a district in Simbu Province whose inhabitants 
dominate sales), so there is no point in hiding it, and I enjoyed dipping in and out of these 
hotbeds with increasing regularity. A small amount of time was spent at or around the bookies, 
but the proprietors (Chinese origin professional bookmakers) were hostile to my research so I 
shall not report on them directly. Other people were almost always happy to talk to me and 
found my topic readily understandable and interesting, treating my own gambling education 
as an imperative that would benefit them in the future. Gambling is an emotive issue, and so 
                                                 
23
 All statistics here are from the aforementioned survey of households and employees. Given gambling’s 
morally ambiguous status these figures are likely underestimates. 
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during my fieldwork and in the thesis I have chosen not to give my personal opinions on the 
moral status of gambling and to report only how Gorokans thought about gaming as vice or 
otherwise. 
 
 19 
 
 
Figure 0.5: Aerial Photograph of Goroka Town (date unknown, source: Papua New Guinea National 
Mapping Bureau). Where I lived at the National Sports Institute is circled red. Banana Blok Settlement is 
bordered blue. The two betel nut markets I conducted fieldwork in are outlined in orange, Kakaruk to the 
south, Chuave further north. The five slot machine joints in Goroka are marked purple, and the bookies is 
in pink. 
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I gambled often and with intent to win (but a secret commitment to redistribute any winnings 
among losers), and found this form of pure participant observation gave me a more complete 
understanding of gameplay. I consumed many hours participating in night and daytime trips to 
various slot machine joints known locally as ‘pokies’, especially with my adopted Simbu blo 
Goroka father Tom Liam24, a prominent local leader and a personality associated with pokies. I 
covered one full three game series of State of Origin gambling events in various locations 
around Goroka, and a further two games of the following series. The Melbourne Cup horse 
race fell only once during my time. Of course counterpoints and adjuncts to the gambling 
narrative were equally important, and I spent three months concentrating my attentions upon 
a Pentecostal church in West Goroka known as Sunrise Four-Square, and conducted forty-eight 
in-depth interviews with a range of people around themes much wider than gambling 
participation.  
 
As a topic tailored to a particular site, my fieldwork on gambling in Goroka had the advantage 
of reflecting, transgressing and embodying various scales of sociality: communities of 
gamblers, players in a single game, an object of moral discussion, and as cause, embodiment 
and reflection of phenomenon. Gambling provides a frame in which people that may or may 
not know each other meet, compete, interact and transact. It led me to explore different 
geographical areas and people of diverse linguistic origins, treating gambling as a motif for 
relating. Like the ‘full-time gamblers’ who were driven by the prospects gambling held out for 
travel beyond their previous confines, I felt it propitious to relinquish the classic concern in 
Melanesian anthropology with the problem of bounding groups. This thesis explores what one 
can learn from gambling across locales that are united by their purpose, taking its cue from 
Roy Wagner’s (1974) ethnographically informed foregrounding of groups as a contingent 
product of relations. In that Goroka is a gambling capital, they are Gorokan spaces, and for the 
purpose of gambling the people of Goroka enforce a certain code of uniformity to enable this 
fluidity, a point of confluence that is perhaps comparable to the universal valuation of pigs.  
 
Gambling as a field of relating is most apparent in my opening metaphor of strewn debris and 
with Loui and I as flâneurs. There was one never-changing topographic trait in the confetti of 
cards: the colour of their flipsides. No matter where you ambled or how many cards lay about, 
                                                 
24
 Tom Liam is a pseudonym, as are all names in the thesis that could lead to a person’s identification. 
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there was only one brand of cards in your hands or under your feet. They were paper cards 
lightly waxed; standard symbols affront, patterned blue backs centred by a silhouetted 
mermaid. The alien symbols on the packets revealed an origin in China, but for all intents and 
purposes, they could have been any cards; bought in sets of ten for around 3 Papua New 
Guinea Kina and 90 Toea (about £1 at the time of fieldwork) either in the markets or shops, 
they were sold on the street for upwards of K2 a pack. Yet a look in large shops revealed that 
they were not just any cards: it was possible to buy many kinds of cards – different colours, 
textures, materials, boxes and distinguishing features, similar prices – but no other cards made 
it onto the street. The roads only wore the one brand, and the ground shimmered exclusively 
with tiny mermaids. 
 
 
Figure 0.6: The brand of cards dominating the card gaming landscape of Goroka at the time of fieldwork. 
The mermaid within the spade on the packaging sits in miniature in the centre of the cards’ flipsides. 
Photograph taken by the author on 30/9/2009.  
 
This brand of cards, which translates from Chinese as ‘Equal Fish High Quality’, was one of the 
cheapest available in bulk; but speculation persisted over why these cards had come to 
dominate the landscape. Apparently there used to be many types of card, but consensus was 
reached that these ones were the best, not just the cheapest. Many people professed that this 
brand was the best because wins go to everyone equally (win save stap lo olgeta man. lit. ‘wins 
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habitually stop at every man’), whereas with other cards’ wins go to only one player. Many 
cited the inferior material properties of other cards: some were not as glossy and thus 
perishable and easily marked, others were too thick. Substandard printing on the backs and 
fronts of yet other cards gave the savvy an advantage. The upshot for each of these properties 
is that people could devise tricks using them. Even worse, locally produced cards undermined 
people’s confidence because local manufacture implied they were susceptible to control by 
local magic. Cards with failings like these used to be the only ones available, and could be 
influenced by a person with a skin diwai (lit. ‘skin of a tree’, meaning efficacious tree bark) or 
another magical object, who could win everyone else’s money. Such negative traits made a 
virtue of the existing monopoly25: one person said that with the current cards, “if two people 
like each other, these new cards will increase this as both will win, not just one”.  
 
Tricks, magic, low quality and localness were all considered together; they fell under the idea 
of influence-ability. As such, to be uniformly made by a distant hand gave confidence to the 
gamblers that their own efficacies would play out unhindered and that the materials mediating 
between them were equally resistant to every player. An illustrative reversal happened when I 
as a wait-man (lit. ‘white-man’) wanted a game. There was sometimes trepidation – despite 
my evident lack of skill – that if I played I would take all their money because the cards were 
foreign too and would consequently like me26. If cards that passed through local hands were 
susceptible, it is no surprise there were so many cards strewn on the streets of Goroka, for 
fresh decks were constantly replacing those only slightly blemished in an effort to quash the 
possibility of interference. And little wonder they were all the same brand, for if they were 
different then you could not know the cards were equally trustworthy. Variable brands of 
cards would betray a dangerous lack of trust and mutual cooperation in a Town already packed 
with suspicions of the many kin and non-kin you saw around you. A uniform outsider brand 
suppressed the assumed differences in the efficacies of different peoples and levelled 
suspicions of an uneven field, therefore encouraging relations between otherwise 
untrustworthy others (cf. A. Strathern 1984: 102-3). In effect, gambling is a mode by which we 
                                                 
25
 The only comparable example I could find was offered in the abstract to a photograph found in Roger 
Keesing’s field notes from one of his fieldworks in Kwaio (Solomon Islands) in the early 1960’s, where 
he notes a deliberate indigenisation of dice in order to prevent them from being susceptible to tricks like 
shaving the di. 
26
 See chapter two; also A. Strathern 1984: 103. 
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can understand New Guinean-ness across social groups in 2009-10 because it was a concern 
live in people’s thoughts, forcing particular types of uniformity.  
 
Gorokan gambling was set among great diversity but united by a Melanesian propensity to find 
or make relations with even the most distant stranger. Ideas of efficacy and fecundity 
influenced gaming and had a profound effect on who played, when, to what end, and even 
enforced a town-wide consensus on the appropriate material culture of gaming. As a ‘unit’ of 
analysis and a motif for relating, what other effects does gambling engender and illuminate? 
This thesis will explore how certain established anthropological problematics such as money 
and its economic value, perceptions of contingency, incommensurability of different ‘cultures’, 
social boundaries, gift/commodity distinctions and uniform calculative logics may be 
interrogated through an analysis of this novel motif for relating. In the process, gambling, in its 
flexibility, becomes a contingent game of relating that quells any ideas of potential paradox 
between it and gifting. 
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Chapter 1 
 
False Questions and Ethnographic Theory: 
Michael Makes a Bet 
 
 
My ethnography begins in earnest with typical betting practices in typical card games. They 
may be mundane to Gorokans, but I argue that engaging with everyday transactions challenges 
and builds upon certain tenets of anthropological description. Three literatures stand out: first, 
gambling in anthropology and across disciplines; second, theories of economics, value and 
money; and third, Melanesian anthropology. This opening chapter breaks with convention by 
engaging the two topical literatures, rather than starting with an ethnographic literature 
review, having introduced Gorokan gambling in the prologue. I shall refer to Melanesian 
anthropology when necessary but deliberately avoid direct engagement until the following 
chapter. Pegging the thesis back to continuing Melanesianist debates on for instance the 
gift/commodity, or ‘big-men’ vs. ‘great-men’, would cloud the argument at this stage. The 
paradigm-defining theories emanating from previous ethnographies of the region demand 
attention, but to my mind this end would be better served by setting out the problem that 
gambling poses to existing trans-regional theory and afterwards seeing how it reflects and 
builds upon Melanesian anthropology’s staple concerns. I believe the thesis’ contribution to 
the anthropology of Melanesia will be ultimately enhanced by a certain distancing at this point 
in favour of using the ethnography on wider anthropological literature.  
 
I begin with a discussion of the pertinent theories and ethnographies of gambling as a form of 
intellectual scene-setting. I find that a largely unquestioned reliance on probability leads 
anthropologists down a blind alley. In the analysis gambling theory and ethnography is 
revealed as a last remaining bastion of functionalism in anthropology. Without interrogating 
the calculations that people make, the mathematics of probability becomes a black box that 
sits in place of indigenous ideas, in turn affecting the types of analyses that anthropologists of 
gambling produce. I hope to open a theoretical space for later, more ethnographic chapters 
unhindered by the residual functionalism of anthropological analyses of gambling. 
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From identifying this imperative, I look closely at the calculations that occur in Goroka when 
people make bets during five player card games. These forms of calculation require an 
appreciation of the material properties of money because they emphasise moneys’ conceptual 
divisibility and material indivisibility as elements in conscious redistributive strategies. I isolate 
two ‘scenarios’ for dealing with large notes during low stakes games, both of which have 
implications for the likelihood of success, and form part of conscious efforts to mitigate or 
accentuate large notes’ redistributive capacities. This brings the chapter to a second literature 
on money and its mathematics or ‘number principle’ (Spengler 1926). I see Gorokan 
understandings of money as a play on the value of wealth items using their material 
properties, in part generated through gambling. Using the phenomenon of free games given to 
people who lose large moneys, I draw out the principles of money in Goroka further and go on 
to set out how my data informs or subverts the assumptions contained in areas of the money 
literature. Later chapters dialogue freely with the field of money as I characterise it in this 
chapter. 
 
Gorokan gambling and Gorokan understandings of money force me to focus on building 
Gorokan principles of value rather than relying on conventional understandings of money as 
the supremely fungible and commensurable medium of exchange. In so doing the data brings 
this thesis into a relationship with what has been called the ‘ontological turn’, or more 
positively ‘ethnographic theory’, a movement that has gained momentum recently around the 
idea of using indigenous concepts as transformative devices to cross-examine not only Euro-
American hegemony but anthropological categories and concepts (Henare, Holbraad & Wastell 
2007; see Viveiros de Castro 2012). This sub-discipline draws significantly from ethnographies 
of Highland Papua New Guinea peoples (see Wagner 1974; 1986; M. Strathern 1988). 
Following these earlier examples, I leave aside the now popular terms ‘ontology’ and ‘alterity’, 
which are quickly expanding into new iterations of an all-encompassing ‘culture concept’. Yet I 
remain broadly in favour of interrogating anthropological knowledge practices using concepts 
and/or practices that seem to subvert anthropology’s tenets (see M. Strathern 1999: 11). I 
deploy Gorokan gambling practices (in my opinion a more plural and fitting description than 
‘concepts’) in dialogue with both Euro-American categories of gambling, money and value, and 
those that occupy the Melanesian anthropological centre ground.  
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False Questions  
 
Gambling in social science is often subject to statistical analyses; it is theorised in terms of 
‘chances’, ‘luck’, ‘probability’ and the ‘rational choice’, which sit at least one level of 
abstraction removed from gameplay (e.g. Gray 2004). I argue that this approach reproduces a 
Levi-Straussian overemphasis on the power of mathematics to explain the true nature of social 
reality to the point where the people no longer seem to be needed (Mimica 1988: 155-61). The 
study of gambling is a stronghold of formalist theories in anthropology, where game and life 
are separated and forms of analysis that social anthropologists would not think appropriate to 
the latter are deemed fitting to the former (cf. Rizzo 2004). Actual punters and interested 
parties often think about their numerical chances in an entirely different way to a 
mathematical model of the game in question, and are seen to utilise a hybrid conception of 
rationality and luck during play, often as a rollercoaster of emotions that belie ‘rational’ 
decision-making (see Oldman 1974). When players are confronted with social scientific 
analyses in the media, they see abstracted interpretations of their behaviour and rationalised 
strategies for success but, under the rubric of free choice, are otherwise left to understand 
their likelihood of success in whatever way they see fit (cf. Schaffer, Stanton & Nelson 2006). 
Gamblers are in turn divided into ‘fish’ and ‘pros’ along the lines of their comprehension of 
abstract and mathematical knowledge about the games they play.  
 
The pertinence of Euro-American mathematics to understanding how games operate has its 
own history that is intimately tied to ideas of progress. The usual historiography of 
mathematics is one of increasing complexity and refinement over time, in many ways the 
sharpest corollary to the myth of Civilisation. This is no less the case in the world of gambling. 
In fact mathematics and particularly probability have had an interdependent relationship with 
gambling which holds a mirror up to the idea of evolutionary progression (Hacking 1990). 
Scholarly investigation of likelihood can be traced back to ancient Greek, Chinese and Indian 
‘civilisations’, among others, and perhaps extends beyond recorded history. It is in Europe, 
however, that we have seen the flowering of probability into a separate scholarly discipline 
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from its various applications and contexts1. Probability stems from a mathematical approach to 
the (supposedly) inherent sense that in gambling the likelihood of particular outcomes is 
intersubjectively perceived at some point or constantly during periods of play (see Goffman 
2006 [1969]). The essential tenet of probability as a theory is that at one level of mathematical 
abstraction, the likelihood of particular events can be calculated based upon a mathematical 
model (usually the law of averages if dealing with a replicable event like gambling) and 
therefore actions based on obtaining maximum returns or averting risk can be extracted from 
these likelihoods and prioritised into outcomes which are hence understood as more rational. 
In spirit it is not a model of causality, but a model for action based upon rules taken in lieu of a 
total understanding of an event’s causation. For instance, it assumes a random distribution of 
cards because of the near impossibility of adjudging how one particular shuffle by one 
particular pair of hands will order the deck, and advises action based upon this assumption. 
 
Probability Theory2, first conceived to address tactical questions relating to gambling for the 
wealthy patrons of leading mathematicians like Cardano, Galileo and Pascal, has grown beyond 
its disciplinary boundaries and come to significantly influence the day-to-day lives of Euro-
American people. Gambling games gave us the Laws of Probability, now applied to spheres as 
diverse as stock trading (see Maurer 2005) and artificial insemination (see M. Strathern 1996). 
Once formulated, these laws fed back again into gambling, providing the mathematical surety 
necessary for the sound financial underpinning of modern casinos, as well as providing the 
basis for risk (mis)management in the current banking system. It also made its way into our 
comprehension of what gambling actually is, and is taken as a model for how people 
apprehend the world in a risk-society (M. Douglas 1992). 
 
Some histories of gambling, like their mathematical counterparts, unreflectively concentrate 
on the growth and progressive sophistication of gambling against a background of ‘innate’ 
human risk-taking in a dangerous ‘winners and losers’ world (see Schwartz 2006). They seem 
perfectly oblivious to the fact that these histories are analytically premised on the pre-
existence of the very probabilistic ideas of which they are documenting the emergence. The 
                                                 
1
 Due to a list of imported mathematical ideas too long to be thoroughly considered here (cf. Schwartz 
2006; Hacking 1990; Reith 1999). 
2
 Taken here as a collective term including Decision Theory, Game Theory, Rational Choice Theory, 
among others. 
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foundation of such approaches, linked to the rationalist mathematical analyses that are the 
current vogue in gambling analysis, is that opportunity-cost decisions are taken rationally by 
actors in accordance with a game theory model, unless pathological gambling takes hold and 
distorts this rationality. Rizzo reminds us that however separated, important, institutionalised 
and powerful Probability Theory has become in Western daily life, these models are 
rationalised and enumerated versions of reality which ascribe game-like characteristics to life 
(Rizzo 2004). It need hardly be stated to an anthropologist that rationality, the result of 
Western scholasticism, is a poor guide even to the societies from which it was spawned. 
Indeed, case studies of gambling activities have shown that they can hold vastly different 
meanings for different actors (Cassidy 2002; Oldman 1974; Henslin 1967), and in different 
societies (Malaby 2003; Woodburn 1982). These may or may not correspond to even a part of 
what some see as individuals’ subjective consciousness, and there is no reason to suppose they 
will do so in a relatively un-Westernised numerical context. After all, money and basic 
mathematical education pre-date a probabilistic understanding of the world by some time. 
 
Nevertheless, probability has also underpinned anthropological understandings of gambling in 
what were called ‘pre-’ and ‘proto-capitalist’ societies like Papua New Guinea. Unable to break 
free of this particular brand of rationality in their analyses, many anthropologists persistently 
used statements about other societies’ gambling games being ‘basically chance’ (In Papua New 
Guinea see the otherwise excellent Zimmer 1986; Hayano 1989; Goodale 1987; Maclean 1984; 
Levine & Levine 1979; and Laycock 1967). Just like theories of probability, these are attributes 
given to the games by the anthropologist and often bear no relation to the opinions which 
their informants have about either the game or the calculations involved (but see Mimica 
2006, discussed in depth in chapter two). Since at least Malinowski’s Coral Gardens and their 
Magic (1935), anthropologists of Melanesian societies have been well aware of other models 
of causality, but in considering gambling they still regularly refuse the possibility that their 
informants’ considerations actually produce non-probabilistic forms of gambling. Gambling 
usually falls into the crack of the already known. It is particularly prone to being taken for 
granted because chance is thought of as, in fact, the lack of a model of causality, so social 
scientists do not see their own imposition. Linked to hard numbers, chance is seen as a higher, 
abstract form of knowledge, providing a ready-made model for intellectual understanding3. 
 
                                                 
3
 See also chapter two. 
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The use of such statements about things being ‘basically chance’ gives the anthropologist free 
reign to put forth any particular theory of the workings of a larger system beyond the frame of 
their subjects’ own ideas, inevitably in a functionalist way. Thus the ‘magical’ abilities of 
players or objects is often dismissed, and games are in some instances rationalised as 
‘redistributive’ (see Hayano 1989; Binde 2005), a way of evening out the unequal distribution 
of goods or introduced money into the traditional community, despite informants 
understanding of gameplay as individualistic. Laycock (1966, 1967), Mitchell (1988) and 
Zimmer (1986) all analysed a particular card gambling game in Papua New Guinea on the basis 
of it being ‘pure chance’4. While Mitchell and Zimmer profitably explore how players take 
winning and losing as an instantiation of their ability to beat each other by summoning a 
winning hand from their inner quality, they nevertheless hold fast to models for card gambling 
as redistributive systems based on the chanciness of the game5. Such models can be traced 
back to Woodburn’s (1982) classic analysis of a Hadza (African) gambling game used to 
distribute goods equally among persons and communities in the context of a fiercely 
egalitarian society. In effect, the players are mere dupes of the game. Such analyses separate 
gambling’s role from the perceptions of those playing, thereby denying a truly interactive 
relationship with gambling or an equitable engagement with any models that informants may 
have. This embodies the fact that probability disclaims a model of causality to the extent of 
denying it as a social reality, and so probability becomes the only model that truly explains, 
because it reveals that no explanation is sufficient.  
 
It is precisely these interpretations that make gambling appear a paradox in a Melanesian gift-
centred context, since acquisition without return sits uncomfortably beside gifts as obligation. 
This is a problem that Zimmer takes on with some success by focussing on the transactions 
surrounding gameplay (1986: 249-53; see also Zimmer 1987). Yet I find the contradiction 
                                                 
4
 This game, laki, is no longer played in Goroka in the form described in these accounts, i.e. by large 
groups of players competing all at once. However laki has taken a new one-on-one form in certain places 
in Goroka, described in detail in chapter three. My later analysis could further contribute to a critique of 
redistributive analyses, but by this point in chapter three the alternative mode of calculation I am putting 
forward makes returning to this point redundant. 
5
 Assertions about redistributive benefit have been used by unscrupulous gaming companies in 
neighbouring Australia as justification for putting their gaming machines and casinos into Aboriginal 
settlements, though they are certainly very far from redistributive, taking revenue out of the community. 
This has become a significant policy issue (see Brady 2004). 
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misleading: gambling only becomes an issue because of the inescapably functionalist 
conclusions which result from perceiving ideas about gameplay as subservient to the laws of 
gaming. Couching the question in terms of mitigating gambling’s effects through surrounding 
transactions begs the question: why use gambling in the first place, why not stick to more 
familiar kinds of transactions? I contend that this paradox is false because peoples’ 
mathematic of transactions infiltrates games to the point of disrupting chance-based 
explanations. More attention must be given to indigenous calculations as they relate to 
gambling activities, and how they might have affected ideas about likelihood and value of 
outcomes in gambling. The meeting of different forms of enumeration in Papua New Guinean 
gambling activities, a space where indigenous numerical practices meet a Western inspired 
currency regime, together with the international material culture of gaming forms, affords an 
opportunity to get to grips with how one might think differently about gambling everywhere. 
 
I observed that people were doing the work of redistribution consciously, though framed in 
another way. Another conception not burdened with the same ideological baggage as 
redistribution was at play, resulting in flows of wealth which look superficially egalitarian but 
are in reality highly complex articulations between persons, kin and their social others. If it is 
as I describe then, gambling ceases to be paradox and emerges as a Melanesian analytic using 
games specific to them. In this thesis I excavate the logic that goes into gambling transactions 
and investigate if and where Gorokans perceive any ‘conflict’ between gambling and what 
anthropologists call gifting.  
 
It is obvious once stated that I will be better armed to comprehend Gorokan understandings of 
gambling via the local mathematics it uses. ‘Ethnomathematic’ ideas were on display 
constantly in the course of gambling and so it was simple to deploy an anthropological strategy 
that I developed during previous study: enumeration (see Pickles 2009). Enumeration, in brief, 
is to remain open to indigenous reckonings of calculation at all levels, taking them seriously as 
mathematical models for comprehension at the broadest scale possible (see Mimica 1988). 
Here is the starting point for an ethnographic theory of gambling in Goroka. It will only be 
possible to explicate this mathematic through careful ethnography, but an outline is necessary 
here to orient the reader. I see Gorokan enumeration as a repertoire of strategies concerned 
with manipulating the value of otherwise numerically commensurable wealth items for the 
purpose of conveying their perspectives to those they are transacting with: a “science of the 
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concrete” as Biersack puts it (1982: 813) in response to Levi-Strauss (1966). In order to build 
this ethnographic theory, I proceed by examining in detail the transactions and mathematical 
operations involved in gameplay and bring them into conjunction with those areas of 
anthropological theory they can be made to dialogue with. 
 
Textual sequencing has prevented me from discussing the use of money, ideas about efficacy, 
and rules together. In actual gameplay these subtly play on one another to reveal calculative 
potentialities for action which are summed up succinctly in the Tok Pisin translation of my 
thesis title: paten senis senis (lit. ‘pattern changes changes’, i.e. the pattern changes and then 
changes the pattern). Verb reduplication is a common linguistic form in the Papua New 
Guinean lingua franca Tok Pisin, and to my mind it usually means that the verb turns in on 
itself, so it would be more accurate but less concise to translate senis senis as change that is 
subject to change, just as luk, ‘to look’, is duplicated in lukluk, which I would translate as 
‘looking at’, i.e. picking out from ones field of vision6. This reflective idea is developed in 
chapter two, where the ‘pattern’ of the two dominant games is described and the process of 
change excavated. Building on this chapter, the phrase paten senis senis evokes the process by 
which Gorokan gambling changes itself in response to the actions of others in ways that are 
then recognisable and subject to interception. It incorporates betting, rules, and notions of 
efficacy within an evolving mathematic or pattern.  
 
In an attempt to mitigate the problem of textual description, the next section on a single 
betting practice should be understood as a convenient but not exhaustive heuristic set of 
evidence people use to understand their likelihood of success and how to act upon it. Notions 
of efficacy are given full space to develop in the following chapter, as they are themselves 
contingent upon an understanding of the valuables in play (the bets) which must be 
established prior to that discussion. In fact, the way the description below is set out, it will 
become clear that Gorokans do not consider betting and gameplay as discrete in any way, and 
this description should expose the misleading nature of the tendency to separate bets from 
game in previous ethnographies of gambling. The practices resolve and then lead away from 
                                                 
6
 For a list of reduplication of verbs in Tok Pisin see Mihalic (1971: 22-23); for a general discussion of 
the use of reduplication in creole languages see Kouwenberg (2003). Damon sees reduplication in the 
Muyuw (Milne Bay) language expressing the idea of continuous, intensified action, such that a duplicated 
form of the verb “see” means “knowing” or “seeing” (2002: 121). 
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the initial, narrow problematic I set out thus far and into another literature on the theory of 
money and value, which then becomes a primary point of engagement for the thesis. 
 
 
Michael and the Tyranny of Denomination 
 
I shall shortly describe, using diagrams, a characteristic situation that arises in all card games in 
Goroka involving more than two players. I introduce Michael, a security guard in his mid-
thirties working at the National Sports Institute where I lived. Michael was my first informant 
and determined my early research to a great degree. While I was there, Michael received his 
pay every other Friday after his shift finished at nightfall, and then walked ten minutes from 
work to Blak-aut Siti (lit. ‘Blackout City’) where he lived, a subsection of Kaunsil Kem (lit. 
‘Council Camp’) settlement7 with his envelope full of notes. The pay packet of K180 (which was 
about average for a security guard) was usually given in two K50 notes, and the rest in four 
K20’s. His money would generally run out after only a week or so, so each payday was always 
cause for excitement. For descriptive purposes I switch to the ethnographic present.  
 
As an unmarried man, Michael supports the relatives he lives with. But he also likes to gamble, 
and on his way home Michael passes numerous groups of people playing cards in the 
gathering dusk. This is sometimes more than he can resist, and he is not alone; with alternate 
pay fortnights for state and private employees, every Friday sees people getting embroiled in 
card gambling. With other newly paid people milling about, the size of bets in settlements 
peak on Fridays at K2, K5, or sometimes K10 a round8.  
 
Michael might join a game of kwin (‘queen’) or bom (‘bomb’), each of which can have as few as 
three players but ideally and usually have five. The rules for these games are the province of 
the following chapter and the bets within them are the same. In the multiplayer games found 
in settlements the stake is always equal for all players9, so with a bet size of K2 you would 
                                                 
7
 And a few houses down from Loui, see prologue. 
8
 One Pound Sterling fluctuated around 3.6 to 3.8 Papua New Guinea Kina at the time (2009-2010). 
9
 Side bets were also allowed, but do not affect the general pot. A side bet is a private bet outside of the 
main pot; it is set up by players or spectators on the outcome of games. Each player making a side bet 
must contribute the same amount, creating a second pot that excludes other players. Alternatively, some 
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normally have a central pot of K10 (we will see why this is only normally the case below). 
Michael’s pay packet lacks the change to play K2. There is no substituting his K20 note for 
chips or matches; players invariably play with the real thing10, saying that they wish to filim 
fos/pawa blo mani (lit. ‘feel the force/power of money’). Both these facts will be crucial to 
understanding what gambling is all about in Goroka. As I discuss below, Michael might prefer 
to play with a large note or with change in different circumstances, but change is not easily 
attained in the settlement in any case. This is because people are loath to reveal their money 
as they will then feel pressure to distribute it to those who see it11; to do so while seeking 
change makes distribution of part of that money even harder to avoid. Michael must use a 
larger denomination to bet the agreed stake during this game (though perhaps he would 
rather not).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
players participate in the side betting while others are bet on by bystanders, creating a partial reflection of 
the main pot including all the players except with bystanders standing in their betting place. Bystanders 
who bet on winners collect the profits themselves but recognise their inculcation in the play of another 
with compensatory acts like buying the player a cigarette or buying alcohol and then drinking it together 
with them. The logic involved in the following analysis applies equally to side bets. 
10
 I am not the only one to have observed this practice; it was noted in the Highlands as early as 1963 
(Brandewie 1967).  
11
 See chapter six. 
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Figure 1.1: A group of card gamblers and spectators in Kaunsil Kem settlement, 14.01.2010, photograph 
by Loui Ipatu. 
 
There is a free place in the game; Michael crouches and puts down his K20, and the other four 
players know he is only betting K2 of it. Without words they acknowledge and accept Michael’s 
bet, at which point one of two scenarios begins. Both scenarios involve quick arithmetic, 
showcasing Gorokan capacities for rapid calculation; it was some time before I could keep up, 
let alone join in the games. I devote much space to explicating the arithmetic here; using only 
the simplest version of what can get very complicated. When I was still struggling I remember 
walking with and talking to a middle aged lady called Anne one evening on her way home. I 
asked about gambling and she wryly said that Papua New Guinean people did not go to school, 
but at mathematics they are clever. That they prefer these complicated calculations to using 
counters testifies to their desire to play for real cash, lending shape to the maxim ‘feeling the 
force of money’, which shall become apparent as we explore the scenarios. The way in which 
Gorokan people reveal the power of secretions of value (denominations of money) to change 
the field of play, will force me to look carefully at value and money. I will show that this game 
is a mathematical field of flows that rely heavily on the materiality of money for their calculus.  
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SCENARIO ONE 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Round 1 of betting scenario One in which a K20 note is used where the agreed stake is K2 
during a five player game. Michael’s K20 note is in orange/pink, the green notes of other players are all 
K2 notes for simplicity’s sake. 
 
In scenario One (figures 1.2-1.6), Michael’s bet of K2 will stap insait (lit. ‘stop inside’) the K20, 
K18 of which remains out of play. The bet creates a state of lok (lit. ‘lock’, to be locked in): the 
K20 note is stuck in the middle because the K2 inside it is ‘locked’ into the game, i.e. nobody 
owns the note completely until it is bought out. This is a means of getting beyond the classic 
problem that while a K20 note is substitutable for a K10 and 2xK5, or whatever, the note itself 
cannot be changed.  
 
While part of it is in play, the fact remains that a K20 is not physically divided. Marilyn 
Strathern (1999: 96) observed that for Melpa people the ability to divide money is a particular 
preoccupation; they see its divisibility as an opportunity to hold something back. As we shall 
see, divisibility is a concern for Gorokans too, and I flag it now to say that I shall discuss 
divisibility with reference to M. Strathern’s work in chapter two. Yet the material properties of 
notes were equally important. Gorokans were highly sensitive to the state of particular notes, 
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often refusing only partially ripped notes and even crinkled old ones (see also Stewart & A. 
Strathern 2002; Healey 1985; Nihill 1989; Foster 1998). People maintain a strong sense of not 
only the divisibility of money in terms of its numerical worth, but also the indivisibility money 
possesses in its sedimented forms: t10, K1, K5, K20 etc12. When they bet Gorokans take 
potential divisibility but practical indivisibility as essential parameters of their mathematics of 
money, and as I am about to detail, act upon their interplay as a means of getting money. 
Playing with a K20 note is therefore more than a mathematical problem, it is a statement 
made in mathematical terms. All the other players acknowledge Michaels intent and put their 
K2 notes into the middle. B then wins the round, not only collecting K8 in K2 notes, but also 
taking over K2 of Michael’s K20 note. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The winnings and pot after player B has won round one of the first betting scenario.  
 
                                                 
12
  To draw the contrast, in Britain the divisibility of money is heavily foregrounded in an e-banking and 
credit card dominated financial landscape. Money can be transferred to two decimal points of the primary 
currency in any quantity numerically required, and the indivisibility of denominations is usually noticed 
more in terms of needing correct change for machines, understood as a nuisance rather than a cause of 
currency fluctuation. 
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In figure 1.3 the next round is starting. Most of B’s winnings from the last round (aside from 
her K2 stuck inside the K20) sit with her13. B uses the K2 portion of the K20 note she won as 
her stake in the upcoming round because it is the easiest thing to do, giving her a way out 
should she wish to leave after losing the round. C, D, and E draw money from their reserves, 
and Michael plays another K2 from within his K20 note. In effect K4 of the K20 note is now in 
play. Within the game players begin to feel the pull of the K20 note as it starts to swallow up 
the pot (see below). This, as we shall see, is one of the capacities that a large note has in a 
game: it pulls in others’ monies every round. Player B is happy to take control over a portion of 
the note’s capacity. Players want to gain control over large monies rather than small notes and 
coins, which hold far less force and are highly subject to the give and take of daily life; people 
dismiss these low denominations as money to give without thought14. Individual 
denominations are thus characterised as having different uses and capacities. The usual 
attitude, phrased negatively, is that big monies should go to supporting one’s family, or for 
making statements such as showing off at slot machines (detailed in chapter four). Larger 
notes are less subject to being broken up, and can legitimately be refused to others because of 
their disproportionate value15. You could reach into your pocket and give K2 to your cigarette 
starved associate, but only a fool or a rich person would pull out a K2016. Phrased positively, to 
play with large notes is to act with the kind of brazen attitude to wealth which in turn attracts 
further wealth and generosity.  
 
                                                 
13
 For the sake of clarity, players’ reserve money is not shown in any of the diagrams except when it has 
already changed hands during the rounds described. 
14
 A common term for a K1 coin (which has a hole in its centre) is a ‘washer’. This is a joking dismissal 
because it equates the highest value coin with a practically valueless piece of metal used to distribute the 
pressure of a nut or bolt. See also chapter six. 
15
 For an intriguingly comparable situation using indigenous money, see Armstrong (1924) on Rossel 
Island (Massim) money. 
16
 Acts of daily distribution and concealment through pockets is the major focus for chapter six, while the 
figure of the careless wealthy man is explored in chapter four. 
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Figure 1.4: The winnings and the pot after C has won round two.  
 
There is a different winner next round (figure 1.4): Player C claims K6 in K2 notes from the pot 
(his own stake, D’s and E’s), as well as taking control of K4 (Michael and B’s stakes) from the 
K20 note. To begin the following round C will release K2 of the K4 he has ‘locked’ in the K20 
note while K2 remains inside. C now owns part of the note outside the game, just like Michael, 
and the conflict means both parties are fused together, drawn in by this note, they are ‘locked’ 
along with their money. Meanwhile B is back to playing with some of her winnings from the 
previous round, and hence one of the K2 notes from her reserves in the diagram has now 
moved into the pot. D and E are still pumping their own money into the game. Michael is 
losing control of the K20 note slowly and continues to stake K2’s from hap blo em (‘his part’)17. 
  
                                                 
17
 The word hap (lit. ‘half’) can be used to mean any fraction, so that a player may own a bikpela hap (lit. 
‘big half’) of a K20 note, say K14, or a liklik hap (lit. ‘little half’) like Michael’s K2. Hap may also mean 
‘there’, as in long hap (lit. ‘over there’, but also ‘that other part of this place’). It is interesting to note that 
the only word used for fractions has this flexible capability. 
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A K20, with its capacity to make people sit up and take notice, draws players in; because of 
Michael’s note, B, C, D and E played on when otherwise they may have left the game. But 
Michael will not be worried just yet. In Goroka a person who plays a large note is thought to 
desire a long game, as it takes time to lose this note. Neither would he want to ask other 
players for change, firstly because his large note is of potentially greater value and secondly for 
the same reason he would not ask for change before the game: he would feel pressurised to 
distribute it. Players with smaller reserves of money will tend to run out of money in the 
attempt to win the K20 note, because Michael can play on for a long time waiting for his 
opportunity to win the rest of his note back. This is why the player with a K20 invites a certain 
kind of regard, arouses certain demands and expectations. Playing your high denominations 
should not be done lightly; it has an irreducible impact upon the game. The other players’ 
response to Michael is therefore also a response to his provocation. Instead of refusing the 
note, which they sometimes do (see below), they played for it; they took on the challenge.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: The winnings and the pot after player B has won round three of scenario one. 
 
In round three B wins for a second time. Her winnings are mounting up, she has K4 of the K20 
note along with K6 from the rest of the pot, which is added to the K6 remaining from her 
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previous winnings. Meanwhile C retains a K2 stake in the K20 note, and Michael has K14 in 
there. In the next round C will stake his remaining K2 of the note, while B does what C did last 
time, betting K2 of her K4 from inside the K20, while unfortunate Michael stakes yet another 
K2 from the K14 he still commands. This time K6 of the K20 note is in play.  
 
B and C perhaps make a living off such games; some do so without great skill by utilising their 
staying power and the pulling power of denominations. While a long-time player might be 
statistically equally likely to lose a great deal (following the logic of a ‘chance’ model of 
gaming), in fact this possibility is mitigated by players whose reserves are small and who 
therefore only play for a short time, losing a couple of rounds and then leaving. Their money 
remains in the field of circulation for those who are still around to pick up the leavings. This 
works because while anthropologists usually assume that the law of averages states that in a 
‘pure chance’ game money will be evened out across a community (e.g. Woodburn 1982), it 
actually implies that each player would end up with the same amount they started with, which 
is hardly a good model for egalitarian redistribution! Laws of probability applied to gambling in 
New Guinea likewise fail to take account of the capacities of denominations that I have 
illustrated and the comings and goings of people, which all act upon the game to confound 
simplistic models of chance. These matters are central for Gorokan players. As one informant 
from the same settlement put it, “if we do not gamble, we don’t see the face of money”. I take 
this statement to mean that gambling brings out the character of money, its capacities to pull 
in and act upon people18. 
 
                                                 
18
 ‘Face’ also seems to imply the literal surface of denominations of kina, for a discussion of which see 
Foster (1998; 1999). The face is often seen as a display of capacities in Highland Papua New Guinea (see 
O’Hanlon 1989), and I therefore see no duality of meaning in this expression. 
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Figure 1.6: B wins round four of betting scenario one, and buys out Michael’s stake in the K20 note. 
 
After winning once again in round four, B takes C’s K2 share in the K20, and another of 
Michael’s K2 stakes, bringing her total possession of the K20 note to K8.  B also takes K2 notes 
from both D and E. With a further K16 in K2 notes in her reserves she buys Michael out of the 
K20 altogether, leaving Michael with K12 in K2 notes19. He need not have accepted this buy-
out, but in practice players who have lost so much of their note are unlikely to refuse because 
having change gives them a way out. B is sitting pretty with a K20 note which is now fully her 
own and K4 in K2 notes. Having only spent her original stake of K2, she has made a profit of 
K22. C has K6, but has spent K4 to get it, and so is only K2 up. Along with Michael, D and E each 
fed K8 into the game with no return; they allowed the note to change hands quickly, because 
they fed small sized monies into the pot. B can now use the force of this K20 note in the game, 
or take it elsewhere. Before considering this further I must first show how a second method for 
dealing with Michael’s K20 note works, and what it means for there to be two options.  
 
                                                 
19
 B may have preferred to keep playing without changing up the money if she decided that keeping her 
winnings in small change was preferable, say for instance she wanted to distribute her winnings among 
others, see chapters Four and Six. 
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SCENARIO TWO 
 
Figure 1.7: Round one of betting scenario Two in which one large K20 note is being used for the entire 
pot, each player giving their K2 to the K20 holder. 
 
In simplified ‘scenario Two’, Michael puts his K20 into the middle, but in this case the other 
four players immediately give Michael their K2 stakes before playing, the full K10 pot being 
contained within the K20. This time when player B wins the first round, she gains control of 
K10 in a state of lok inside the K20 note, Michael has the other K10.  
 
It is worth noting at this stage that the two ‘scenarios’ often come into play at different times 
in the one game and may even coincide. In fact the following situation could well occur soon 
after the previous one is resolved, because if B continues to play, she may well be required to 
stake the K20 note once again. I remember vividly a game where no one seemed to have the 
correct change, and three out of five of us in a K1 game were using larger notes: a K5, a K10 
and a K20. Bets were made inside different notes at different times, and they became verbal 
transactions without money changing hands. After each round people were careful to clarify 
where everyone’s money was just then. This brought up a host of everyday gambling 
utterances like mi autim tu kina blo yu (lit. ‘I have ousted K2 of yours’, meaning I have taken 
over K2 of your K5 note), mi dinau lo yu, no ken bet (lit. ‘I have lent to you, don’t bet’ meaning 
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you are borrowing part of my note to bet, so don’t put in your note (it is too large)), and tupla 
blo em lus, em betim tripla nau, (lit. ‘two of this is lost, he/she bets the third now’, meaning K2 
from that K5 note has already left it, this is his/her third kina from it). The reader will note in 
the last statement that money is removed from a note and placed into the hands of another 
person. I have teased out two ‘scenarios’ which I see as building blocks for the contestation of 
value within money when gambling.  
 
It appears (to us) that both scenarios One and Two refer to an identical situation, so the choice 
between them must be based on preferences that Gorokans have but which are not 
immediately apparent to us. As all the bets appear equal, and one’s winnings or losses should 
not in theory be affected, what could be the matter of decision? What is the problem? Why is 
it preferable to centralise the large note in some circumstances and bet portions of it in 
others? Why does it not make sense for players’ to keep their monies apart so each player 
knows what they have at any time and can better keep track of their wins and losses? Why 
make things more complicated? The reader will note that if we take money to be equally 
fungible and denominations as unimportant then this is a non-decision, but as I have thus far 
suggested, it becomes pertinent in a place where different denominations have non-fungible 
capacities.  
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Figure 1.8: The situation before round 2 of betting scenario Two. The total amount in kina belonging to 
players A and B are represented in brackets; their stake in the upcoming round is represented in square 
brackets.  
 
Following round one, Michael stakes another K2 from inside the K20, and K2 is also staked by 
B, (shown in square brackets in figure 1.8). The K20 now has K4 in the pot and K8 belonging to 
each of two different players but not in play. Once again the players have reached a position 
where they are playing for portions of a note, though this time Michael’s K20 note has been 
collectively consumed much faster than in the first scenario. As scenario Two will play out by 
the same logic as scenario One from here on, with one player eventually taking over the whole 
of the K20 note, there is no need to take it any further. The important thing is that there is a 
qualitative difference for Gorokans between allowing the K20 note to be progressively 
incorporated into gameplay (One) and assimilating the note fully into the game as soon as 
possible (Two). 
 
The size of the note and thus the discrepancy between high conceptual divisibility and low 
material divisibility changes the game in a very real sense, and therefore the same amount of 
money comprised of a single denomination on the one hand or of a few smaller denominations 
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on the other is both of equivalent and different value20. The weit (lit. ‘weight’) of larger monies 
force players to adjust their strategies and goals (cf. Munn 1986: 10-11), and this allows for 
certain strategies, or ‘scenarios’. This is not to imply that Gorokans do not recognise that two 
K10 notes are of equivalent monetary value to a K20 note, but the material indivisibility of that 
note allows different, more powerful, impressive, imperative and reciprocally attractive 
transactions to occur in even ostensibly identical situations. As I described in scenario One 
Gorokans recognise that with a large note to play for, the target for each player has effectively 
been hijacked by that player, so as to attract in more small monies, to up everyone’s 
commitment. This is not necessarily desirable or undesirable, it can be phrased both positively 
and negatively, but it is a simple Gorokan fact: wealth attracts more wealth and competition. 
The difference between the scenarios represents ways of engaging with the capacities of 
different notes, so what do these strategies do to those capacities?  
 
The advantage of scenario Two (where all players give their stake to the player with the large 
note) is that it can be used at any time in order to turn a large note which appears to 
imbalance the game into a single prize, rather than a complex mixture of small wins and 
portions of the note. Scenario Two usually happens when players want to get the play going, 
to heighten interest without using the K20 to attract wealth to one person in particular. As 
some of the note can be shared by the participants prior to play, the force of the money is less 
strongly associated with the player who introduces it: Michael is blame-free. This method is 
usually preferred if possible to scenario One among people known to one another, as the 
money becomes predominantly a central pot that players can attempt to attract equally, 
without one player having an imbalanced control or influence over it. It is more prevalent in 
places like settlements (where people know each other and many of them are poor) because 
players will feel the impact of differential wealth more acutely than elsewhere. In short, 
Scenario Two is a more magnanimous strategy, while scenario One is overtly aggressive, and is 
thus associated with public spaces and strangers. Scenario One is a strategy for players who do 
not entirely trust each other, and do not feel the compunction to mitigate the attractive power 
of their note. The two strategies are enumerative explications of mutual cooperation or 
                                                 
20
 A partial analogy would be the fetishism of displaying ‘platinum’ credit cards in Wall Street and the 
City of London in the 1980’s and 1990’s (see American Psycho 2000), though platinum cards cannot be 
taken over in the same way as K20 notes can. 
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antagonism using concrete wealth items, each with their own results that back up and 
perpetuate the presence or absence of that affection. 
 
Michael (like many people) gets a thrill from gambling with big money, and he often wants to 
feel the attractive power and the buzz of his money without the associated accusations of 
irresponsibility. Hence larger denominations tend to be played in public places among 
strangers who are not able to exert pressure on players like Michael. If he had little money in 
low denominations Michael might prefer to gamble close to home, but he deliberately goes 
elsewhere on his paydays to gamble, where people don’t know him and he can spend his 
money freely without being subject to all the demands of being known to have money. 
Michael is not alone in this: 25% of over 16 year olds I surveyed went outside of their local 
area to gamble, some but not all of whom were among the 45% who gamble in their local 
area. The most popular destinations for these adventurers were the central betel nut markets, 
taking 43% of those who go outside their communities to gamble21.  
 
This time Michael joined a gambling game where he knew some of the players but not all of 
them, at the main entrance to the settlement and still some way from his house. Both 
scenarios were therefore possible, or alternatively, his denomination could have been refused 
altogether. Quite often I saw someone who introduced a K20 in a low-key settlement game 
told to go away and not to be a bikhet (lit. ‘big head’, meaning ‘too big for your boots’). This 
would not happen in the betel nut markets. When people refuse large denominations, it is not 
usually because they feel lazy to do the mathematics; people complain instead that even 
though the bets would remain the same, if they allowed the large note then the game would 
become too serious.  
 
These complications show that my simplified ‘scenarios’ are momentary expressions and 
instantiations of a constantly negotiated language of money and betting. Another instance 
touched on above is when two players in the game have K20 notes. At this time people usually 
give change to one player, as in scenario Two, and this player’s note becomes the primary 
object of play. The other K20 note is played from progressively as in scenario One, until a 
solution can be found where there is only one large note in the centre. The player whose K20 
                                                 
21
 See chapter three. 
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note becomes the pot is the insider, and the one who plays progressively from their K20 is the 
outsider, and adopts an overtly antagonistic style that plays up to their role.  
 
From an analysis of betting we can see that gambling is not simply an activity in which one 
spends or wins money, gambling is of money, and money is of gambling in turn. Gambling is a 
play on the powers of moneys to extend peoples influence (cf. Munn 1986). Gambling and 
money form a single complex arena for a play of efficacies emanating from many sources, and 
subject to the control of those able to recognise and manipulate the concrete forms that these 
efficacies take.  
 
In sum, gambling can be seen as an instantiation of how the attractive powers of different 
monies are able to work for/against people. In this case it worked against Michael, who tied up 
the other gamblers in his note, until their persistence wrested it from his grasp. This brings us 
back to the oft-given response to my asking why people gamble: ‘to feel the force of money’, 
or even ‘to see the face of money’. Players get a real buzz seeing all the money going around, 
knowing how they or others are doing in terms of hard currency and manifesting the capacity 
for attraction that money brings forth when it is made visible. The logic of the bet is not just 
representative of, but also generative of the logic of money in Goroka. This logic becomes the 
paradigm that then operates when, for instance, they leave the game and put their money 
back in their pockets (see chapter six). It is to this logic of money that we now turn. Whereas 
we started by examining the inadequacies of gambling based theory and ethnography, it is 
necessary after seeing what gambling does in Goroka to explore theories of money and value, 
the new primary literature that this material speaks to. This being an introduction, I do not 
offer any conclusions, preferring to set out the aspects of the literature which the ethnography 
should inform. I do so through the free turn that follows the betting practices described 
heretofore. Free turns further develop the notion that gambling and the transactions of 
everyday life fit within a single spectrum of transaction, thereby broadening the scope of the 
logics I am uncovering and providing a bridge to money in its everydayness. Gambling becomes 
part of the everyday play of value in transaction, which allows the thesis to draw upon other 
areas of transaction to uncover gambling (in chapter three marketing, four leadership, and five 
ceremonial exchange) and vice versa. 
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A ‘Look’ at Money and Value 
 
When Michael runs out of money, more often than not he (or anybody else for that matter) is 
given a luk (lit. ‘look’, a free turn) as a form of compensation22, even when playing among 
strangers. B, C, D, and E tacitly agree that all five players will play for the stakes of the four of 
them for a round, while Michael is dealt a hand without having to contribute to the pot (hence 
the above qualification that the pot is only normally K10). A player either asks for a luk directly, 
or states they have run out of money and asks implicitly. The other players merely nod to each 
other or the dealer23 simply deals to all of them without saying a word. For players with only 
small denominations like D and E, this will occur when they have lost all their money. But a luk 
may also be given as compensation for the loss of a big note.  
 
 
Figure 1.9: A luk where Michael does not contribute to the pot as compensation for losing his K20 note. 
 
I naturally thought it must be an affront to take advantage by accepting a luk only to reveal 
you had more money all along, but after his luk Michael simply pulls out another note from his 
                                                 
22
 Those making side bets on players’ behalves are not offered a luk because their betting is not directly 
involved in the central pot. 
23
 In these games the dealer is always a player, see chapter two. 
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pocket to play the next round, and no one feels deceived or duped24. The compensatory 
actions of others therefore add up to a literal increase in a large note’s value vis-à-vis the 
equivalent in smaller denominations when gambling.  
 
The compensation is manifested consciously in the game, not just in compensatory gifts 
outside or as a consequence of ‘chance’ as the existing literature on gambling in Melanesia 
points to. The pot changes magnitude as a result of the need to do socially well by others, 
while guarding against ill feeling which might lead to one’s own downfall25. The game becomes 
compensation, while the modus operandi for these compensatory acts is in money and an 
attempt to render the effect of individual monies more or less valuable. Together with the 
previous ‘scenarios’, we see one’s chances of success depend on the way that people react to 
the money one puts into circulation as part of gambling. Having money is not just a 
prerequisite for playing in a given round, at which point the laws of chance take over, and then 
after chance has had its say then people compensate those who have lost out. Instead money 
interacts with the game, lending itself toward compensatory or aggressive acts which affect 
whether one is successful and the direction of compensation. In opposition to existing studies 
of gambling, Gorokans made no distinction between these acts and any formal rules. This 
standardised gift is only a shift in emphasis away from being a rule itself, one we must accept if 
we are to take games on Gorokan terms. Gambling ‘rules’ are responsive to social mediation; 
they are in dialogue with its players over their redistributive potential.  
 
The upshot of all these transactions is that Michael’s K20 note prefigures the consumption of 
other moneys’ in compensating for its loss and anticipates its own consumption in the 
response the (new) owner feels obliged to make to those who have participated in its 
circulation. The force that money exerts in Gorokan eyes is equally visible in related forms at 
other locations like slot machine joints or on market stalls, at brideprice ceremonies or by the 
meat section in supermarkets; all settings that I shall visit during the thesis. Though not 
exclusive to gambling situations, gambling does have a central location in substantiating the 
                                                 
24
 A pertinent analogy here is the giving of freebies to high rollers in casino’s worldwide, making for a 
complex relationship between profitability and amity. The contrast between them lies in casino’s granting 
of freebies based upon abstract amounts of expenditure, whereas in Goroka this is tied to physical 
denomination as a form of surety that one has spent significantly. 
25
 The repercussions of negative thoughts or ill feeling are explored in the following chapter. 
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capacities of individual monies: it is one of the most consistent and pervasive ways that the 
attractive force of money is made apparent and transparent, as my informant said, it is the 
place to see the face of money26. Gambling is therefore a major analytical starting point for 
looking at how transactions involving money operate in Goroka, including all the kinds of 
relations and spheres of interaction that money touches, such as success (chapter two), 
marketing (chapter three), leadership (chapter four), kinship and social organisation (chapter 
five) and distribution (chapter six). 
 
From my analysis of gambling transactions, I would like to suggest that for Gorokans money is 
fundamentally understood as a set of marked paper and metal shapes whose numerical value 
is set as commensurable and fungible but whose actual value is set by the situations in which 
moneys are separated from each other at different times and places. At these times people are 
able to manipulate the impact and therefore effective value of the money they encounter. 
Gorokans take this reality, where value is dependent on various contextual and physical 
attributes, as a baseline for their understanding of money (cf. Zelizer 1997). Gorokans have 
taken on the word ‘value’ (valyu) and recognise and manipulate shifts in ‘value’, involving 
intriguing modes of quantification that seem to actively resist a standardised value for 
individual moneys resulting from the control of an ‘invisible hand’. Money becomes both 
commensurable and incommensurable. Each variation in price cannot be summed up in a 
mean average price. This would be a deceit. Money’s value is continually distorted consciously 
and with a preoccupation with (in)commensurability. Gorokan people quantify in a moment of 
valuation. These themes shall return in different guises throughout the thesis, so it is only 
proper that I lay out the literature on money and value that I have been implicitly battling 
against, in order to state Gorokan originality in broader terms. Without suggesting hard and 
fast conclusions I open up areas for investigation through the course of the thesis. 
 
Firstly, I do not feel the need to dwell too much on the introduction of money in Papua New 
Guinea, partly because it has been well rehearsed elsewhere (see M. Strathern 1975; Foster 
1995a; 2002), and partly because in Goroka money is now the primary modus operandi for all 
transactions, gift and commodity alike. This argument was already made by Akin and J. 
Robbins (1999); they take money seriously as a complex arena for understanding and 
                                                 
26
 See Foster 1995a on the materiality of Papua New Guinea money. See chapter two for the relevance of 
the face as an index of efficaciousness. 
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competing in the contemporary worlds of Melanesians. However, none of the contributions to 
that volume come from an urban perspective, and so my standpoint differs from theirs27. 
Furthermore, Gorokans use their own understandings of words familiar to the economist: 
‘profit’, ‘market’, ‘gambling’, ‘chance’ and ‘luck’. My fieldwork was thus conducted in 
languages (primarily Tok Pisin, a Neo-Melanesian Creole, but also in English) which use much 
of the vocabulary of formal economics. I must understand money as a pre-existing part of 
urban life for my informants. Gudeman (1986) calls for indigenously understood models of 
livelihood, and I recognise this by taking into account that Goroka’s formation owes much to 
money and theories of formal economics. To treat indigenous livelihoods in a Papua New 
Guinea town seriously is to understand money as a prerequisite for urban life (cf. M. Strathern 
1975). If, as the evidence seems to suggest, money has become another medium for 
Melanesian people to be inventively different, and it is an imaginative vehicle of inventiveness 
with its own forms and constraints, what then can this contribute to the burgeoning field of 
money-theory without assuming that money confuses an Other because it is new?  
 
I begin a narrative of money theory with the philosopher Georg Simmel (1964 [1921]), who 
thought that money creates "a matter-of-fact attitude in dealing with men and with things… 
[as] it reduces all quality and individuality to the question: How much? All intimate emotional 
relations between persons are founded in their individuality, whereas in rational relations man 
is reckoned with like a number, like an element which is in itself indifferent” (Simmel 1964 
[1921]: 411). Once in place this “automatic mechanism”, as he put it, constantly gains power to 
the detriment of the person, alienating the self and fostering a blasé attitude. For Simmel the 
social forms characterising a rise of money were ones of distance, strangers, blasé and cold-
hearted calculation: the "[m]odern mind has become more and more calculating. The 
calculative exactness of practical life which the money economy has brought about 
corresponds to the ideal of natural science: to transform the world into an arithmetic problem, 
to fix every part of the world by mathematical formulas" (ibid: 412). According to Simmel, this 
process of abstraction is total and inevitable; his represents the earliest iteration of the ‘money 
as acid’ point of view, in which money dissolves all social relations to numbers. 
 
Zelizer says that to classical theorists the “mathematical character” of money filled social life 
with “measuring and weighting”, with an “ideal of numerical calculability”, which necessarily 
                                                 
27
 For an excellent national level analysis, see Foster 2002. 
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“blunted personal, social, and moral distinctiveness” (1997: 200, quoting Simmel 1990 [1907]: 
444-445). Running counter to this tendency, Zelizer asked when “monetary transactions 
multiply, do they render social life cold, distant, and calculating?” (1997: 2). This straight 
forward question epitomises an anthropological response to economic theory. Zelizer, and 
other allied theorists (see Weatherford 1998; Granovetter 1985), represent a counter trend in 
anthropology that has as its foundational text The Great Transformation, by Karl Polyani (1957) 
(see Gregory 1997). Polyani was concerned with embedding the rise of economics within 
societal shifts, as opposed to seeing money as an agent in itself; his book became a rallying call 
for anthropologists. Zelizer, for example, points out that even in the economies of developed 
countries money is continually being reclaimed from its starting point as abstract and distant 
(see also Hart 2000). Yet in dealing with my material I find within these attempts at re-
entanglement or re-embedding an artificial juxtaposition that reinforces Simmel’s original 
opposition between the ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ of money. Neither coldness nor distance is 
necessarily or even straightforwardly relatable to calculation. Neither is there anything 
necessarily abstract in calculation, or in the use of money, that then requires embedding. 
Images of the unemotional killer, or the taxman, or perhaps the ruthless politician are 
immediately brought to mind by such words as calculation, but why is it so? While authors like 
Shell (1995), Zelizer (1997) and Hacking (1990) are to be applauded for their re-entangling of 
money and mathematics with meaningful context, the initial disentanglement reinforces 
Simmel’s position and prevents understanding of social life from really penetrating this bastion 
of money-theory. Their disentanglement is not a Gorokan problem, and so what is needed is 
an ethnographic theory that does away with the initial dualism. The luk for instance is a mode 
of calculation with money that communicates through a play on the mathematical character of 
money, but at no point does money emerge from or come near the cold. My material suggests 
that the use of money is every bit as calculating here as among budget-slashing accountants, at 
the same time it is based upon a system of valuation and calculation which is not  distanciated 
and unemotional, but engaged and emotive. Indeed what is more emotionally charged, 
thoughtful and immediate than calculation in Goroka, and seemingly in Papua New Guinea 
more broadly (see for example Young 1971; Reed 2007; Munn 1986)? 
 
To my mind these writings always seem to rest on an assumption that abstraction is the same 
everywhere. Abstraction in Euro-America is seen as emotional distanciation or objectivity, and 
decisions which are based upon a desire for money prioritise an abstract mode of thought 
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(because money is an ‘abstraction’) that is by definition separated from the emotional of 
everyday life. The person is thought of as cold and distant, looking past the virtuous and moral 
at the numbers (cf. Spengler 1926; Hacking 1990; Zelizer 1997; Shell 1995). Chapter two is 
devoted primarily to the question of what ‘abstraction’ actually looks like for Gorokans, but for 
now it shall be enough to demonstrate that calculations with money need not be devoid of 
morality, emotion or whatever. Dealing with Gorokan mathematics of monetary transactions 
leads me to question the straightforwardness of money as a mathematical trick involving 
abstraction.  
 
Bill Maurer has been exemplary in explicating these issues, his book Mutual Life, Limited 
demonstrates the morality and values imbued in certain conventional mathematical practices 
with money from within a subset of a modern Euro-American economy by looking at Islamic 
banking practices and alternative currency movements (2005). Maurer recognises the 
abstraction of economic thought and the perceived imperative to re-entangle it into the social 
as a peculiarly Euro-American phenomenon. He sees it as no surprise therefore that Simmel 
and many others since have been tied up in getting to the bottom of a ‘truth’ about real 
economics (Maurer 2005: 113). Whereas Simmel and Zelizer attempt to ‘reveal’ money and 
social life as in reality connected, Maurer joins  Žižek (1995) and D. Nelson (1999) in 
confronting and further elucidating the illusion that "consists in overlooking the illusion which 
is structuring our real, effective [and affective] relationship to reality" (Žižek 1995: 316). 
Maurer draws on Nelson’s point that "[p]laying detective and getting down to how the fetish 
'really' works completely misses the magic act" (1999: 77). As such, Maurer opens a space for 
looking at indigenous meanings of money, whilst holding to the notion that there is always 
some kind of ‘magic act’ going on wherever money is in play, and that this ‘magic act’ is the 
essence of money.  
 
Maurer’s insight comes from his attention to "mathematics: not whether and how the 
mathematics are used, not the meanings attached to it, not its metaphorical functions - but 
the mathematical form… itself" (2005: 104), which he understands to be of a moral character. 
The ratios and calculative activities in his ethnographic material are morally charged rather 
than being seen as ethically empty mathematics. Maurer demonstrates that the act of 
calculation with numbers and over money may be a moral and virtuous act a priori. Maurer’s 
compelling argument brings to the fore the morality which can infuse economic reason, 
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revealing different possibilities within a single system, when other analysts reproduce a 
fruitless dichotomy between abstract versus immanent money. Yet alternative enumerations 
with money remain absent from the literature, and therein lies the potential for the material I 
am presenting (but see Walsh 2003; Kwon 2007). Neither the luk nor the two scenarios offered 
appear to have much to do with abstraction or immanence, their enumeration relies upon a 
logic that conveys amity or antagonism through denomination, and it shall require an 
exploration of the meanings that are instantiated in these calculative choices to bring out the 
character of money in Goroka. 
 
To my mind the only classical theorist of money to truly recognise its alternative potentials was 
the visionary Oswald Spengler, who bemoaned the lack of records of actual data on the money 
of other civilisations in the early Twentieth Century (1926). Spengler, whose concern was the 
rise and fall of great civilisations, recognised that "every Culture has its own mode of thinking 
in money, so also it has its proper money-symbol through which it brings to visible expression 
its principle of valuation in the economic field. This something, a sense-actualizing of the 
thought, is in importance fully the equal of the spoken, written, or drawn figures and other 
symbols of the mathematic" (1926: 486). While classical theorists like Simmel basically 
adopted Adam Smith’s understanding of money as abstract mathematical marker, and later 
thinkers disputed how abstracted or disentangled actual dealings with money are, the 
mathematical precept that money is abstraction (as the x in the equation of specific values), or 
that abstraction is uniform, has never been wholly interrogated, with Spengler hinting at the 
problem. As Maurer puts it, all the questions posed by Simmel, Giddens, and others "assume 
that quantification necessarily involves standardization, homogenization, and universal 
commodification" (2005: 103). Those critical of seeing ‘money as acid’ like Zelizer (1997), Parry 
and Bloch (1989), Akin and J. Robbins (1999) among others, while making important points in 
their own rights, nevertheless assume “monetization goes hand in hand with calculation” 
(Maurer 2005: 103; see also Maurer 2006; Hart 2000), and that this calculation is of a similar 
character the world over. Spengler pre-empts the work of Maurer, Shell, Zelizer and Hacking, 
and opens possibilities for more ethnographic theories of money. I wish to show how currency 
can engender different thought processes without having to deny the subjects’ calculative 
propensities. In this respect my aim takes further inspiration from Keith Hart (2000), who aims 
to rethink money for the twenty-first century in opposition to inequality-producing machine 
capitalism by tying it more closely to people (see also Gregory 1997); I see this thesis as an 
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attempt to document (however partially) one existent approach to money that is already 
people-oriented.  
 
What if (in the spirit of Henare, Holbraad and Wastel’s (2007) Thinking Through Things), then, 
we were to take seriously the immanence of valuation in money (see also Holbraad 2005; cf. 
Reed 2007)? What if the calculations that people make to ‘distort’ the value of money are the 
primary mathematic within Gorokan money-thought? What then would the mathematic do as 
opposed to generating abstract calculations and moral quandaries? What if the value of money 
was a variable within a logic of transaction that conveyed comparative valuations of people 
instead of reducing people to abstract numbers? What if the emphasis on transactions makes 
the logic an inharmonious, inconsistent vehicle for eliciting differences between people? 
People say, and I believe gambling demonstrates, that in Goroka money has the capacity to 
attract people as well as money to it – other capacities shall be revealed during the course of 
the thesis. What if we did not attribute these capacities to a world of market capitalism that 
causes people to get confused and mistakenly ascribe agency to money (Hart 2001), but 
instead saw it as a part of the character of monies themselves, as people in Goroka seem to 
see money’s ‘face’?  
 
One of the alternative possibilities is given here within the decision to play scenario One or 
Two above, one being more antagonistically effective, the other generously self-effacing. The 
possibility of alternative paradigms depends upon foregrounding certain attributes of the 
relation between money’s material form and enumeration (see also Holbraad 2005). In Goroka 
I found situational changes in value were a matter of conscious manipulation, and thus 
expanding on notions of value as a transformative potentiality is an overall aim for the thesis. 
 
I use ‘value’ as my term for the change in relative efficacies of money because it is a word that 
Gorokan people often use (valyu) and speculate upon, asserting that this or that is of 
lesser/higher valyu, or gains/loses valyu at specific times and places. Statements like i nogat 
valyu blo em (lit. ‘[this item] has no value belonging to it’), or insait long pokies valyu blo mani i 
go taunblo (lit. ‘in the slot machine [joint, the] value belonging to money goes down below’) 
can be heard daily around Town. With such an ambiguous and potentially expansive word in 
English that has taken many routes in academic discourse, it is necessary lastly to define 
exactly what I refer to when I speak of ‘value’. Is economic value just one of the multiple 
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values that exist in each ‘culture’ within its own system of reckoning? When some 
anthropologists talk of values (Dumont 1986; J. Robbins 2004, Sahlins 1985), they put their 
informants’ idiosyncratic ideas into a single meta-category ‘values’, converting them into 
commensurable and equitable individual ‘values’ that can be ranked on a single scale. Whether 
this kind of thinking is useful in given contexts is open to opinion, but this semiotic approach is 
not relevant to my analysis of Gorokan ideas. Instead I deal solely with what people in Goroka 
see as value, i.e. transactable items which are (not unproblematically) comparable on a single 
scale and thus of a single system of valuation.  
 
Following the Gorokan usage, this thesis takes a simple position; I treat value as a single scale 
of measurement where people rank items in terms of their effectiveness as against other 
items. For my purpose value is the comparison of one item against others which are 
considered comparable under the same system of valuation or scale. In order to clarify I shall 
lastly compare my own definition of value to Marx’s labour theory of value. Marx thought that 
the labour – that is the proportion of the sum-total of creative energy that is for sale on a 
market as labour – put into any given material product is its value. Marx argued that the kind 
of quantification that led to an appreciation of value (conceived through the false lens of 
commodity fetishism) was only possible because of the emergence of a market for labour. 
Nevertheless, for Marx this value is not related to how people actually priced objects; it 
reflects a hidden but nevertheless objectifiable ‘true’ quantification outside of action. Graeber 
(2001) traces back an obsession with value as object rather than process and action to an 
argument between Parmenides and Heraclitus, the former arguing that there is a uniformity in 
the essence of existence which allows objects to be comprehensible. Heraclitus famously 
argued that one can never jump in the same river twice, i.e. the only enduring existence is the 
pattern of flow. Heraclitus lost the argument, despite coming closer to current understandings 
of the physical world than he could possibly have anticipated, while Parmenides won and his 
philosophical descendants were (ironically) responsible for the tools that made Heraclitus’ 
position observably more accurate. Graeber argues that Marx’s appreciation of creative 
energies in a material world as the source of value is a continuation of the Heraclitan position 
(Graeber 2001: 52-56), but he does not convince, I find the act of creating an abstract position 
from which to gain a grasp of ‘true’ value does not fully reflect value as creative exercise, 
which I argue better represents Gorokan valuation.  
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Returning to the ethnography in this light, I understand Michael’s betting as bringing forth the 
fact that gameplay is not divorced from transactions in Goroka, and outcomes of games rest 
upon knowledge of this interplay. I argue that rather than sitting outside of statistical 
probabilities and the laws of chance that force their own types of analyses on the 
anthropology of gambling these transactions mingle with likelihood of success in a way that 
reaches out to ideas of money and value while influencing probabilities. These transactions are 
therefore better represented as spatio-temporal statements that manipulate value in order to 
transmit good will and contribute to the socially enhancing activities of gamblers; or signal 
overt acquisitive desires in a forum that recognises the transactive nature of everyday life (cf. 
Munn 1986). This shift in emphasis evokes the literature on transactions, efficacy and value in 
Melanesian anthropology.  
 
Combining an exploration of value as spatio-temporal transformation (see Munn 1986) with 
M. Strathern’s observations on and theory of the separation of cause and effect (1988), I hope 
to create a better framework for Goroka, where value is seen as an extension of agents’ acts 
rather than the result of abstract forces collectivised into an invisible hand. If we are to take 
seriously a Gorokan money-thought then our points of reference in the literature should now 
be those of Melanesian anthropology and especially what they have to say about transactions, 
viewed through contemporary Gorokan gambling. It is in Melanesian anthropology and in 
Gorokan ideas of agency that we are likely to begin building an understanding of Gorokan 
methods of money-thought through gambling, and it is to this that the thesis now turns. 
Perhaps this regional literature would in turn benefit from the inflection of a gambling 
perspective.  
 
 
Chapter Outlines  
 
In this chapter I began by showing that existing literature on gambling in anthropology is 
largely inadequate because it relies on a Euro-American separation between games and the 
likelihood of success. By over relying on probability anthropologists of gambling helped to set 
up a false paradox between gambling and gifting when in fact shades of  cooperation and overt 
acquisition can be seen within what would otherwise be understood as competitive gameplay 
without obligation. I then explored how betting practices in Goroka support a complex 
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language made through money by utilising the conceptual divisibility but material indivisibility 
inherent in denominations. This led into a discussion of theories of money and the 
contradiction that emerges from my material between money as a mode of immanent 
calculation and the assumption that money is by default abstract in character. I have argued 
that while calculations with money are everywhere in Goroka this does not make transactions 
impersonal but quite the opposite. Lastly I suggested that the proper idiom to explore the use 
of money in Gorokan gambling is the contingent way that Gorokan people manipulate valyu 
(‘value’) (cf. Gregory 1997; Munn 1986). 
 
Many claims were made in this chapter, and I am well aware that I have bought the big picture 
on higher purchase. I have found this necessary to orient the reader toward the literature that 
the ethnography engages, and so the chapters will be organised as instalments to repay the 
debt of suspended disbelief, and to generate interest for the patient reader via various 
calculations and accounts. Chapter two begins by deploying Melanesian ethnography and 
analytic tropes to situate the previous analysis within a broad tradition of rendering indigenous 
categories analytic. By looking closely at the separation between cause and effect in 
Melanesian ethnography the chapter opens a space to take the reader into the heart of the 
most prevalent forms of gambling in Goroka, working through the rules and social settings of 
the two card games that dominate the scene. Looking at the idioms of gameplay and how to 
win, the chapter aims to dissolve the division between game and life, and to postulate a model 
of thought about situations of effective action which do not rely on the dichotomy of chance 
and skill, replaced instead by thought and speed. Notions associated with effective play like to 
control one’s ‘corner’ and having effective ‘ideas’ are brought into dialogue with another arena 
for tactics: Kula exchange. Via analogy with this well documented field of competition I aim to 
bring out a Gorokan model of flows of wealth in life that are reproduced in a card game: the 
Gorokan ‘invisible hand’ if you will. 
 
From this base understanding of efficacy and gaming, chapter three elaborates on the relation 
between street selling (maketim) and gambling, by looking at the more exceptional, 
archetypical antagonistic fast game known as Chalinj (lit. ‘challenge’). As the apotheosis of fast 
games, located in the place of fastest and most impersonal transactions, the market, Chalinj is 
understood as a reproduction of Goroka’s most extreme market ‘logic’. The subtext to the 
chapter is the attribute of speed given to money across Goroka, and how this impacts upon the 
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value of money. More overtly, the chapter explores the minutiae of three different types of 
transactions in the marketing sphere in order to counter the ‘barter model of value’ that 
results from economistic models (M. Strathern 1992a), instead investigating the structural 
relations between the three types through ethnographic accounts of what transactions are. By 
way of explanation, the chapter engages with Gorokan conceptions of what constitutes work, 
and what does not; this sets up an opposition between production (in Gorokan terms ‘work’), 
and finance (which covers many other types of transaction, see A. Strathern 1969) that sets a 
foundation for the discussion of leadership in the following chapter. 
 
Having concentrated thus far on card gambling, as the most simple, widespread and 
reproducible form of gambling, I open the analysis up to high stakes machine gaming in 
chapter four, which has a highly contrasting character. The discussion centres around this 
highly prevalent form of gambling, and the actions of local big-men who display vast sums 
compared to that available to the followers who help them travel through the dangerous and 
drunken town centre at night. Contrasting to the fields of efficacy at play during card games, 
the lack of control players have over slot machines is a crucial factor in their popularity, and 
contributes to the marked destruction of the value of money in these places. The chapter is 
concerned with the multiple sources of money available to big-men who play pokies, and their 
gifts between each other and followers. I argue that while “finance” and “production” may 
have been limiting factors in the control that big-men exerted across the Highlands (A. 
Strathern 1969), today many big-men all over the Highlands have access to novel forms of 
finance that allow them to transcend their local emphases and play the part of ‘generic 
Highlands big-man’. 
 
From an exploration of leaders in terms of their “finance”, I move to the collection of items of 
value into singular entities in chapter five. I begin with a current manifestation of a classic topic 
in the anthropology of Melanesia – bridewealth payments, focussing narrowly on how pooling 
wealth is organised prior to payment. I spend the rest of the chapter inflecting this material 
through the collection of bets for two opposing sides during the annual State of Origin series of 
rugby league games. The festival atmosphere of State of Origin gives people the opportunity to 
collect together and oppose one another on spurious grounds (supporting Blues or Maroons), 
crossing kin and affinal relations. The aim is to reveal their common aesthetic as large 
agglomerations of money, reimagining exchanges from the perspective of pooling itself rather 
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than the necessities of reciprocity. I argue that the value of money is thought to be higher 
when it contains the efforts of many people to bring it together, exposing the simple joy of 
collective transaction and the value it generates. I then reflect back on previous material from 
the thesis and examine how other forms of gambling can be seen as variations on the theme of 
pooling. 
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis while drawing on new material. I first summarise the points 
made during the course of previous chapters, and then draw out two areas for elaboration and 
synthesis. These are 1) indigenous formalisms using money and games, along with 2) the 
changes that seem built into these formalisms. I suggest that by looking at how people hide 
money – the trope that gambling battles against – we can see how a focus on formalisms built 
up through gambling can help us unlock other areas of Gorokan life. I focus particularly on how 
people display and conceal wealth upon their bodies through pockets, and how this has its 
own ‘logic’ which, like gambling, is subject to eclipse. The ‘logic’ of concealment and revelation 
engendered in pockets reiterates many of the themes of previous chapters and feeds directly 
back into a discussion of the materiality of money. I return to the literature on money and 
Melanesia, summing up how money and value are manipulated through Gorokan gambling, 
and how this informs our understanding of change from an indigenous perspective.   
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Chapter 2 
 
The Pattern Changes Changes,  
or How to Win at Cards 
 
 
One of the most stimulating observations made about money in Papua New Guinea is the 
interest people have in its divisibility. Marilyn Strathern’s informant Manga famously dwelt on 
how money’s divisibility promoted Hagen peoples’ new concern with holding part of their 
money back, something that seemed impossible before with indivisible live pigs or shells 
(1999: 96-7; see also Akin & J. Robbins 1999). Rather than shells or pigs aiding in the 
configuration of people into a single unit because all the interests in a shell or pig are 
subsumed when it is given whole, money encouraged people to think of many transactions at 
once. Manga thought this happened because money is much more useful than other exchange 
objects. That usefulness and divisibility stimulated people to think about the price of 
everything, and so Hageners sold what they once gave. For Manga this excess of thinking 
meant that money divided the mind, a familiar notion for Melanesianists (see Akin & J. 
Robbins 1999). M. Strathern takes this indigenous theorisation and uses it to characterise what 
inflation might look like within a “gift economy”. Instead of price inflation, she said, in Papua 
New Guinea the number of exchangeables increase relative to the relations capable of 
absorbing them, leading to an expansion of relationships through either intensified 
transactions with existing relations or (by implication) increasing the number of relationships 
one has by spreading exchangeables broadly (M. Strathern 1999: 105-6). In either case, she 
says, ‘relationality’ (the primacy of relations) gets accelerated (ibid: 106).  
 
Gorokan people’s use of money for gambling could be one context in which people have both 
increased transaction and thus intensified existing relationships and (in an urban context) 
created an opportunity to transact with new people in a relatively safe format. In that case 
scenario One from chapter one being done with strangers and scenario Two with existing 
relations would seem to express both forms of ‘relational’ inflation respectively (see M. 
Strathern 1999; cf. 1975; 1992a). Nevertheless, this straightforward interpretation does not 
explain why people started to gamble in the first place, rather than use other, more familiar 
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modes of transaction to expand their field of relations. We thus return to the question of how 
gambling became popular. I intend to show that gambling reveals how ‘relationality’ feeds on 
numerically organised forms of transaction because cards have a numerical character similar 
to but different from money. Cards’ numerical character leads the movement of money, and 
excites players. The relationships between cards and their movement enables a process of 
configuration (i.e. building a set of winning cards) that will lead one player to have control over 
the divisibility of money, and so gambling provides models and implications for perceiving the 
‘relationality’ M. Strathern found transformed by money. 
 
This chapter sets out to show that relationships are a focal point for cards, but what is meant 
by ‘relationality’ as the primacy of relationships? If gambling is part of the acceleration of how 
people negotiate and understand one another, then it should help us uncover how people do 
what M. Strathern models as ‘relationality’. First I must characterise what people see as the 
premises for their relatedness. I begin with a simple observation: I learnt early on in my 
fieldwork that when walking around, the often asked ‘where are you going?’ (yu go we?), 
should not be answered in any definite terms, lest the enquirer be able to infer one’s wealth 
and intentions, and thus to intercept or thwart one’s aims and desires. My initial frankness was 
apt to make people suspicious. I was quickly advised to give statements like mi raun tasol (lit. ‘I 
round that-is-all’, I am just wandering about), or to say that I was carrying out the wishes of 
another. To my surprise, my revised utterances were not followed up with more questions 
about my purpose or destination. In fact, with those who hitherto had been privy to (but 
suspicious of) my intentions, such statements usually elicited a knowing look to the effect that 
I was learning. This will be very familiar to ethnographers of New Guinea, a point which J. 
Robbins and Rumsey (2008) bring to the fore in a recent edited collection on the ‘opacity of 
other’s minds’. In this collection, Rupert Stasch argues that “Melanesian sensitivity about not 
presuming to know other's minds is intertwined with sensitivity about not presuming to 
impinge on other's self-determination” (2008: 443). When Gorokans say that they cannot 
conclusively know what others are thinking, they often state that the only real knowledge lies 
in what people do, and the many people who escorted me eagerly to find out what I was doing 
certainly support this claim1. A great positive stereotype Gorokans like to make about 
Highlanders is that they are aksin lain (lit. ‘action line’), meaning they are doers, they will not 
                                                 
1
 Reed (2011) rightly points out that being attuned to actions rather than speech entails a retrospective 
orientation or judgement of events. 
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say one thing and do another, so their intentions are overt. A countervailing critique was that 
people tok tasol (lit. ‘talk is-all’). Action is paradigmatically associated with gifts and 
transactions, because these are solid gestures that (whatever people’s motives) can be 
responded to as such. When they are not ready to act, the Gorokan subject finds themselves 
muddled (feeling fifti-fifti (lit. ‘50:50’) or tu bel (lit. ‘two stomachs’)), until they resolve upon an 
action2. Such a muddle can be caused by another, because inaccessible thoughts are wont to 
travel, and they can infiltrate the mind of the subject (see below). When people do act, they 
assume that action to have resulted from collapsing the multiple thoughts going on within 
them (their own and others) into a single course of action (cf. Reed 2011).  
 
In Gender of the Gift Marilyn Strathern makes much of a related observation: in Melanesia 
people tend not to understand themselves as the cause of their own actions. According to her 
model, each person can only know his/her actions in reference to another person who coerced 
them into these acts. At the same time the relation between them and the other which they 
are acting in reference to is of a given kind (say husband and wife) because of other relations 
that position the two as such (in this case affines). In M. Strathern’s example the wife who 
grows food for the man because she is married to him does so by virtue of her relations to her 
natal kin, which made her a marriageable other for the husband. This, she argues, is the 
assumed basis for all social action. Participants are only able to make themselves apparent 
through the web of relations that define them3, and are therefore ‘relational’. M. Strathern 
puts it thus:  
 
“The agent’s position is thus a multiple one, constituted in the different directions in which 
he or she is faced, but his or her consequent acts are singular. Each act is ‘one’ act. This last 
perception is the single most significant metaphysical basis for the understanding of 
Melanesian relations” (1988: 274, emphasis added). 
 
Imagine an occurrence as perceived by a participant in which they have acted. They have 
assumed that another or others have caused them to act, and whether they resolved to do so 
with the person/people in mind or the person/people coerced them without their conscious 
                                                 
2
 See chapter six. 
3
 There is another form of collectivity, the unity of groups, which is an achieved state for M. Strathern, 
but this shall be a major focus for chapter five. It shall cause no harm if left until this time. 
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knowledge, an effect has occurred. This for M. Strathern is the fundamental or ontological 
state of being for a person, and the source of wonder for Melanesians is over which single 
course of action occurred and which other(s) inculcated them to perform that action. This is 
also the point at which the actor can exercise agency. Their agency lies in how they chose to 
make a single event occur in reference to particular others when multiple relations could have 
acted as the starting point. Meanwhile the person/people who emerged as the starting point 
are attributed with the initiating agency, because they won out over other potential starting 
points.  
 
Evidence for this radical re-evaluation of causality, essentially splitting it in two, should be 
visible in an activity like gambling, if only because gambling is a theatre for effects (wins and 
losses) whose causes are deliberately contingent on others. If M. Strathern’s influential ideas 
rest upon an understanding of the relationship between cause and effect in Melanesia, then 
how people think they win should be of interest to Melanesian anthropology just as it is to 
gamblers. The inverse should also hold true, that what gamblers have to say about cause and 
effect should give food for thought to Melanesian anthropology. Hence how people perceive 
winnings and losses coming about is the focal point of the chapter. 
 
Although, as M. Strathern emphasises, in a given exchange one may foreground a given 
relation, the receiver and observers are never wholly sure that it was this relation that was 
truly evinced and what exactly that gift is truly intended to act as cause to in the future. In fact 
a close inspection quickly destroys any notion of objective truth in any guise. If all one knows 
of the other is speculative, and only possible through acts of transaction, then it makes a good 
deal of sense to increase those transactions if you want to know people better (cf. Minnegal 
2009). In other words the lack of knowledge of others’ minds and their intentions is a 
prerequisite for playing cards. Playing cards is a vehicle for the knowledge of both self and 
other, founded upon the basic assumed un-knowability of minds outside of concrete action 
and evidence. Gambling seems to offer empirical data of concrete action involving wealth 
items5. In a game of cards, as we shall see, people are concerned with this visibility, bringing 
interpretations of relations out systemically. Gambling is useful in this regard as it is a set of 
changing patterns with unreliable signs leading to definite gains which are nevertheless not 
entirely reducible to a given intention.  
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Mimica (2006), briefly mentioned in chapter one, dealt with Yagwoia (in the Highlands Fringe 
south of Goroka) gambling in a manner particularly sensitive to local understandings of 
causality. It will be useful to consider this article now. Mimica notes that winning at the card 
game laki (lit. ‘lucky’) is often associated with acting upon dreams. These dreams offer the 
possibility of success in a variety of fields, whose interpretation is the responsibility of the 
dreamer (see also J. Weiner 1991). Dreams of unending fertility symbolise an opportunity to 
succeed in hunting, gambling, prospecting or sexual liaison, which must be correctly 
interpreted in order to become potent. The force behind these dreams comes from spirits or 
ancestors, but their correct reading is a mark of the actor’s abilities. Therefore the content of 
dreams are kept secret except amongst a small group in order to maintain their potency and 
guard the reputation of their interpreter should he/she make the wrong choice (cf. Reed 
1997). Mimica’s article can be read as a process of interpreting relations with supernatural 
others as a standardised entry point for assessing the efficacy of the self. As an important 
exception to the main thread in gambling literature, the article posits a nexus of possibilities 
that negate luck or odds as an explanatory framework, suggesting a more complex 
understanding than the nullification of responsibility espoused in probabilistic understandings 
of gambling (see also Trompf 1994: 387-388; chapter one).  
 
Yet Mimica’s interpretation remains divorced from what I consider crucial: the mechanics of 
gaming. Instead he concentrates on a single aspect of the efficacy-divining process, that of 
dreams. The games remain one-dimensional testing grounds for evidencing their action. In fact 
one could have substituted the incredibly simple card game laki they play (see chapter 3) with 
the internationally acclaimed brain-busting game chess, or math-centric Blackjack, or steady-
handed pool, and it would not change the ethnography. Clearly there is something missing 
here. In Goroka dreams were only one of the possible portents of success for gambling, and 
relations with human others played a much larger part in gaming than Mimica relayed. 
Crucially, as we shall see below, in Goroka gambling was its own portent: success breeds 
success, you might say.  
 
Among Gorokans, like the Yagwoia, luck (laki) is part of daily conversation. It will be a useful 
segue into efficacy as they see it. The word does not only denote a card game, its use also 
covers fortuitous occurrences, as in English. Lest the reader assume it is a direct translation of 
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the English term, I must describe it before proceeding. Gorokans use laki in a conceptual sense 
(see also Mosko 2012, forthcoming), usually defined thus: 
 
“Luck comes up when you use your mind, when your brain is right, then you will be 
lucky, if your brain is wrong, you will lose.” (Richard, 35, brought up in Goroka and 
tracing ancestry from Simbu). 
 
As Mimica reported, laki left possible cause open, not dismissing happenings to probabilistic 
likelihood. ‘Luck’ the word had little meaning beyond things going right, and this had nothing 
to do with how those events came about; asking people what laki meant did not prompt them 
to think causally. I then started asking gamblers to divulge tactics instead, and people talked 
causally of their own, extremely personal aidia (lit. ‘idea’), which they utilise during play (see 
Pickles forthcoming).  
 
In what follows people’s aidia, which they emphatically attribute to themselves, can be seen as 
the how that M. Strathern sees as the locus of agency. It is so because Gorokans think that 
their relationships with others must be in a reasonable state to avoid others mentally 
interfering with their play. People often articulated to me that the thoughts of others, 
especially negative thoughts (whether or not one knows about them), can enter your body and 
ruin your own thinking, effectively sabotaging your chances at cards. And yet, all being well 
with these relationships, players may make use of their aidia to configure relationships 
between cards and other players and achieve victory. As they do so they innovate upon the 
base of ‘relationality’ and aspire to an understanding of the paten (lit. ‘pattern’4) of 
relationships through which they effect a new outcome (a win). 
 
The below description and characterisation of how people choose to make relationships 
appear provides scope for uncovering a Melanesian process of self-conscious social change. 
How relationships are interpreted and made apparent seems to offer people opportunities to 
think through and theorise new configurations for relationships that precludes arguments 
about the encroachment of individualism or money as social acid critiqued in the previous 
chapter (see also chapter three). Likewise M. Strathern’s how crucially allows for social change 
                                                 
4
 The word paten has to my knowledge completely replaced the work makmak (lit. ‘mark-mark’) to mean 
pattern in Goroka. 
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in a way which has been overlooked among those who draw clear divides between proponents 
of a strict ethnographic continuity of M. Strathern’s (e.g. 1988; 1999) theories (usually paired 
with Roy Wagner’s (e.g. 1978; 1986) theories) on the one hand and the ‘reality’ of 
contemporary and historical Melanesia post European encroachment (see Josephides 1991; 
Foster 1995b). 
 
Two social forms are exposed during the course of uncovering the how of gambling. One is the 
kona man, the person who is able to dominate others by appreciating the flow of cards in a 
game. Second is the paten (lit. ‘pattern’): the mode by which evidence to build one’s aidia 
(ideas) are made pertinent. I find that far from a functionalist appreciation of gambling that 
makes the abstract impersonal and the province of Us as analysts, we can see a Gorokan vision 
of patterning as a kind of abstraction, allowing both constructs of abstraction (Gorokan pattern 
and Our deliberately impersonal modelling) to illuminate each other.  
 
In looking at how people perceive routes to success in gambling, I find a running analogy not 
with gambling games elsewhere but with another great Melanesian competition, the Kula5. I 
am not so much interested in revealing gambling as somehow Kula-like6, but rather to reveal 
that both encourage people to think in terms of patterns and tactics (see Munn 1986; A. 
Weiner 1992; Damon 2002; Campbell 2002). In the process we will see that gambling is an 
indigenous analytic device that is good to think with. The point shall be to see how far the 
social forms of gambling can be said to direct other social forms. In other words, how much of 
life in Goroka is game-like? Much of this strategy has its origins in the theoretical leaps made 
by Melanesianist anthropology in the 1970’s, 80’s and 90’s (Wagner 1974; 1991; M. Strathern 
1988; 1992a) in its attempt to render indigenous categories analytic (see Toren 1999; 
Josephides 1991; chapter one). The chapter attempts to follow the spirit of this anthropology. 
 
 
Thought vs. Speed: The Games 
 
                                                 
5
 The analogy was first brought to my attention by Roy Wagner and Frederick Damon after I gave a 
shortened, early version of this chapter as a paper at the University of Virginia in November 2011. 
6
 Or indeed gambling as kin-like, exchange-like, relational, ritualistic, or an iteration of myth; which is 
not to say that those comparisons do not hold a grain of truth. 
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Two card games dominated the residential landscape of Goroka in 2009-10: kwin (‘queen’) and 
bom (‘bomb’). All of the habitual gamblers across Goroka (1.9 per household according to my 
survey) were familiar with both games, but the innovation of new games is continuous and 
rapid, so it would be wrong to characterise both together as representing a holistic model for 
Gorokan sociality. Kwin is sometimes believed to have come from a merging of two games 
called blok (lit. ‘block’) and kala (lit. ‘colour’), in the 1970’s, while bom has swept the scene in 
the last few years and is a recent elaboration on the longstanding game las kat (‘last card’). 
Bom superseded a myriad of other games which are now very rare, excepting kwin. In keeping 
with my overall argument for gambling as indigenous analytic, I now argue that their 
changeability is a more powerful metaphoric model for characterising Gorokan life, helping the 
reader to appreciate games as agents. Kwin and bom are thought to be of different characters, 
and appeal to different moods and temperaments that I am about to describe, and this in turn 
affects how quickly they will be outmoded.  
 
Kwin and bom represent points on either side of a dialectic applying to all games: that of 
speediness and thoughtfulness. In the absence of an explanatory framework based upon a 
balance between skill and contingency (see chapter one), Gorokans consider games in terms of 
the speed of their paten (‘pattern’). A pattern may be too fast to allow a person to impose or 
discern the game’s future direction, or if slower, one’s aidia (‘ideas’) make their impact felt 
upon it. Both of these concepts will be elaborated later, but here I outline the broader picture. 
Those games which to me might involve a large element of chance/luck are typically 
mechanical in their gameplay, and so tend to occur more speedily. It is this speed (versus 
thoughtfulness) that people identify with games that are beyond one’s control, rather than 
lingering on the chanciness of moments within a game. There are a series of points at which a 
person might act within a game, whose turnaround is objectified into a game which is either 
speedy, with many moments requiring immediate action, or slower, with more considered 
choices (cf. Goffman 2006 [1969]). 
 
In Goroka bom is the major fast game, kwin is the chief slow one. People’s preferences are 
couched in terms of one being too fast or slow for them, and these penchants are correlated 
with peoples’ life stages. The young (ol yangpela) are thought to be metabolically speedy and 
thus attracted inexorably toward faster forms of gaming (ol fas gem, lit. ‘all fast games’). Older 
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people (ol lapun) are slower and more considered, and therefore keener on kwin7 and other 
tingting gem (lit. ‘thinking games’). Married (ol marit man/meri) but not yet old people express 
different preferences at different times but show a tendency toward kwin as they get older. 
Furthermore, one’s speed/thoughtfulness at different stages in life are thought to make one 
more likely to succeed in the corresponding game, because one’s thought processes 
synchronise more easily to the pace of that game8. The different types of game act to cultivate 
their particular speed of thought too: fast games hotim (li. ‘heat’) people up, getting their 
thoughts going, and testing them out, while thinking games clear people’s heads and allow 
them to focus (cf. Mosko 1999)9. Thus thought and speed are cultivable attributes of people 
that are fed by the speed of the game, altering peoples’ mental states toward either 
speediness or thoughtfulness.  
 
Taking the games together with the age grades of players generates stimulating parallels with 
Frederick Damon’s work on Muyuw Island in the northeast of the Kula ring. Damon has written 
on Kula valuable categories’ analogical relationship with age grades and the behaviour 
appropriate to people in these grades (2002). High rank and thus high value Kula arm shells 
and necklaces are said to “[o]nly move when [the] path [is] well laid out” as do the elderly; 
middle rank valuables move “[f]ast, but with intentionality” corresponding to those who are 
“[m]arried but still very active”; low rank Kula items move “[w]ithout reason”, as do the young 
who are accused of “running around without reason”, their acts create only “[i]mpermanent 
relations” that do not lead to fame; both the young and low rank kula valuables thus have no 
“names” (ibid: 126; see also A. Weiner 1992: 134-5). On Muyuw, temporality is literally 
measured by Kula participation, the marks of time on the body evidence the effort put into 
Kula (ibid: 116). What is more, people aspire to handle high rank valuables “so they can be like 
them” (ibid: 127), a kind of transmission that I found literalised in Goroka when people play 
                                                 
7
 The very old are partial to an old and slow game called faiv lip (lit. ‘Five Leaves’), a mixture of the first 
game laki (also known as tri lip (‘three leaves’)) and kwin, but they played only rarely, so I shall not take 
this any further. 
8
 It is interesting to note that this type of synchronicity is not generally available to Western gambling 
discourse. While players may be ‘in the zone’, their selfhood is not combined with the game, they are 
simply ‘well suited’ for blackjack, horse-racing or whatever (cf. Cassidy 2002). Skill at individual 
gambling games is usually thought of as the product of experience and a personalised proclivity that is 
often thought genetic, like having a ‘pokerface’ (cf. Kusyszyn 1984).  
9
 Money may also be either fast or slow, and this is the major focus of chapter three. 
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games that instil them with the speed of thought they desire, marking and cultivating the 
speed that defines them. Yet there is a scale shift in Goroka, players find games as a whole, 
rather than individual cards (the equivalent of shells) embody speed, and cards are the same 
whichever game is played. Kula valuables are also gendered, and Munn reported that gender 
affects their speed of movement (Munn 1986: 158-60); I found no parallels on this front, with 
both games involving men and women together in roughly equal numbers, there being no 
gendering of either card games or cards themselves. 
 
As evidenced in the below diagrams, each game lies within an elaborate and growing inventory 
of possible games, adding further complexity to an analogy with the Kula. Neither card 
diagram is my own, but rather came out of a process of consultation with prodigious playing 
friends. I drew diagrams together with people about when games became known to them, as 
well as where and/or what they came from, and how they lost popularity. Many resulted in 
something half-way between genealogical diagrams and Kula valuable’s ‘paths’ that Annette 
Weiner thought so important to keep in mind that she compares participants to master chess-
players (1992: 141).  
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The genealogical analogy gives some sense of the nature of card games and should help the 
reader visualise the characteristics of the games I am about to describe. In both diagrams, 
games began with the introduction of laki (see prologue), also known as tri lip, and it is from 
there that things get more complicated. The second diagram demonstrates one recurrent 
feature particularly well. Two channels of games parallel each other through the years, one 
containing more thinking games and the other fast games. Kwin is the main or most popular 
game on the slow side of the kinship divide. Among the blood-line of fast games with fast 
thoughts, the game bom is now king. Despite illustrating this point well, the genealogical 
analogy breaks down now because speed is related to age grade rather than consanguinity or 
other kinship ties, and in this respect the diagrams begin to look much more like Kula ‘paths’, 
with games following along from each other within the age grade that dominates the faster or 
slower sides of the spectrum. 
 
Just as fast games have fast patterns that constantly change, so too the character and lifespan 
of interest in games themselves. Gorokans expect that kwin, the more thoughtful, mature, 
stable and considered game will outlive bom. Kwin has lasted since the 1970’s, and bom is but 
a few years old, replacing games that themselves had only a fleeting period in the sun. With a 
Gorokan average age of just twenty-four, it is no surprise to residents that a game like bom is 
the most popular right now, and that fast games keep emerging and sweeping to success. Note 
how many more games and how short the interval between them on the faster right side of 
the diagram compared to the slower left. One slow game gives rise to other slow games on the 
left, slowly; fast games lead to fast ones on the right, and more quickly. A fast game’s 
popularity does not last as long as a slow game because the fast-minded players quickly move 
onto new games. Innovation in new games seems to be built in to the logic of the kind of 
games people want to play, so fast begets fast quickly, and slow changes little gradually. Card 
games’ longevities are themselves the imprint of their action, and will recede or endure in 
synch with the thoughts they promote, arising and falling as fractal agents of their times. Bom 
is therefore to be understood as a craze, generating huge interest during my time in the field, 
but fully expected to be superseded by yet another manifestation of speed, which will of 
course come along quickly and spread like wildfire.  
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Another way of looking at this is that kwin produces thought which is designed to last in the 
long term, while bom would never try to (see below). Those who think fast invent new things, 
and those who play bom encourage this inventiveness. Below I describe how the slower kinds 
of thought promoted by kwin are considered more Melanesian, and thus act like the high rank 
Kula valuables that are the measure of proper activity on Muyuw. The games are similar in that 
the low rank, fast valuables and games are lost track of and are replaced easily by others, while 
more valuable, slower games or valuables are less subject to change and retain their worth. 
Annette Weiner sees a fundamental contrast between Kula where objects of exchange are 
individuated according to rank, and the Melpa of M. Strathern’s fieldwork, who do not 
individuate shells (A. Weiner 1992: 135), but perhaps a more productive similitude lies in 
comparing the ranking of games/spheres within which exchangeables can move to the 
individuated Kula valuables. The two are not entirely similar of course, unlike kula valuables, 
the games are not considered stable; they morph into new versions as times change. Kula 
shells ideally remain circulating, and are not supposed to lead people to accumulate shells of 
their same category, with lower ranked shells ideally propagating the acquisition of higher 
grade shells. Card games in Goroka, on the other hand, do not seem to mature into slower, 
more valuable card games; each speed of game is replaced by another of the same order. 
Across time I see each game’s pasts and futures as expanded versions of the games 
themselves, adding temporality to the analogy. I now go on to look at the dynamics of the 
games themselves, hoping to excavate how these games engender the traits people attribute 
to them, and, what amounts to the same thing, looking at the skills one needs to become 
successful in each.  
 
 
How to Play… 
 
The first thing one learns when approaching a game is the size of the bet and the name of the 
game, so this seems a good point to begin. In both kwin and bom bets are standardised by 
consent of all players, so if you were to ask what people were playing, they say for instance fifti 
toea bom (lit. ‘50 toea bomb’). This is a significant adjunction, as the game and its bet size are 
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only together considered sufficient information to characterise the game10. In kwin the range 
of bets begins around K1; but while bom tends to peak at K2, kwin can range up to K50 in some 
high profile gambling locations. These same places tend to discourage or ban bom outright, as 
it is thought to be a game for the excitable, and therefore would disturb the ambience of 
serious gaming establishments. Bom is associated with more dangerous environments (see 
below). High stakes gambling dens are unique to kwin.  
 
As with all bets in Goroka, they are placed prior to play, and may not be added to or 
subtracted from during each game. As we saw in chapter one, the bet size marks the 
commitment of players and seriousness of each game, and as we shall see, kwin is marked out 
for higher bets because it lends itself to a more serious attitude. I shall now explore the games 
individually; their rules and tactics, bearing in mind the lessons of the last chapter: that betting 
and money are intrinsic to our understanding of both player and game. Continuing the 
characterisation from chapter one, I concentrate on the first hand, when Michael lost K2 of his 
K20 note to Player B. For simplicity’s sake, the bets are excluded from the explanation at this 
stage, returning toward the end of the chapter. 
 
 
1. Kwin – Cornering 
 
In kwin there are not more than five players, and rarely fewer than four, but five is considered 
ideal. The aim of each player is to collect combinations of consecutive cards of the same suit 
(for instance 6, 7, 8, 9)11, or identical cards of different suits (say 2, 2, 2, 2) in 
order to rid themselves of all their seven cards12. After shuffling, the dealer offers the cards to 
                                                 
10
 See chapter one for more information on how the divisible units of money are vitally tied to gameplay 
in Goroka. 
11
 A set can span from the highest card to the lowest (e.g. K, A, 2 and 3 could comprise a set). 
12
 Kwin is therefore similar in form to the international game of rummy, though it appears to have a 
history independent of that game. As I mentioned above, in Goroka some think that two indigenous 
games were amalgamated to make kwin. These games were sometimes called blok gem (lit. ‘block game’: 
identical value cards of different suits game), and kala gem (lit. ‘colour game’: consecutive numbers of 
the same suit, i.e. following colour game), where the aim of each was to achieve just one of the two 
possible forms of card combinations. 
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the player on their right, who cuts the cards and places the card at the bottom of the deck face 
up in the middle (in the case of Figure 2.3 below, this is the Q). Players are then dealt seven 
cards each by the dealer, face-down13. The winner will use all seven cards to make one set of 
three cards, and another set of four cards (say 6, 7, 8, 9 along with 2, 2, 2). This 
would be very unlikely to occur from the deal, and so play revolves around achieving sets 
though the acquiring and giving away of cards. The remaining cards are placed face down in 
the middle. Play rotates to the right and so begins with the cutter.  
 
                                                 
13
 It is interesting to note that the system of shuffling and dealing for all games in Goroka is of a different 
order to that used in Euro-America: the style of shuffling (miksim kas) is completely uniform, everyone 
simply holding the cards lengthways in one hand facing downward and taking a proportion of those cards 
from the bottom of the deck (if they are not cheating, in which case they try to control which cards end up 
at the top or bottom of the deck) with the thumb and forefinger of the other hand, bringing them to the 
front of the deck, sometimes with a dramatic slapping show of force. At this point the fingers of the 
stationary hand pinch some of the cards from the top of the cards in the slapping hand, and the process is 
repeated with the remaining cards. This is done very quickly, and the whole method is repeated two or 
three times. Despite repeated demonstrations of alternative shuffling methods on my part, my ways were 
roundly dismissed as not mixing the cards properly and allowing people to do tricks. Dealing (dilim) on 
the other hand is completely individualised. Each dealer hands out cards in various directions, orders, and 
amounts of cards to each player at a time, as long as they always end up with the same number of cards 
for each player. Methods of dealing come under the rubric of personal ‘style’, and are not, as I first 
suspected, an alternative way of showing that the cards have been properly shuffled. Though the dealing 
of cards is known to mix the cards too, this is not their expressed purpose; rather people enjoy the chance 
to showcase their creativity while enforcing the sense of fairness by sending cards of unknown values in 
all different directions. 
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Figure 2.3: A deal of kwin before play begins. The green arrow indicates the usual course of picking up of 
a card at the beginning of one’s turn; the red arrow represent laying down of one of the player’s cards, 
which occurs at the end of a turn. 
 
As illustrated by the arrows in Figure 2.3, each player picks up a card at the beginning of their 
turn, so players actually have use of eight cards rather than seven, one of which is 
discarded/offered face up into the middle to conclude the turn. This practice is often playfully 
termed maketim kat (lit. ‘marketing a card’, meaning to offer the card for sale on the street)14. 
As the game goes on, the pile of face down cards quickly diminishes, while the face up 
‘marketed’ cards build up. These cards are not placed in a single orderly pile, as this would 
prevent people from knowing which cards have been discarded, and thus working out the 
paten (lit. ‘pattern’) of play (see below). As shown in figure 2.4, in low stakes games ‘marketed’ 
cards are spread haphazardly, the priority being visibility. Players often sift through the cards 
with their hands if they cannot see them sufficiently well. Seeing all the cards allows players to 
make decisions on which of the cards in one’s hands can be combined with those which will be 
in the deck after a reshuffle, and which cards and combinations of cards are being held or 
sought by other players. At the high stakes dens (figure 2.5), cards are placed in smaller piles in 
                                                 
14
 The importance of marketing in relation to gambling is explored in chapter three. 
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front of the player who discarded them, so they also keep a record of who put which cards 
down. The aim is to aid players in discerning a more complete pattern15.  
 
  
Figure 2.4 and 2.5: How ‘marketed’ cards are made visible to all players during play. Figure 2.4 (left) is 
typical of low stakes games in informal settings, with cards spread haphazardly so long as all are visible. 
Figure 2.5 (right) is typical of high stakes, serious and formal games, all cards being made visible in front 
of the player who ‘marketed’ the cards to allow for maximum deductive potential. 
 
After all the face-down cards are finished, the last player to pick up gathers and shuffles the 
face-up cards and places them face-down to replenish the deck, play then continues in what is 
now considered another raun (lit. ‘round’, used here to mean both ‘to go around’ as in to 
circulate or perambulate, and as a discrete but replicable interaction between two or more 
people, as in a boxing ‘round’). Each player should now have an improved understanding of 
which cards are in the deck and which cards people are choosing to hold onto. Because 
stalemates are not infrequent the game may be re-dealt if the cards have been reshuffled four 
times (at the discretion of players). 
 
Players are not beholden to the way the deck was shuffled, they could choose to use the card 
‘marketed’ by the player before them instead. They may do so if they can complete a set with 
that card (say it is a 6 to add to your 7 and 8), bringing that card toward them and placing 
the two corresponding cards on top for all the players to see (See Michael and player D in 
                                                 
15
 The ordering or otherwise of ‘marketed’ cards is also related to different styles of marketing discussed 
in the following chapter. There we shall see that the arrangement and offering of objects, no matter how 
chaotic, have an aesthetic quality that invites participants to search for patterns in order to choose a course 
of action for the future. 
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Figure 2.6 below). If one could make a set of four cards from another player’s ‘marketed’ card, 
they should only put down two of their cards and keep one hidden because (as I will shortly 
explain) they will need it later on. Putting down a set is known as a kik (‘kick’). There is 
considerable emphasis on not giving away a card which might be valuable to the player to your 
right, and that player is poised to pounce, often forcefully saying kikim (lit. ‘kick it’, an analogy 
to football and rugby) to induce a favourable outcome, and I will come back to this expression 
later. These are moments of great anticipation for players, as they think hard about the card 
they want to see put down. 
 
Supposing first that the player to one’s left has not given them a kik, and they have thus picked 
up a card from the deck, they now have the opportunity not only to help their own hand but 
also to hinder the success of others. The former is achieved by assessing which cards do not 
seem to be reappearing among the discarded cards – these will be the cards desired by others 
– and trying to concentrate on building a set of cards which avoids those cards. They will 
accomplish the latter by putting down a card that others do not desire. Players are essentially 
trying to prevent a conflict of interests for themselves with others, while encouraging it for 
others with them. It is only possible to directly affect the play of the person immediately to 
one’s right (by either giving them an opportunity to make a set or preventing it). One’s own 
action is in turn partially determined by the player before you. The choice of which cards to 
hold onto and which to discard can prevent other players from winning more indirectly, 
though this is not what people highlight when they speak of skill at kwin. 
 
Assuming instead that the player to one’s left has lain down a card that gives them a chance to 
kik, the player must take into consideration the following: When a player has ‘kicked’ a set of 
three cards, these cards are effectively open to other players, who may add a card to it to 
make a set of four. Revealing a set of four should be a winning move, so a player with a set of 
four cards would rather keep their fourth back as this allows them a degree of flexibility in 
assembling a second set of three. Equally, putting all four cards down would increase the 
opportunities for other players to make their own set of four upon those cards. This is because 
if you had for instance 9, 8, 7, and 6, and you played them all, then another player 
could add a 10 and complete a set on either the high or low end of the kik, but if you held 
back the 9 then they could only do so on the lower end.  
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There are still risks in a three card kik, as in figure 2.6 below where Michael’s 10, J and Q 
are joined by player B’s K. As long as their other cards are in two sets of three (player B), any 
player who can add a card to a kik made by another player (either Michael or player D) may do 
so. Whether or not this final card is played on your own kik or another player’s kik, the card 
which makes a set of four is known as their brek (break), and should be held onto until the 
moment of victory. To avoid the possibility of others making a brek on their kik, ideally a player 
will not kik, but instead put down both their sets at once and their brek card, as did player B. 
Nevertheless, being offered a card that can complete a set is often too tempting, and thus 
people often feel they were induced to kik. For example, Michael’s susceptibility to making a 
kik on player E’s ‘marketed’ card means that player B is the happy recipient of a tidy sum 
(including K2 of Michael’s K20 note, the reader will recall). With all this tactical manoeuvring 
Kwin is a strategic game, involving a lot of careful consideration, and therefore takes longer 
than other card games, up to twenty minutes or so per game, so it is quite naturally considered 
slow. 
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Figure 2.6: Player B’s winning hand in kwin. B discards the A, circled red, lays down two sets of three 
cards (2, 2, 2, and 9, 10, J, circled green), and the K acts as the player’s brek card (circled 
green), making a set of four with the player to the left’s kik (10, J, Q, circled blue). 
 
When B won, as a matter of course each player then revealed to each other what they were 
holding in their hand and by imputation what sets they were aiming to achieve. One often 
finds that you were never likely to receive the desired cards because they were being hoarded 
by another player. In an inversion of the anticipation of a kik, this is a moment of great 
retrospection and revelation for players, who are unfailingly absorbed in learning the 
preventive capacities of their competitors16. During the game people anticipate knowing what 
cards are in others hands, and when it is over they indulge in retrospective examination of 
their deductions. It is worth drawing the analogy with Kula activities, where competitors 
anticipate the flow of valued objects across the islands and act upon those deductions. Once 
the necklace or arm shell has made its way, people reflect on one another’s strategies and 
                                                 
16
 In friendly, low stakes games a re-deal also occurs if four people have made a kik, as people think the 
competition is too close and there should therefore be no winner, i.e. no one is sufficiently preventative. 
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their ability to hoard and direct these valuables in long remembered histories of those items’ 
movements (Damon 2002: 130; A. Weiner 1992; cf. Reed 1999). So it is with a game of kwin. 
 
In the game Michael has been influenced to kik by player E and this has then been acted upon 
by player B’s winning brek. Michael is complicit in the win of player B, because he chose to 
make that kik. Michael is therefore thought to be either a poor player or worse, to have 
conspired. If the collusion is obvious, then gamers are thought to be playing kompani (lit. 
‘company’, i.e. together), and may be confronted by the other players. If two players cover 
each other’s bets when either runs out of money then they will become immediately suspect; 
compensation for loss should be done via the group, with the luk (lit. ‘look’) discussed in the 
previous chapter, not as a team against the collective of individuals in a game. Michael with his 
K20 is therefore safe from accusation. How much a player is aware of what cards another 
player might have depends greatly upon deductive powers and the recognition and delineation 
of complex patterns of play, and so suspicion is only rarely voiced in public. This is part of the 
attraction of kwin: because cheating is a difficult accusation to make, the game is thought to 
be relatively peaceful. This is one of the attributes that make it a socially good, ‘Melanesian’ 
game. Instead skill is displayed when preventing others from winning by controlling what cards 
they can use.  
 
As I outlined above, to play well is to have many an effective aidia (lit. ‘idea’/’ideas’) guiding 
your gameplay. Particularly in kwin, having good aidia means being a kona man/meri (lit. 
‘corner man/woman’17). Each player in a five player game is their own kona, and it is a mark of 
some distinction to be a standout kona man among a group of experienced players18. Players 
feel the presence of a kona man in the lack of opportunities they receive to win, and when 
they compare their cards at the end of a game it is to see who the best kona man was.  
 
Returning now to the theoretical introduction in the light of kwin, the reader will note that a 
kona can be broken down into a simple pivot relationship, where a player is constrained by 
their own circumstances and the card offered by the previous player, causing them to think 
carefully and act accordingly. When they do act, they must be aware that they are having an 
equal effect upon the player that follows them. So each player acts with two others in mind, 
                                                 
17
 The male form is usually used by all to cover both sexes, a convention I follow hereafter. 
18
 See chapter three on the wider significance of the kona in Goroka. 
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one of which is the direct cause of their action, the other will be directly affected by it. Hence 
the imagistic term ‘corner’19. Players anticipate the causative actions of those before them 
when they say kikim!, which attempts to induce a usable card for themselves. It is instructive 
to note the imperative transitive form of the verb here: the player about to be offered a card 
and hoping it will be favourable says kikim!, meaning ‘kick!’, even though the kick would 
belong to themselves, rather than saying something like kik i kam! which would mean ‘bring a 
kick here’. This shows attribution of cause to the player before them, who unleashes a card 
combination which literally causes the kik then completed by the receiving player jumping on 
the opportunity. This fits the Strathernian separation between cause and effect I outlined 
above, and a comparison between a kona and M. Strathern’s use of Deborah Battaglia’s (1983: 
296-297) diagram (figure 2.7) will be profitable here. It also maintains the running analogy with 
the Kula, as Battaglia’s fieldwork was conducted on Sabarl Island, in the southeast of the Kula 
region. In this famous example, Battaglia’s informant describes the Sabarl axe or the elbow as 
the image of flows of wealth, in this case the segaiya payment that goes from mother’s 
brother’s child to ego’s child, but is thought to be induced by ego. For M. Strathern this is the 
ideal illustration of the pivot relationship that she sees as the location of agency in Melanesia, 
where the past relationship between two people causes an effect on a third but the person 
who acts on that third attributes the cause of their action to the first, who would seem 
uninvolved to our eyes. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Diagram from M. Strathern (1988: 270), adapted from Battaglia (1983: 296-297), showing the 
person and the axe as figures of motion in a pivot that always involves two relationships. 
                                                 
19
 The ‘corner’ has strong resonances with street corners, which I explore in chapter three with reference 
to marketing. 
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Figure 2.8: A player’s kona in a game of kwin displayed as a circle of pivot relationships. In this diagram 
we see player D making a kik, in response to the 6 ‘marketed’ by C. D’s hand is exposed to the camera 
so that one can get a sense of the decision process D makes. 
 
In figure 2.8 each player’s kona or pivot is highlighted with different colours; I focus on player 
D as a kona (in green); exposing their cards to see what happens more clearly. For D, the player 
before them (as an active (purple) kona themselves) ‘markets’ a card which is the direct cause 
of his/her action (in this case making a kik by adding the 6 to D’s 7 and 8). The same (red) 
pivot relationship is true of the player following D, and so on. Each player attempts to 
manipulate the action of the player before to allow them to act unfavourably to the following 
player. A less consequential example would be if the player before you ‘marketed’ a 5, and 
you had a number of cards you could ‘market’ which are of no use to you, one of which is the 
5, you may decide to play your 5 simply because the next player will be unlikely to have 
both the other 5’s, and so the likelihood of helping the following player make a kik is reduced. 
A kona man makes calculations like this but often at far greater complexity; based on which 
cards they have seen circulating around amid the players.  
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Going back to the game, we see player D making their initial kik, caused by the 6 that C 
‘marketed’. In turn D offers the A to player E because he or she no longer needs it and 
perhaps suspects that that E does not want this card, sparking the red kona into action. 
Likewise in figure 2.7, player B’s success is only achievable through the ‘support’ (wittingly or 
otherwise) of Michael: his agency is made manifest in his ‘marketing’ and converted into 
success by canny player B. In light of Battaglia’s diagrams as explored by M. Strathern, we see 
a game formed by overlapping pivot relationships; Battaglia’s elbow is expanded and 
formalised anew. The kona acts always with two relations in mind, one which causes their own 
actions, and one which will be affected, and a kona man is able to exercise some skill in turning 
this pivot relationship to their advantage. This brings us back to the question of how people 
choose to render the causes of their actions and apply those actions to others. In kwin the 
kona man is able to convert the agency of another to their own advantage by eliciting an 
action that is configurable with their own desires. The kona man configures that relation into 
an act which hiders others and helps themselves. It is the configuration of relationships that 
bring about wins. 
 
The third subject of the pivot relationship is the centre-point of the next pivot in the game (see 
figure 2.8), and so they stand for the structure and circularity of the game as a whole. The third 
player in fact defines the front element of the pivot as causative. This is tantamount to M. 
Strathern’s observation that people’s relationships are defined by other relationships, like the 
wife who is married because of a relationship between the spouses’ clans. This is a classic M. 
Strathernian perspective: a kona can only affect your play in the context of the multiple 
perspectives which have defined the situation as a game of kwin and thus a set of five corners. 
It is acting with others in mind that defines Melanesian personhood as at base ‘relational’, and 
a conclusion to a game defines a winner as someone whole: one who encompasses the kona 
(relational) position becomes a kona man with winnings as their quantitative measure. The 
meaning of the term ‘market’ becomes clear in this context: Michael offered a card for B to 
take up, and when he did then B is considered to have elicited the correct offering from 
Michael, who produces the card as a favourable unit. Marketer-buyer (as I discuss in chapter 
three) is a potentially on-going and mutually supportive relationship, and so not only has B 
shown herself a good kona meri, but also become subject to accusations of playing kompani 
(lit. ‘company’) because they both might not be playing as singular actors with minds 
impervious to each other. Winning temporarily raises the name of the following player while 
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diminishing the ‘marketer’ and thus leads, Kula-like, to gambling fame. Yet unlike Kula, fame 
does not travel with an object, which instantiates the famed person. Instead it travels in card 
players’ memories and in the money which they may use in different circumstances from 
gambling, limiting the scope of their fame. Still, as in Kula, players should not ignore the 
demands of others, at least not blatantly, or they will be found to be playing kompani and this 
shall lead to exclusion and the diminishment of their names. 
 
Despite the worry of being caught playing kompani, a kona man is not an implacable saboteur 
either. In fact some people stressed that a good kona man will give sometimes too. Players like 
Michael will give away favourable cards intentionally (especially if they have impinged on the 
game with a high denomination) to ensure the harmonious continuation of the game. So 
tactics reach out beyond the immediate desire to win the next round. The medium of currency 
allows people to make sympathetic and antagonistic gestures more easily when it is 
deliberately separated from players in a pot rather than a direct transaction between people 
(see chapter one). We can see this clearly when contrasted to the dramatic and tense Kula 
transactions where giver and receiver put on disinterested airs when they are forced to 
transact one-on-one (Damon 2002: 118; Munn 1986: 52; A. Weiner 1992: 145-6). Their 
methods for deflecting the tension include making accomplices handle the valuables when 
they are tossed by the giver. In gambling, the elicitation of wealth is made simple and on the 
whole pleasurable within a structured game that does not involve direct reciprocation.  
 
Returning again to the game, we also notice that a ‘marketed’ card acts upon player B as one 
card only in the context of seven. This is analogous to the Kula valuables one holds at any time, 
and the choices people must make to retain or dispatch them in order to get their hands on 
yet greater Kula items. Players are agents in the game inasmuch as they understand their own 
position within a set of relationships and turn the standardised gifting of cards into an 
enhancing rather than meaningless circulation20, just as those who choose to participate in 
Kula enter into a system of rule-bound gifting that may or may not come off well. To render 
the gifting complementary, player B will not be looking at Michael alone, her focus is more on 
the other cards that are down, which is to say the circumstances that prefigure her 
relationship with Michael. Players are primarily abstracting out a pattern from sources other 
                                                 
20
 See chapter three for an analysis of how marketing on the street and marketing cards is perceived to be 
on a continuum with gifting. 
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than their specific kona relationship, in the discarded cards as a whole. In Kula “good players 
must carry in their heads reckoning of all their debts and obligations and also the past histories 
of former paths and debts while conceptualising all the future moves that they plan to make, 
much like the complex knowledge necessary for a chess champion” (A. Weiner 1992: 141). 
Card players similarly hold the paths and movements of cards as well as the past patterns of 
previous games with others in their heads, but they focus on the short-term memory of cards 
in the game, rather than a deep history of Kula valuables’ paths and owners. It is the pattern of 
all the kona relationships and their manifestation in cards that allow people to see their 
particular kona effectively. 
 
Damon’s informants on Muyuw had a clear vision of the wider world of Kula trade, which they 
characterised as an up and down movement that turns on its axis at each end (Damon 2002: 
122)21. Both Kula participants and card gamblers acted by looking for patterns within a 
totalised system, adding a further level of interpretation for players. I learnt this as I was 
repeatedly told to stop looking at my cards, or at other players, because their bodies do not 
give off reliable knowledge. Instead, they said, look only at the cards that are down, because 
this is where the patterns are, that is where you win or lose. In other words the specific kona 
or pivot relationship one is in does not determine the frame of thought for a person, which is 
ideally more an outward-looking pattern-finder. It is important to note however that the scope 
of movement is far shorter-term and far more limited than that of Kula, and that the actions 
and even existence of many of the ‘players’ in Kula are obscured to any given player. In card 
games the participation of five players is tightly controlled and immediately evident, whether 
or not a player knows which cards each player is holding. The scaling down of Kula-like thought 
in Gorokan gambling therefore concentrates players’ imaginations on the cards being held, 
rather than the activity or not of unknown agents. 
 
Nevertheless, people see patterns in the cards themselves, just like the Kula ring is a set of 
geographic points measured by their possession of different valuables and conceptualised by 
these ‘paths’. This logic is extended beyond how cards circulate, all the way to the propensities 
of cards as themselves ‘relational’. The clearest demonstration of this is in the card that 
players are allowed to keep between rounds. Some players feel that certain cards are more 
effective at enticing their own kind to gather together, and people allow each player to hold 
                                                 
21
 Curiously Malinowski never talked about Kula paths (A. Weiner 1992: 140) 
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onto one card between games, which they call a laki kat (lit. ‘lucky card’, a card for which cards 
come together). For some people the qualities of the card 7, for instance, may draw out 
(cause) the card 6 or 8 from another player’s hand, or if their cards are more suited the 7 
or 7. Suited-ness and seriality appear to have their own agencies; they attempt to assemble 
into their preferred configuration (contra Baudrillard 1994: 13). People would often give me 
assistance in the early days of my gaming, and they sometimes vehemently insisted that I 
reorder my cards into combinations between turns, which I now understand as an attempt to 
suggest configurations to the cards. Other players chose to avoid bringing these cards 
together, preferring not to second guess their cards’ preferences (laik blo kas). Likewise in Kula 
some high rank arm shells are paired with particular necklaces and can only be used against 
each other, and so they tend toward each other (A. Weiner 1992). While Kula items lack any 
sacred powers (ibid: 133), like cards they have the capacity to configure other shells into paths 
that lead to success. Annette Weiner goes so far as to compare some shells to “wild cards in 
poker, enabling a player to multiply the possibilities for success by negotiating simultaneously 
with several partners on different paths over the same sought-after shell” (ibid: 135). She calls 
participants ‘players’ and this chapter reverses the analogy to see how ‘playing’ – or rather 
competition – in Melanesia takes forms such as cards and Kula. 
 
I will discuss the use of magic once I have dealt with both card games, and again in chapter 
three, but it is worth noting at this point that magic used for card games is directed at the 
cards themselves, not the opponents. I alluded to this in the prologue, where I divulged that 
the uniformity of card brands prevents people from using magic that is allied with certain kinds 
of cards known only to the magic user. Magic charms act medicinally upon the player by 
drawing dirty blood away from the fingers and face, pulling clean blood into these areas, but 
the explicit target is not other players. Instead the clean blood is designed to attract cards. 
With the right magic in hand, they say kas bai laikim yu (lit. ‘cards will like you’). It took me 
some time to decipher this statement through questioning, after all, if cards like you, shouldn’t 
your hands be full of them, which is hardly a recipe for success. After a few confused 
exchanges it became clear to me that ‘cards liking you’ is an act of configuration. Kula remains 
a useful analogy in that while innumerable spells were cast over different parts of canoes, 
configuring the canoe as a whole into lightness and swiftness – as a means of collecting 
valuables – magic for influencing the minds of Kula partners was far less emphasised 
(Malinowski 1961 [1922]; 102, 415-418; Campbell 2002: 99). In this case canoes are means to 
 89 
 
wealth, like cards, and it is means that require magic to gain potency. I remind the reader that 
making a choice as a person is also an act of configuration in M. Strathern’s formulation, so it 
seems logical to extend this to cards. In Goroka people are tu bel (lit. ‘two stomachs’, i.e. 
caught in two minds) until they choose a path of action. Transactions are usually required to 
make someone wan bel (lit. ‘one stomach’) which is to say both singular in intention and 
content.  
 
Acting in a singular way is to properly configure thoughts. I suggest that with the cards too, the 
same rule applies. Cards are in a state of multiplicity until they act. Cards express their 
preferences by coming into proper alignment as sets of cards in your hand. At the same time, 
there is a sense that the cards have to have liked me because they have come into alignment 
under my persuasive powers. The patterns existing between cards are not related to players 
directly but as a collective they can be coerced into acting in relation to players. Cards’ 
relations exist out there, between each other, and are knowable from the point of view of a 
person who is open, ready to comprehend them as an abstracted set of relations which can be 
brought into alignment. As such they are abstractions of relations, which are grasped 
relationally, and thus we see a Gorokan form of ‘abstraction’ taking the form of a ‘pattern’ (see 
Pickles 2009). This is what makes kwin in particular a gem blo yumi (lit. ‘game belonging to us’); 
it is a ‘Melanesian’ thing to think through. 
 
The capacity for individuals to act with reference to a world not explicitly related to them, in 
the form of patterns of empirical occurrences, is a crucial and underrepresented aspect of 
Melanesian decision-making, which is all too often subsumed under the idea of being directly 
acted upon. I see games in Goroka as a modelling of larger relational fields that act upon a 
person without one knowing all the interconnections of relationships, and thus see gambling 
as a mode of analytic for comprehending the wider world. The kona is like the Sabarl 
axe/elbow, and the Kula like the card game; they are indigenous categories for characterising 
and analysing actual transactions, not ethnographically inspired analytics. After a fine-grained 
explication they become useful idioms that do more work than Mimica’s testing ground use of 
laki (2006). Yet as we have already learnt from the description of the gaming spectrum, neither 
the kona nor kwin (unlike Kula, perhaps) are worth considering as total social facts. I shall have 
to pit them against complimentary and antagonistic ideas. This is because while the kona is the 
dominant idiom at play in a game of kwin, bom has a different set of dynamics which in 
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combination with the above bring us closer to the full spectrum of efficacious possibility in a 
variously speedy gaming world. It will also show how some games can be more properly 
‘Melanesian’, while others are less so. 
 
 
2. Bom – Think Fast 
 
Like kwin, a game of bom has no more than five players, so Michael could just as easily have 
joined this game. Bom is the game of choice to pasim taim (lit. ‘tie/close-up the time’, to pass 
time, see Reed 2003: 88-91; Pickles forthcoming), with stakes starting at T10, and usually 
peaking at K2, though K5 games sometimes occur. If Michael would be joining players who 
have been there all day, ‘passing the time’. Such people will often be unemployed and may use 
gambling as both entertainment and means of income. Young men in particular find it difficult 
to gain work, and they lack opportunities in the political sphere (see chapter four); they 
therefore say their speedy thoughts need an outlet, so many gamble at bom, and some try 
more audacious means of making money through theft (see Sykes 1999; Reed 2003; cf. M. 
Strathern 1975). As I mentioned in chapter one, the bets will have built up during the day as 
‘passing the time’ gives way to more serious, exciting gaming. Even when killing time, bom is 
far from a peaceful game; the pace is often frenetic, as the rules will show. Terminologically it 
is a Stops Game22. 
 
The dealer shuffles and then offers the cards to the person on their right, who cuts them, turns 
over the bottom card from the cut, places that card face up in the centre and lays the rest of 
the cards face down. If the cutter cuts the 7 (the bom card), they automatically win. The 
dealer then deals seven cards to each player23, and if he/she fails to do so properly, she/he 
picks up two cards, because a two card penalisation is given for any mistake during the game. 
Providing this does not happen, to the casual observer kwin and bom look identical just before 
play begins. The face up card is the lead card, but from here the similarity ends: each player in 
turn has to put down a card from their hand of the same kala (lit. ‘colour’, in this context used 
                                                 
22
 Bom was originally derived from another longstanding “stops game” called las kat (see above 
genealogies). 
23
 The deal is invalid if a player holds three two’s, but if one player has four two’s, they automatically 
win. 
 91 
 
to mean ‘suit’24) as the previous player (say 6 to follow a 3), or a card with the equivalent 
symbol belonging to a different suit (say 6 to follow the 6), upon which the suit required by 
the next player changes accordingly (from  to ). The stream of cards is therefore a chain of 
transformations in De Coppet’s sense (1981; 1995). If one cannot follow suit or symbol, or 
prefers to keep one’s remaining cards for a better opportunity, then one has to pick up a card. 
Hence the number of cards in Michael’s hand will rise and (hopefully) fall during play. The 
object of the game is to rid oneself of cards, especially those of a high numerical value, 
because if play stops then you have to count the total value of your cards up and the player 
with the lowest score wins. Some cards have special properties during gameplay, and, 
correspondingly, often have different numerical values at the end of the game. Queen is 
valued at two points, King at four, and Ace at one. The only other way of winning is to rid 
yourself of all of your cards. 
  
 
Card Special Properties During Play Point Value 
after Play 
Jack 
(called 
the J) 
Known as a res kat (lit. ‘rest card’), the Jack can be joined by another 
card of the same suit in the one turn, allowing a player to get rid of 
two cards at once. If one cannot do so then the player who put down 
the Jack must pick up a card from the deck. 
45 
2 Makes the player following you have to pick up two cards from the 
deck if they cannot respond with another 2. If the following player 
can respond with a 2 then they cancel out the penalty, and the next 
player may play as normal. If a player is forced to pick up two cards, 
the next player plays as normal. 
20 
4 Reverses the direction of play towards the previous player, after 
which the direction returns to normal, beginning again with the 
person who played the four. 
20 
                                                 
24
 In other parts of the Highlands colour terms have shown themselves to range more broadly than our 
own, often taking into account glossiness and brightness (see O’Hanlon 1989). In this case it seems the 
Tok Pisin word kala has likewise been extended to include the suit it is denoting. Note that kala is a 
defining feature of games in the above genealogies. 
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8 Another ‘rest card’, it acts exactly like the Jack, but without such a 
large point value. 
8 
7 The bom kat (‘bomb card’) ends play when laid, forcing players to 
compare the total point value of the cards remaining in their hands. 
The player with the lowest points is the winner.  
Not Applicable 
 
Table 2.1: Cards with special properties and their values 
 
The cutter on the right of the dealer plays first; if the lead card has special properties they 
apply. The 7 or bom card is the most important card to have as it has the power to end play, 
giving its possessor a superior chance of winning because they hold the bom card back until 
they have only a low total point value. A short but otherwise typical game is represented in 
Figure 2.9 below, depicting all of the special properties of the cards in action25. 
                                                 
25
 I have chosen to represent the game in this form rather than how it would appear in actual play (as I did 
with kwin), because I believe this rendering represents the diachronic unfolding of possibilities better 
without wasting space with too many diagrams of little content. My ability to do so is made possible by 
the form of the game, which has to unfold in a linear fashion card after card, and without necessarily 
picking up each round as in kwin. Because one’s hand is not usually added to, the cards and thus decisions 
of a player can be easily deduced from previous play, and not confused by a continuing renewal of one’s 
hand. 
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Figure 2.9: A game of bom represented in the abstract. The black arrows indicate the succession of play, 
except when a 4 disrupts the order of play, at which point a red arrow brings the play back to the previous 
player. Face-down cards signify when a player is forced to pick up a card. Each column represents the 
actions of one particular player. After the game is ended by the bom card (7), the cards remaining in 
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each player’s hand are shown below, along with the total value of those cards. The winner is Player B 
with a score of 9. 
 
Despite a strong deterministic element in gameplay, many tactical decisions are made by 
Michael and the others, a few of which I will expound here with the aid of the model game 
above. Mastamindim (lit. ‘masterminding’, to understand and recognise patterns) in bom is the 
equivalent to becoming a kona man in kwin, and a matter of noticing the amount of any 
particular suit or symbol which have been played by one and all players, and thus the chances 
of others having cards to respond to the ones you play, and vice versa. 
 
As in kwin, play is dependent upon all the cards lain down, but not to the same extent or in 
such complexity. In the model game, it will be noted that s have been somewhat overused. 
Player D therefore decided to play the 4, forcing player C to play again, having anticipated 
that player C might have run out of s. As it turned out player C was able to respond with a 4 
(a tactical move as he/she had a Q in reserve), but if C had not then D was ready to play the 
2, dispensing with another high value card and bringing this to bear on player E. Instead it 
was B who could not play and was impelled to pick up a card, and C was given the opportunity 
to play again. Out of choice, a player would not play a 4 unless they had another card of the 
same suit to use when play returned to them next turn. Player C tried (more successfully) to 
use the same tactic (4 followed by a 2) as player D, but D is able to counter with their 2, 
and they go back to playing s. In the process players C and D have both dispatched two high 
value cards, worth 20 points x 2 = 40 to each of them.  
 
Also seen in figure 2.9, laying a 7 or  is risky should other players have only a few cards 
remaining and you are not holding the bom card (7) yourself. This is because the next player 
would be able to use the 7 if they had it, as in the unwise actions of Michael. Nevertheless, 
the 7 was Michaels only option other than to pick up a card, there being a shortage of s, so 
Michael decided to take a risk in hoping player B did not have the bom card, which backfired. 
Skill is attributed to a player who provokes another to play their bom card and then beats 
them with a low score, but this could hardly be said for someone with Michael’s cards.  
 
There are many possible cards which can be played in response to any given suit. 
Correspondingly people say that bom has many more chances to win than kwin, and they 
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come thick and fast. These include opportunities to rid yourself of cards, like with the 4s and 2s 
used by players C and D above, but there are also opportunities to lay a combination of cards 
or to change the suit playing to favour your hand, as with player B’s first turn. With a  as the 
lead card B uses her 8, a ‘rest card’, in combination with her 8 (a second ‘rest card’), to 
change the suit to s. Looking at B’s cards at the end of the game it is clear she had many s26. 
It did not quite work for B, the opportunity to change the suit to diamonds was wasted, and it 
does not come round again during play. 
 
Most of the time you only have one or two options, in which case players simply play the 
highest value card they can, which makes much of the play automatic and very speedy indeed, 
and quite unlike the ruminations sparked by kwin. This catches out inattentive or 
inexperienced players (i.e. me) and forces them to pick up two cards. The game is 
characterised by rapid opening and curtailing of opportunities to pull the game towards you, 
but while opportunities to manipulate play come thick and fast, they are nevertheless only 
glimpses of victory, which require quick thinking to take advantage of. These situations have 
been restricted in my depiction for brevities sake, but they make up a large portion of play. 
Bom is ideal to tie up the time in an electrifying way while keeping losses at a minimum with 
low stakes. Furthermore, when the game ends with the Bom card and players are forced to 
count the value of their cards, it is astounding how fast this is done, in a manner more akin to 
pattern recognition than addition (cf. Pickles 2009). The many rounds, one after another, and 
the speed by which decisions are made and turns taken, make it the most popular fas gem (lit. 
‘fast game’). Bom is thus considered extremely exciting.  
 
Speed manifests itself in the idiom of the paten, which I outlined in connection with kwin. The 
term comes into its own in bom, where the paten is the dominant term used to characterise 
tactics rather than the kona, and where a good player will have mastamindim paten blo bom 
(lit. ‘masterminded the pattern of bomb’). Again this idiom is directed toward the cards 
themselves and their patterns, not to the mastery of others’ tactics and thoughts. Once more 
the pattern is visible in the accumulating face-up cards, but it demands even more direct 
attention from players of bom. The need to control the actions of the next person is more 
direct and unmediated, less thoughtful, and so less kona-like. Paten as I understood it is 
                                                 
26
 Especially as the reader will be able to deduce that the card B was forced to pick up was the K, 
because otherwise she would have played this card rather than picked up when he did. 
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conceived as a diachronic unfolding: revealing itself over time and then extrapolated into the 
future (see also Ingold 2000; Küchler & Were 2005; Pickles 2009). Because play is faster in 
bom, the pattern unfolds faster. The pattern also changes constantly, as players take 
opportunities to change suit or symbol. Each phase of play where  follows , for instance, is 
seen as a discrete pattern that is redirected into another pattern when  becomes . In kwin 
the pattern remains locked in people’s hands and the general relationship between cards on 
the ground, whereas the pattern in bom is visible, immediate, and changeable. Of course when 
a player changes the pattern from s into s, they are controlling the pattern, and so pattern 
in bom visibly changes all the time (paten senis senis) as the result of one’s actions. Another 
player can piggyback this change to victory, or change it once more, because there are many 
possible cards that can follow on. The paten and its change become a place where a person 
can calibrate themselves in the knowledge that it is moving too fast to be controlled by 
another for long. This is where the analogy between low-rank Kula valuables and bom comes 
to fruition: bom seems to act like the unnamed low-value Kula artefacts that are said to go 
every which way, neither retaining a coherent flow nor making a significant difference to the 
order of things in and of themselves. Bom likewise is a place where those who would graduate 
to kwin learn to hone their pattern-discerning skills, but the thoughts which work for bom are 
importantly not sufficiently kona-like (relational) to be considered properly ‘Melanesian’. 
People say that kwin is part of the “Melanesian Way”, while bom is not, because the pattern of 
bom is oriented towards fast money rather than sharing, and the pattern appears between 
cards without sufficient reference to people. 
 
The hierarchical and age-grade relationship between the patterns of bom and kwin can be 
seen more clearly if we break down the rules of the games into their syntactical elements and 
those elements’ relationships with each other, which is of two orders. As we shall see, while 
cards are not divisible like money (see chapter one), they are connected in novel mathematical 
relationships that allow play to occur and variation to be expressed. Things like numbers (say 3 
and 6) are terms that have meaning inasmuch as they are related to each other, as part of a 
code. The same can be said of cards within a suit, which are related in an ordinal fashion as 
numbers, but with the addition of four other symbols, the A, J, Q and K, that are also arranged 
ordinally. In turn all cards are given cardinal numerical values which (as in bom) may be tallied 
when the game is over to count peoples’ points score. This is complicated by the four suits, 
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which replicate the cardinal and ordinal values four times over in four different sets27. Various 
other arbitrary rules may be added for any particular game, and there may even be different 
stages of play where different types of ordinal or cardinal values take precedence.  
 
Bom is one such game, acting on two levels of signification: cardinal numerical value in the 
counting up period, and also the ordinality between cards in play. Bom demands that one adds 
a single card ordinally by following one of the possible rules of sign-relation (following suit or 
symbol, using a rest card, reversing the play with a 4, etc.). Kwin on the other hand demands 
combinations of three and four cards related to each other by a single rule of sign-relation, of 
which it only allows two (ordinal similitude and suit difference (5, 5, 5, 5) or ordinal 
seriality and suit similitude (5, 6, 7, 8)). Kwin works by using a single level of 
signification but with a heightened demand for sign conjunctions. With bom the single serial 
ordering of cards lain down means that one can clearly see what types of cards will have what 
impact on the game and which cards are most valuable in your hand or otherwise. As such the 
paten of bom is stronger, more unfolding, more subject to change than the more intuition-
based understanding that comes out in kwin. The result is that in bom, even though cause is 
even more strongly associated with the front end of a player’s pivot (the lead card), and the 
effect more direct, it is the change of pattern in the cards that are emphasised in talk about 
tactics. One’s agency is even more directly concentrated into how to control the empirical 
signifiers of relations as they unfold in a changeable pattern.  
 
As I mentioned above, one of the main attractions of bom for the young is the fact that the 
paten is constantly changing. A close informant Alfons, who worked security at the National 
Sports Institute alongside Michael and was particularly partial to bom, echoed this argument, 
he said: the reason bom is speedy is the change in patterns, they drive the speed. He thought 
that opportunities open and close more quickly, and you have to be aware and keep your mind 
open to new patterns or you will not be able to win. Allowing one’s thoughts to speed up 
carries its own risk, because bom is so fast it gets you excited, and this can quickly turn into 
anger; vigilance is therefore essential. While kwin might be understood to be a game for 
friends, a thinking game where older players are typically respectful of each other, bom, with 
its fast changing pattern, is often derided as too fast, not involving enough interactions. Older 
                                                 
27
 In some games suits may be ranked in an ordinal fashion too, for example in a game of trumps where 
hearts are of higher value than spades. 
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people complain that bom, despite its low stakes, involves only a lust for money, not sitting 
down well with people. In fact people say the low stakes in bom are a response to the fact 
people win and lose very quickly. The game could be regarded as more money-oriented 
because the focus on the changing pattern means players are not engaged with other people, 
an accusation often levelled at the young who enjoy it so much. If we relate this back to the 
argument made about kwin and the kona man, who is a successful but socially responsible 
(relational) being, then the changing paten of bom may be understood as directed to a more 
abstracted set of relations between cards, and a corresponding lack of regard for other people. 
Bom is accused of skipping past people for material success. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
analysis the two games must be understood together, and within the lifecycle of a person, for 
it is assumed that young minds will slow as they age and their tastes will change 
correspondingly. It is clear from my card-genealogical material that fast games have long been 
a concern for Gorokans, and it seems likely that similar derisions were levelled at previous 
games.  
 
Whether good or bad, patterns remain pertinent to both kwin and bom, so how does the 
Gorokan use of the term paten inform our understanding of pattern? Paten emerge 
diachronically as a result of Gorokan people’s aidia, which are idiosyncratic theoretical 
extensions of what they take as given about the seriality, ordinality, and configurative 
proclivities of cards. When one’s aidia prove successful, one is able to adapt one’s 
understandings of the workings of cards with what one knows already in the context of the 
game. Bom is a formidable obstacle in this regard as the pattern is constantly changing and so 
one requires aidia that include linkages between patterns to overcome this changeability. The 
young whose minds are changeable are particularly well-suited for such tasks (see Sykes 1999), 
and thus relish the prospect of a game whose paten senis senis.  
 
I see an analogy between the way in which pattern is elaborated and how Pickering describes 
the construction of new theories in science. For Pickering, scientific ‘discoveries’ are intuitions 
which are freely extended; when they produce results then scientists attempt to emplace their 
intuitions into existing knowledge by retrofitting theories that seem appropriate to the 
results/ideas, what he calls a ‘disciplinary force’ (Pickering 1997). In the process, existing 
knowledge is transformed. Aidia also represent attempts to surpass existing knowledge by 
freely extending themselves. These theorisations are then examined in terms of how they 
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affect what is already known (the paten), and a ‘disciplinary force’ fills in the gaps with what is 
already known, placing the aidia within the confines of tactical norms. What Pickering mostly 
calls a mangle, sometimes a pattern (ibid: 66), is his attempt to theorise the method that 
brings about scientific discovery, in much the same way as paten covers an understanding of 
the flow of cards in a game. Paten, which I introduced as the how that M. Strathern 
emphasised, seems to me to be a highly intellectual and yet materialistic endeavour that 
projects forward into the future using aidia, and then conventionalised within tactical norms. If 
indigenous number systems can be seen as a “science of the concrete” (Biersack 1982; see also 
Wassman & Dasen 1994; Mimica 1988; Ascher 1991; 2002), then searching for paten would be 
a crucible for concrete scientific discovery through inductive and deductive theorisation. That 
people recognise that the paten senis senis is indicative of Gorokan understandings of the 
consequences of their own and others’ aidia in the material world. Pattern can therefore be 
understood as a diachronic unfolding that requires human agency to retain or redirect its 
course (see also Küchler & Were 2005a).  
 
Having set out some differences between kwin and bom, I finally move on to card gambling in 
its entirety. For all their different foci, and despite being rendered into either positive and 
negative forms, the methods by which players discern patterns and affect the course of flows 
of cards to win money require an attention that is similar at the most fundamental level. 
 
 
How to Win at Cards 
 
With an emphasis on patterns of play and the opening and closing of opportunities, people 
think of games as fields of motion and circulation that are beyond their individual capacity to 
totally determine, but may be redirected in players’ favour given foresight, nous, and 
synchronicity (cf. Mimica 2006). From their kona people can become agents acting upon 
others at the instigation of yet others and then (hopefully) take control of those multiple flows 
to effect a singular outcome: a win. To do so they must crucially keep their eyes on the bigger 
picture, to abstract the ‘pattern’ out of play, which they attempt to manipulate. 
 
Even as a player skilfully manipulates the pattern within a game, they are liable to be disrupted 
by others outside of the game. This is not to say they are pestered by onlookers but rather, as I 
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mentioned above, there are unseen forces that can work for or against them. It is common 
knowledge in Goroka that if those around you are not happy with you, if they think that you 
have been miserly or uncaring toward them, their unpleasant thoughts may go inside the 
game, causing you to lose (cf. Reed 1999). This is known as jelas pasin (lit. ‘jealous passion’) 
and it can be very serious. For instance when a player wins a significant amount of money it is 
imperative that they placate any losers as those losers may use sorcery or witchcraft to hurt 
them (see chapter one). Sorcery and witchcraft are the most concrete manifestations of jelas 
pasin, but negative thoughts do not require a spell to take effect, just thinking badly of another 
is enough to disrupt their thoughts and cause them to lose. Gorokans found it difficult to 
articulate how thoughts travel between people, but is seems their minds are connected and 
that others’ thoughts are inseparable from one’s own (see above). This multiplicity is resolved 
when one makes a decision and thus acts as a single person, but the thoughts of others 
contribute to the decision and can thus meddle with one’s powers to enact relationships.  
 
It is thus necessary to straighten out one’s relationships and make people happy before one 
plays cards, not only to give one the requisite peace of mind, but because the thoughts of 
others, so extended, also may affect the cards themselves. Negative thoughts travel from the 
mind by dirtying the blood, which then circulates around the body, polluting the skin, which is 
in turn felt by the cards. If one is muddled with the negative thoughts of others, then cards will 
not like you, which is to say they will not configure correctly in response to you. Michael 
O’Hanlon (1989) makes the same point in reference to dancing among the Waghi westward of 
Goroka, whose skin manifests moral transgressions, causing a dancer to appear ugly and 
unattractive. The same is true of all kinds of acquisitive activity in Goroka: it does not 
necessarily matter which kind of transaction you are performing, if you are being blocked, all 
desirable things will be less drawn towards you28.  
 
                                                 
28
 In chapter three I discuss the power of attraction with reference to marketing and wider transactional 
spheres. Kula magic known as mwasila, which Malinowski discusses at length (1961 [1922]: 334-349), 
imparts powers of attraction upon people, which affect a variety of objects but also go directly into the 
minds of potential Kula partners and soften their will to resist. Campbell found that the magic that 
Malinowski called mwasila was known to her informants as kaimwasila because it affects the minds of 
others directly, as opposed to mwasila, which is concerned only with making the individual beautiful and 
attractive (Campbell 2002: 157-8). No such division seems operative in Goroka, where card/marketing 
magic simply makes a person attractive to all people and things capable of configuration. 
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On the other hand, if you are able to procure a substance known to attract things of value 
towards you, then this may be utilised in gambling when held close to the skin, where it acts 
through the body to clean and purify the blood and thereby skin, which will attract the cards 
toward you, regardless of others attempts to disrupt you. Many people do have magical 
charms that they think will aid winning in this way, but these are not legitimate things to 
mention that one possesses (see also Pflanz 1977: 175), and people deny as much when they 
are in public. These items were various and secret, but generic descriptions included the bark 
of a particular tree, a seed, stone, and even ash from the Rabaul volcano in New Britain. Clean 
or new blood is also associated with pregnant women, young children who play, or those who 
have cleaned their blood by ritual purging and bathing or using oils (see O’Hanlon 1989; Read 
1965; Hogbin 1970; cf. Gell 1979).  
 
Anthropological convention heaps significance on the specificities of this type of material while 
citing gambling as one of a number of fields where these actions are efficacious (see Pflanz 
1977: 175; Mimica 2006). Yet in Goroka majik (‘magic’) is an additional possibility, not a 
necessary means to victory. This is in keeping with the running Kula analogy, for in the 
Trobriand Islands Malinowski notes that “the effects of magic are something superadded to all 
the other effects produced by human effort and by natural qualities” (1961 [1922]: 421; see 
also Campbell 2002: 54-56), and the same applies to magic used for gambling in Goroka, which 
adds to the openness that one needs to cultivate.  For this reason magic is an addendum to 
this study, as my aim is to explicate the shape that human effort must take for gambling 
success with or without magic. In the case of Goroka, a town, people assumed that others had 
their own, idiosyncratic magic for gambling, and they thought about the games as far more 
concrete ways of finding out what success was and how to get it. As discussed in the prologue, 
this state has been deliberately cultivated by policing the kind of cards that can be used to 
mitigate the effects of magic.  
 
The games provide a model for achieving success with or without magic, and I therefore focus 
on this mode of knowing how one’s magic or home relationships are getting on through one’s 
aidia. ‘Ideas’ are used to attract cards and money towards oneself, but they may as likely be 
interrupted by the thoughts of others within and outside the game, for the thoughts of others, 
while unknowable, are still in discourse with one’s own mind, so people often resort to magic 
after a run of losses that tell them their aidia are underperforming. There is a lot of 
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retrospective analysis of individual games, and these are being refined on the back of the 
games that follow. As discussed in chapter one, the Gorokan concentration on flows of 
thoughts and objects precludes chance as a framework for the unknowable. Instead people 
assume that flows cannot be totally understood, connected as they are with the minds and 
distortive attractions/repulsions of others. 
 
The lack of knowledge of others’ minds and their intentions is a prerequisite for playing cards 
(cf. Minnegal 2009). Playing cards is a vehicle for the knowledge of both self and other, but 
which is founded upon the basic assumed un-knowability of minds outside of concrete action 
and evidence. Knowledge is aspirational, one’s theorising of patterns are literally ideas of what 
is happening, unverifiable until the end of the game. All the more so for the fact that Goroka is 
a large community; one cannot know everyone and so the full scale of flows and thoughts are 
far beyond humans’ capacity for knowing. Again this goes back to the ‘opacity of others minds’ 
(J. Robbins & Rumsey 2008), adding a temporal dimension, where concrete signs of intentions 
and action are made manifest in cards but do not reveal themselves fully until the end of a 
game. Yet Gorokans are not ones to give up. Skilful deployment of aidia (‘ideas’) can still 
generate success if masterfully deployed at the right time with the proper force. As Mimica 
observed in a Highlands-fringe area nearby: “the world-body continuously demands from 
humans a relentless corporeal self-application in every endeavour” (2006: 122). Cards offer a 
great opportunity to do just that. People test themselves at things like cards in order to know 
not only whether they will be successful (see also A. Strathern 1984: 102-103), but who they 
are, as this is constituted in one’s relations to others. 
 
The most prized asset of a player for any game is consequently mental openness, their ability 
to recognise the total flow of cards laid down, the positions and motivations of other players, 
and openness to signs which might otherwise be thought to have nothing to do with gambling. 
Likewise in the North of the Kula ring, Campbell found that a prerequisite for initiates’ 
attempts to own magical knowledge is clearing their mind, which predisposes them toward 
successful use of the magic they are taught (2002: 55). The same applies to gamblers in 
Goroka, and this asset sits above clean blood, efficacious objects and trickery in importance, as 
it is the possibility of detecting and directing all these things through the recognition of 
patterns. Master carvers in the Kula ring have clear minds and their magic consequently 
transforms canoes into beautiful, light and swift agents of Kula acquisition. These people feel 
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compelled to carve, “allowing the designs, patterning and form to ‘flow’ from his mind through 
his hand and eye”, and this seems exactly the kind of thought that gamblers in Goroka strive 
for (ibid: 132).  
 
In their strivings, a player who participates in a game of cards often finds it necessary to focus 
their consciousness in some way in order to open their mind. Some options include: 
concentrating on a recent dream portending victory; how much one desires to win; which 
cards one aims to win by; or even employing reverse psychology by trying to forget ones desire 
to win or renounce attachment to how much one is up or down in a game (see also Mimica 
2006; Reed 2011). The game one is playing again determines how one synchronises with it and 
the level of openness required, be it thinking deeply or quickly. Successful players are 
constantly thinking about the movement of their cards and the cards of others, looking for 
opportunities to once again have a hand in their direction, as successful Kula practitioners on 
Muyuw think about the movement of shell valuables (Damon 2002: 130). The truly skilled 
gambler will gain the status of a kona-man or one who has mastamindim kas, and as with 
masters of the shell paths, known as ‘men of Kula’, they will have many friends through 
gambling that acknowledge their skill rather than assuming trickery or magic. It is worth 
reminding the reader that Kula fame travels within the ‘game’, with objects, whereas gambling 
fame may, or may not, move outside of each game’s temporary circulation of cards, so there is 
no systematic means by which gamblers gain universal renown. Within a town, gambling fame 
is particularly unlikely to travel (but see chapters four and five). There is thus no consensus on 
who is a great kona-man in Goroka, unlike the self-evident fame that occurs within the single 
‘game’ of Kula. 
 
Despite their being no consensus on who is the best kona-man, without activities like gambling 
it is difficult to gauge intentions and efficacies, just as people along the Kula ring use their 
transactions to gauge their fame. By playing cards, in Goroka people benefit not only by 
winning, but also by finding out that it will not be their day, that it might be better to stay 
home with the door locked. Portents of material success bring me back to the issue of money, 
which has been largely kept out of the descriptive sections of the chapter. If you recall, 
Michael has been losing his money and with it control over a large note. At the same time 
Michael will be feeling out how his pattern-discerning skills are working today, with some 
knowledge of his history of transaction with the other players within the game and 
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relationships outside, and whether his blood is likely to be somewhat clean/dirty. The inherent 
dilemma is that one has to engage in an activity which might lose you money in order to 
discern whether you are likely to lose money at it. It is only by attempting to attract things to 
you by doing things like playing cards or Kula, that one can gauge the efficacy of one’s tactics 
and the present state of one’s relations with others. Gambling and Kula offer thorough 
empirical data of concrete action involving wealth items. While people do find other ways to 
gauge their own efficacy such as sport, health, or their transactions with others, I was unable 
to find anything which appraised people’s current efficacy as precisely as gambling (see also A. 
Strathern 1984: 102-103). The demand for evidence of intention is in turn reflected in the type 
of games played in Goroka, and Michael will have joined whichever best fit his mental state.  
 
To reiterate, we might say that a player will have to control the flow of cards in the game, take 
control of their relationships within and without the game, attempt to tame and counteract 
the flows and attraction and agencies inherent in other objects like charms, cards and money, 
and at the same time abstract oneself from relations between people so that they can search 
for patterns, strengths and weaknesses which determine their course of action at every level. 
This is what it means to have an open mind. In one final likeness between the tactical outlook 
shared between Kula and Gorokan gambling, I note how well Annette Weiner’s 
characterisation fits my own ethnography. She states that “[t]he perceptions that surround 
Kula combine fact and possibility, success and failure, with loss as much a part of the system as 
gain” (A. Weiner 1992: 144). It seems then that despite their many differences, people need 
gambling to test out relations, similar to the pursuit of Kula in its famous ring. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both kwin and bom are similar in the sense that they are a collection of persons in which one 
and only one can best all others29. I have argued that kona (‘corner’), aidia (‘idea’), paten 
(‘pattern’), and mastamindim (‘masterminding’) suggest a social world where selected 
abstractions play a key role in the self-determination of Gorokan people. Using the model of 
relationality and the analogy of Kula within my fieldsite, I identified how gambling allows 
                                                 
29
 The few that are not will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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people the opportunity to theorise about what kinds of thought are efficacious and to project 
those ideas into the future. The analogy was not exact, and I was at pains to point out 
differences where I saw them, most notably in the fact gambling’s many discrete events do not 
allow for universal fame on the same scale as Kula. Even so, Kwin and bom, slow and fast, 
consistent pattern and changeable, relationships between people and cards; all are held 
together on a continuum that relates to different scales for understanding the world and 
testing ones understanding (see A. Strathern 1984: 102-103). There are various vantage points 
for comprehending them while you occupy a kona, from which a player can observe an overall 
paten, leading to some aidia which can be used to mastamindim the game, so that one will be 
known as an outstanding kona man and hopefully a winner, and a leading part of the process 
by which the paten senis senis. It is within this that I saw a great talent for abstraction, for 
taking a version of the big picture and turning it to one’s advantage. If one imagined that 
Gorokans did relationality, one could see this as an abstraction of a relational reality, a 
deliberately detached and objectivised creation of solid ground on which to act relationally.  
 
In the chapter that follows, I elaborate upon the issue of speed within card gambling, and draw 
a more concrete ethnographic link between cards and money through the medium of 
marketing. Marketing takes a number of forms which play on the process of creating units of 
value out of possessions. I emphasise the enumerative qualities of these transactions and 
explore what it means in transactional terms for a Gorokan to be surrounded by strangers. My 
focus shifts to the relational ‘logic’ which is applied to transactions and their potential for 
reproducing and cultivating relationships over time. As a means to grasp this ‘logic’, I bring out 
one remarkable gambling game that is only found in small pockets around Goroka, in the thick 
and dense atmosphere of speedy transactions. The search for patterns and the testing of ideas 
are all pillars of the manipulation of value that I discussed in chapter one, and together with 
this chapter they form the basis from which I proceed to talk about the various transactions in 
the following chapters. Now that I have described normal gaming, I am able to tackle the more 
unusual games in which value manipulation becomes increasingly rapid and intense. I return to 
the issue of value in each of the following chapters, bearing in mind that the search for efficacy 
described in this chapter underpins all attempts to manipulate value. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Challenge: The Fastest Money in Goroka 
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to marketing and a card game format paradigmatically associated 
with certain markets; called chalinj (‘challenge’). The style of gaming is rare but well-known for 
its frenetic speed and high stakes, much like the markets which host it. Like cards, markets are 
exogenous: they were first introduced into Goroka and the Highlands in 1955 by Australian 
colonisers exasperated by what they saw as incessant door to door hawking. Quickly though 
the colonisers saw an opportunity to distribute exotic fruit and vegetable seeds they could 
later buy back, stimulating development, their taste buds, and adding commodification to 
subsistence (Jackson 1976: 175; see also Meggitt 1989). The idea caught on, and soon markets 
became almost exclusively Papua New Guinean social spaces; they fulfilled the urban need for 
comestibles and provided subsistence agriculturalists hungry for imported products with cash 
to buy them (Jackson 1976: 175). Once set into motion, markets emerged as important 
meeting and trading places, and the category of activity known as maket (lit. ‘to market’) an 
inescapable part of everyday life in urban areas (cf. ibid).  
 
Chalinj occurs in wholesale betel nut markets, and betel nut is the most marketed item in 
Goroka1; a seed from the areca plant, it is combined in the mouth with lime powder and piper 
betle. A reaction begins as they are chewed, producing a vivid red mash in the mouth, and 
inducing a pleasant, energising, sometimes heady sensation that also acts as an appetite 
suppressant. As betel nut does not bear fruit locally, it is brought from the coast and sold in 
markets all over the Highlands. Originally betel nut selling was banned from the markets of 
Goroka due to the colonisers’ distaste for bright red spittle discolouring their town. Yet with 
demand exploding and other markets proving so successful, markets specifically for wholesale 
betel nut and its corollaries sprung up on customary land as near to the centre of Town and 
the Main (produce) Market as possible. The ban was unique among Highland towns, and 
                                                 
1
 The betel nut trade began after World War Two when Mekeo people of Central Province started 
supplying betel to Port Moresby; in the 1980’s Highlanders began to take over the retail trade within the 
city (see Mosko 1999; Hirsch 1990). 
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effectively allowed the differentiation of two types of marketing occupying separate locations. 
Fed by growing consumption and without state regulation, the betel nut markets 
metamorphosed into places that I see as radically differentiated from their legal counterparts, 
and which I think helps sustain this particular form of gaming.  
 
There are currently two large central markets for betel nut wholesale in Goroka, called 
Kakaruk Maket (lit. ‘Chicken Market’, so called because it began by selling chickens before 
moving into betel nut) and Chuave Maket (named after a district in Simbu province). Kakaruk 
and Chuave are dank, crowded, sludgy places where the ground – no matter how dry it has 
been – is soft, moist and trampled into shifting peaks and troughs. The older of the two, 
Kakaruk, is built on a dip in ground level, and the husks of betel nut, beer bottle caps, plastic 
bags and discarded cards form the ground upon which you walk. The site resembles a 
composting heap, the spongy ground yielding oily black ooze under foot. Chuave is flatter, 
wetter, bigger and newer, but otherwise much the same. The betel nut markets are so packed 
with marketers they spill out onto the streets like a colonial headquarters setting up outposts 
all over Town. At the roadside, on street corners and outside houses, 32% of street marketing 
vendors in Goroka sell products supplied by the betel nut markets2. Much of my time was 
spent hanging around those who marketed, as gambling melded with marketing in my 
understanding (see also chapter one). Anticipating their coterminacy, betel nut markets went 
so far as to designate card game areas: Chuave has four, Kakaruk one large one, sometimes 
two; other gambling forms have their places: darts and pool are played for beer or money, 
while bingo and a spinning wheel deal only in cash. They were gambling’s central locations, 
and when I first mentioned my topic on arrival, people invariably told me to head to Kakaruk 
Maket. 
 
                                                 
2
 All statistics used in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, were collected by my field assistant Loui Ipatu 
in 2009-2010 via a series of surveys (see prologue). 
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Figure 3.1: A typical scene in Kakaruk Maket as street sellers move between wholesale stalls searching 
for a good deal, taken by the author on 24/3/2010. 
 
With the intensification of marketing and gambling activities at these markets, this chapter has 
at its core an idea of geographical centrality, of a fixed spatial location whose fame is retained 
over time. I use the term centrality here to refer to any enduring spatial prominence 
associated with transactions. Enduring spatial prominence is widely acknowledged as an 
introduced phenomenon in Papua New Guinea (cf. Hirsch 1994). Barter was conducted by 
travelling to other communities with your wares, exchange ceremonies shifted location often, 
while tribal warfare made known meeting points hazardous, and hence centrality was a 
moveable state rather than a fixed place (see Godelier 1986). Centrality may have once been 
an achieved and ephemeral state enacted by specific persons as fractal encompassments of 
their component relations (see Hirsch 1994). Yet today markets are thriving in Goroka and in 
Papua New Guinea more widely, and marketing in a fixed place is one of the most reliable 
ways of gaining an income today. 
 
For Gorokans betel nut markets, money and gambling went hand in hand, and this was 
thought to happen because of the speed that money changed hands in these locales. Among 
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the many strangers I met in Kakaruk Maket, one explained to me that while White people say 
‘time is money’, this does not apply here; here money can come at any time. He meant that 
with money moving fast, constantly being given by one person to another for all kinds of 
reasons, one might be the recipient of money at an unexpected hour. In places of 
concentrated marketing, the speed of money’s flow increased, and with it time became 
denser, so time was no longer money. Two idiomatic aspects of the betel nut markets were 
particularly emphasised, the extreme speed of money and the many kinds of pasin (lit. 
‘passion’, habits or preferences, cf. Mihalic 1971) that emerged. They were causally connected: 
fast moving money brought out all kinds of pasin, some good, some bad (see also chapter 
two). I concentrate solely here on pasin blo kas (lit. ‘passion belonging to cards’3), though 
other kinds of pasin were equally evident, especially drinking. Fast money and flaring pasin 
produced an ideal – and the only – setting for chalinj (‘Challenge’), the fastest form of card 
gambling in Goroka, and the one that elicited the most violent pasin. Only places like Kakaruk 
and Chuave (where money moved so fast as to generate any number of moral problems) could 
contain this kind of gambling: the fastest game, the fastest money. 
 
Betel nut and its corollaries were sold for money and so this chapter is also concerned with 
what We see as commodities (Appadurai 1986; cf. Gell 1992, 144; Gregory 1982). According to 
Appadurai commodities are objects which have been alienated in exchange during at least one 
'phase' of their existence (1986). Yet those participating in Gorokan betel nut marketing, 
wherever they did so, were not ‘quits’ after each transaction. As I will show, while one was in 
principle free to call it quits, the act of transaction was deliberately implanted in the memory 
of transactors so as to impart a sense of enduring obligation. Bound up with persistent 
transactions was the generalisation of a world of debt and credit and a town saturated with 
indigenous accountancy. My intention is not to destabilise the notion of commodities, a point 
as routine in Melanesian anthropology these days as to be mundane, but to articulate a mode 
of thought, a ‘logic’ (cf. Holbraad 2005), which bore only passing resemblance to Our world of 
commodities. Marketing and gambling iterate this ‘logic’ in different intensities based upon 
the notion of speed explored in chapter two, and so after describing chalinj, I make a 
pilgrimage from the slowest to the fastest forms of marketing ‘logic’, taking in their different 
                                                 
3
 Pasin is here translated as ‘passion’, but it also encompasses the terms habit and behaviour. In this 
circumstance passion seems the most accurate translation. 
 110 
 
forms. The slower forms of marketing sat alongside games I explained in chapter two, so I 
leave them unarticulated here. 
 
My portrayal may evoke in the reader’s mind Clifford Geertz’s description of a Balinese 
cockfight (1973), where a central place of gambling enacts a ‘culture’ in its most concentrated 
form. While Geertz aimed to show a culture enacting itself as text, my ambition is to illuminate 
new social practices that emerge from particularly Melanesian logical forms4. I will attempt to 
demonstrate that marketing, and its twin card gambling, contained a mode of money-thought 
or ‘logic’ peculiar to the Melanesian context instead of either a static cultural enactment or an 
instance of universal commoditisation of a formerly gift-based system. Yet to my mind Geertz’ 
description was enlivened by its structure, working like a murder mystery by beginning with a 
description of the game and then elucidating its context. I travel the same path, and therefore 
this chapter breaks my convention by making the journey in the past tense.  
 
 
Chalinj (‘Challenge’) 
 
Not strictly speaking a game, chalinj was a type of gaming: a direct contest between two 
persons or parties. It was said to have arrived in Goroka at various times from 1999 to 2009. 
Chalinj was believed to be prevalent further up the Highlands in Hagen and Wabeg, from 
where it was supposed to have come5. The typical game adapted for chalinj was tri-lip (literally 
‘three leaves’), also known as laki6. Other games like fombe, bom and las-kat could have been 
used in theory, though I never observed them, and the only game which was excluded by 
virtue of its rules was Kwin (see chapter two for a history of these games). In Goroka tri-lip (or 
laki) and its frenetic speed were associated with times when the Kina had a higher purchasing 
power, but its group form was long gone from Goroka7. During 2009-10 tri-lip or laki, in its 
                                                 
4
 Bear in mind that Geertz does not problematize the money changing hands around his cockfight, itself a 
non-indigenous exchange form, and thus I hope by example to demonstrate the scope of ‘interpretation’ 
left open by Geertz omission. 
5
 I was not able to verify this claim. 
6
 See prologue; chapter two. 
7
 Gorokans say that in villages, people still play laki because money holds no value there. A form of laki 
persists in other rural settings in Papua New Guinea (see Mosko 2012). 
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chalinj form, was confined to the margins of special events like the Goroka Cultural Show, or 
deep within the betel nut markets, or to drunken culminatory times of wealth and abandon 
(cf. Mosko 1999). This was so markedly the case that people described places where chalinj 
games go on as ones which were mani pulap (‘money filled’) or where mani kapsait (‘money 
overflows/falls down’). Osama, an informant who knew the markets more intimately than 
anyone (he collected rent from betel nut sellers at Kakaruk Maket and ran a successful bingo 
operation), explained chalinj as a game where: 
 
Money flows, it will take the money from inside your pocket8; money goes fast. 
…that is why many people try to stop this game from happening because they 
want to keep more money, that is why it is now only in Chuave Maket and not in 
Kakaruk Maket. Challenge is like cock-fighting, where two people battle in the 
middle and other people bet on the two playing9. It is like State of Origin, with 
Blues and Maroons10. 
 
                                                 
8
 See chapter six. 
9
 Despite further shades of Clifford Geertz, this is actually the only reference to cock-fighting that 
anybody in Goroka made during my fieldwork, I have never heard of a cock-fight occurring in Town. 
Osama was always on the lookout for curious vents, particularly if he thought they could be used to make 
money, but I do not know where or when he experienced or heard about cock-fighting. 
10
 State of Origin is an Australian rugby league competition discussed in chapters four and five. Here the 
reader may note that in both chalinj and State of Origin, two sides challenge each other openly and in 
public view. 
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Figure 3.2: A game of chalinj at Chuave Maket, while in the background a tarpaulin shelters more 
sedentary games of kwin (see chapter two). I am at the back of the crowd watching the game, the 
photograph was taken by Alfred Gotaha on 22/4/2010. 
 
Chalinj was a fast game, in fact the archetypical fast game, with extremely, almost anarchically 
simple rules: after shuffling, three cards were dealt to each player, and the numerical value of 
each set of three cards was compared. A winning hand was the closest to a score of 10, with 
the cumulative value of the cards recursively returning to zero upon reaching multiples of 10, 
as in baccarat. Face cards held a value of 10, such that if one had a king, a ten and a four, one’s 
total would be four: an unfavourable hand. Combinations of face cards beat other totals of 10, 
but which combinations of face cards beat which others varied, and the most common 
solution was to re-deal. Each hand lasted from a few seconds to a minute or two, most of 
which was taken up organising the bets. 
 
Despite decisive simplicity with the cards, the betting system was intricate and key to 
understanding what the game was about. To illustrate I will take the reader with me as I 
approached a game already in motion, as all but two players would have done throughout the 
day. Inching our way through a throng of curious bystanders and potential players, I saw a 
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man11 perched on an empty cooking oil drum; he was our ‘referee’, dealing the cards and 
mediating the betting on a mat floating atop the muddy ground. A queue of varying amounts 
of money sat by the referee’s side on the mat and a more beguiling large heap of money was 
closer to him12, between his legs (see figure 3.3). Near the centre of the ring of bystanders was 
my friend Kripel, he wore a comical jester’s hat and sold betel nut at the Town bus stop during 
the day, returning to his settlement Genoka at night. Kripel came to Chuave Maket to buy his 
betel nut, and must have stopped for a game. He smiled, sunk his teeth into a ripe tomato, and 
pointed to the K1 coin at the front of the queue; I was just in time. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: A typical arrangement of money between rounds of chalinj. 
 
Two people were about to be dealt their three cards: Kripel, the challenger from the front of 
the queue of money, and the incumbent, who won the last round. Figure 3.3 shows the 
incumbent had K65 and the challenger only K1, but the amounts of money queuing or standing 
in the middle did not dictate how much players bet. Our incumbent said he wanted to bet K15 
from his winnings (see figure 3.4), while Kripel declared he would bet K4, handing K3 to the 
referee who added it to the K1 that was holding his place.  
 
                                                 
11
 Theoretically this could have been a woman, but the physical presence and social standing of men was 
such that they stood a greater chance of controlling the mayhem, and in practice I never saw a woman in 
charge of one of these games. 
12
 Making money visible or invisible was an important choice for Gorokans, I discuss it in depth in 
chapter six. 
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Figure 3.4: Incumbent and challenger making their bets in a round of chalinj. 
 
The two bets did not match, and this was where the crowd came in to play. Some of these 
people, if they fancied, were able to join in the betting on either side and thus build up the pot. 
Several of them knew one of the bettors, others just thought they would win, and no one ever 
felt pressured to bet (contra Geertz 1973). It was up to our referee, sometimes aided by an 
assistant, to make sure that the overall sums matched, refusing or negotiating bet sizes from 
the supporting bettors or one of the two central players until they did. In this case two 
spectators come forward immediately, one for each side (figure 3.5), but their motives were 
never made clear. One spectator bet K4 on the incumbent; he wanted to bet K5, but there was 
no one willing to match that total for the other side, so the referee said he could only bet K4. 
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Figure 3.5: Two spectators join in the betting in a game of chalinj, making the pot balanced. 
 
Now that the bets were equal, cards were dealt, and after anxiously revealing the cards to 
themselves and then the crowd, an incumbent was quickly ousted or a challenger bested. At 
this point our referee gave out the winnings to all but the (new) incumbent, whose money 
remained in the heap and joined their winnings from the previous rounds, or started a new 
pile if there was a new incumbent (figures 3.6 and 3.7). In either case B was the next to make a 
chalinj. The referee took a small cut from the incumbent’s pot every three rounds; T50 if the 
bets were modest, K1 and upwards as they increased, but not this round. In figure 3.6 Kripel 
lost and the incumbent remained in the centre with an extra K15 added to their hoard, and the 
spectator who bet on the incumbent doubled his K4. 
 
 116 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The incumbent wins the round of chalinj. 
 
In figure 3.7 Kripel won instead, the incumbent was expelled and the spectator who believed in 
Kripel doubled his K15. Figure 3.7 shows how the betting structure in chalinj allowed the 
incumbent to lose a particular round and be ejected without losing all their money, some of 
which, in this case K50, was still in the heap between our referee’s legs, leaving with the 
outgoing incumbent. This prevented a zero-sum situation from applying to those on a roll, and 
was crucial to the building of sizeable winnings. People talked of ‘working’ to make the bets 
get bigger, and this was demonstrably and intriguingly the case. Those who did well from their 
time in the centre were likely to play again, while those who lost out often became agitated 
and played once more until a few were much better off and others very short of money. In this 
sense also the game was a challenge for supremacy. In figure 3.7 the ousted incumbent 
headed straight to the back of the queue with his remaining K50, and so their money would 
soon feed into the central heap once more. 
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Figure 3.7: The challenger wins the round at chalinj. 
 
Winners and losers ebbed and flowed, with winnings slowly agglomerating into the hands of a 
few or eventually even one winner. The central heap of money visibly grew as the day went 
on, which we shall see was an important aspect of play. The tendency to build bets and the 
wish to do so is important, as it demonstrates a desire to cooperate and intensify monetary 
transactions. People really enjoyed seeing this happen, whether they were part of the winning 
side or not. They pushed money into a concentrated central point so that one person 
(hopefully them) could surmount it, and direct this wealth at will. There was nothing in the 
structure of the game which guarantees that this would occur13, and the build-up was 
                                                 
13
 See also chapter one. 
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repeatedly curtailed by a winner’s departure, stuttering and then intensifying again, swelling 
and subsiding.  
 
Bets regularly rose above the 100 Kina mark (£25), and safety concerns prevented me from 
seeing the K600-800 (£150-200) games that came up around payday afternoons14. To build up 
the pot, the game was reliant on the nature of its market, its big-money flows and the short-
termism prevalent there. Many of the players were betel nut sellers like Kripel and more often 
wholesale traders, who had access to large amounts of money in short time frames. Traders 
could lose and then return with money only a few short minutes later15, it may have taken 
street sellers like Kripel much longer.  
 
The reader will notice that this style of gaming is quite distinctive, it lacked the deflected 
responsibility that was enshrined in the games described in chapter two, and players went 
head to head often and for high stakes, which regularly led to anger and confrontation. So why 
here in the betel nut markets could a game be so different in its betting structure to the other 
games I have described? Why such a fast turnaround? Why this odd and unique betting 
structure? Why an emphasis on ‘challenge’ between two individuals, who were constantly 
replaced? Why this desire to cooperate in building up the pot? Why was building bets equated 
with ‘work’? And what does it reveal about how people thought about money in Goroka? In 
order to answer these questions we need to understand more about the rhythms of money 
flows, and the best way to do this is to look at marketing and its symbiotic relationship with 
cards. It is no accident that cards and marketing were contexts for each other.  
 
 
Street Marketing as ‘Logic’ 
 
                                                 
14
 Fridays and weekends at these markets could be very difficult because of the many drunk and often 
aggressive men around. When drunk some people were attracted to the prospect of intimidating an 
outsider and partially absolved from responsibility by their intoxication (cf. M. Strathern 1975).  
15
 Purely conjecturally, one could see this as a reason chalinj games were no longer present at Kakaruk 
Maket. When Chuave was set up as an alternative betel nut market, concerns about violence and 
drunkenness meant that most betel nut traders switched sites, and hence there may no longer have been 
enough betel nut traders in Kakaruk Maket to sustain a Challenge game. 
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While much has been made of the continuing existence and indeed ‘efflorescence’ (A. 
Strathern 1979a) of traditional exchange since colonisation and the introduction of money (cf. 
Gregory 1982), comparatively little attention has been given to marketing (but see Modjeska 
1985, Epstein 1982 Benediktsson 1998; 2002), which has enjoyed a boom in many ways 
outstripping its more famous economic sister. To maket (‘market’) has become a huge part of 
money-getting and self-sustenance activities in Papua New Guinea. From my survey of 
Gorokan households I found that 70% habitually marketed, still more would market to take 
advantage of nearby social events, or in anticipation of an upcoming marriage or school fee 
payment. Very few households derived their entire regular income from marketing; more 
often it supplemented wages, subsistence, rent collection, remittances or retirement funds. 
Average employed people per household were 1 (out of 6 residents)16, while 69% of 
households had at least one garden used for subsistence. A household was almost as likely to 
be involved in marketing (70%) as to have a wage earner among them (71% of households)17. 
For street marketers buai (betel nut) and smuk (tobacco products) were by far the main 
comestibles sold. Those who sold other things like sweets, deep fried flour-based hand-food or 
fruit, deliberately sold them near a buai-smuk table; if they were sold together, people said 
these other things only kalaim (lit. ‘colour’, decorate) the main trade in betel nut and tobacco.  
 
With 32% of all households marketing betel nut alone, the casual observer would wonder how 
anyone could possibly make money. Still, people told stories of some earning huge amounts 
while many others made a loss, even with tables next to each other selling ostensibly identical 
products. Kripel was one such prosperous marketer. Success in this field relied on a well-
defined and yet open-ended set of tactics. For instance, Kripel often called out to people in the 
street and offered them a free betel nut, either as a way of initiating a new patron-client 
relationship or to further convince a known customer of his good nature, a gesture often timed 
for maximum effectiveness in generating rapport and memorability. Kripel asked customers 
about some aspect of their life, their day, the weather, and often initiated running jokes 
                                                 
16
 This figure was taken from a reduced sample of 412 households; two of the sample groups (security 
guard company employees and National Sports Institute employees) were removed because their 
selection was based on their employment, which would have biased the results.  
17
 The employment figure was also taken from the reduced sample. Many of those working at the security 
company and the National Sports Institute live in accommodation supplied by the employer, but as this 
does not affect marketing participation, the former figure is taken from the full sample of 563 households. 
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between him and the customer. Another friend and supplier to my betel nut habit, Charlie, 
explained his method: 
 
Charlie: My way of marketing is this… I sing out to you, give you betel nut, I want 
to be your friend. I am not bothered about money, I know that money will still 
come, so when I give to you, it has a blessing18 from it which will come to me. I 
don’t have food to give so I give another food… I am a giving man, and I try to get 
many customers by this. Before I was only one person doing sales here, now many 
tables have surrounded me and coins go every which way and I need to get 
customers, so I give some away without thinking, and later it is up to them, they 
want to buy from me, or they want to buy from another, your save [lit. ‘savvy’, 
knowledge/understanding] is your own. So the important thing is to make friends 
with you, if you come along with your mouth dry19 others won’t know your needs 
but I know them, and I will give to you. 
  
AP: Many people do this, so do you have your own way? 
  
Charlie: I am a man who is very good at skelim [lit. ‘scale’ as a transitive verb, 
measuring/deciphering20] all people. I look and I see people and I can see if 
someone needs betel nut or cigarettes; if they are desperate for it, I will shout out 
to them and give them it then… My brain is open, I can skelim you, and so I can 
give you something through the right channel… If you walk past and you haven’t 
chewed betel nut, your face will look different, it will show that you are hungry for 
betel nut, so you will come, I know that you smoke or chew; I will see that your 
face looks hungry. People are often surprised and ask me “how do you know my 
needs?” I just say “I know that’s all”, and I give to them. I don’t tell them I worked 
it out, I just say I am supporting them and I give to them. I don’t tell them because 
                                                 
18
 Charlie’s use of the term ‘blessing’ is a deliberate allusion to his Christianity, most marketers would 
use the term laki (‘lucky’, see chapter two), or profit (‘profit’), or simply say em bai kam bek (lit. ‘it will 
come back’). For a discussion of ancestral blessings and the re-couching of language to take advantage of 
new opportunities, see Crook 2007a. 
19
 A dry mouth is a sign that one wants to chew a betel nut. 
20
 Skelim is sometimes associated with dream interpretation (see Read 2011). 
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I don’t want to, this knowledge stays with me. I don’t want to let this thinking of 
mine get out to customers. 
 
Charlie, like Kripel, understood his marketing technique as a process of prenim (lit. 
‘befriending’); he was particularly well suited for this because he was a clever reader of people. 
Despite the assumption that one could never really know what others are thinking (see 
chapter two), Charlie thought that his deciphering skills were better than most. Just as in 
gambling, Charlie put his success down to his open mind, that ability to look at the big picture 
and notice the pattern of people (again see chapter two). Yet he did not want them to know 
that he was thinking of reciprocation down the road, as this would have been too explicitly a 
self-interested transaction, or in Our language, too commodity-like. Neither did he wish others 
to know he was reading them, as this implied that he was interfering with their sovereign 
thoughts. It was not so much that marketing was a way of getting money but rather a way of 
making friendly relations with persons through valuable and desirable objects without 
impinging on their sovereignty. That money was derived from this was nevertheless crucial, 
not only to survive but as friendship was manifested in transactions, so Charlie had to turn a 
profit to be a friend through generosity.  
 
Marketers were well aware that their income fluctuated wildly as a result of ‘free’ betel nut 
giveaways, spoilt betel nuts and their customers’ varying incomes and inclinations. Good 
marketers were able to ride the flows or channels of money in and out, making the good times 
more persistent than the bad. My observations of marketing and gambling resonate with J. 
Robbins and Akin’s understanding that "Melanesian anxieties about money are grounded in 
the important role that controlling the flows of objects has traditionally had in the societies of 
the region" (1999, p7). In marketing, like gambling, the control and redirection of flows of 
money allowed people to generate short term kin/alliance-like relations and exert status 
differences21. Some focused on exploiting this system for monetary gain and others 
concentrated on the relations, so marketing brought forth what were seen as positive or 
negative personality-traits. Marketing was not an elaborate ruse for money, the emphasis was 
on flows, or as Charlie put it ‘channels’ of reciprocity (just as gambling went beyond selfish 
acquisition in chapters one and two). For career marketers, the goal was a mixture of personal 
or familial regard, long term profitability and immediate material needs (cf. Gell 1992, p160). 
                                                 
21
 For a comparative example in Madagascar, see Walsh 2003: 293. 
 122 
 
 
Blesin (‘blessings’), as Charlie put it, that came from marketers’ unselfish acts went beyond 
loyal customers and high sales, some were given money, alcohol, and/or a contribution when 
they had a wedding or death among relatives. In this sense marketing was differentiated from 
working. The latter was conceptualised as ideally a more or less standalone economic activity 
divorced from community relations, despite people knowing that kin and language groups 
tended to favour each other at work. Employment was accompanied by a wage and work-
related duties were explicitly differentiated from outside duties (cf. Sillitoe 2010: 352). 
Employment, in as much as it was not controlled by the employee, fell within the sphere of 
production, while street sales were in the sphere of social reproduction22. Instead of thinking 
of a profit ratio per betel nut or trip to the wholesalers, and therefore marketing as a version 
of work, marketers subsumed their selling into the whole of their lives, which was to say a 
world of transactions. They sat and traded, using their networks to derive money, and so they 
were thought to be lazy or at least not working (cf. Sykes 1999).  
 
Furthering this dichotomy, it is instructive to note that tending ones garden was also work, as 
both employment and gardening were antecedent to the transactional sphere (people were 
not allowed to collect produce from others’ gardens without asking) while marketing was not. 
Interestingly, work was also separated from bisnis (‘business’), where a person was seen as in 
control of operations and therefore able to channel wealth whatever way they wished23, so 
bisnis was closer to, but higher prestige than marketing. If, in marketing, one’s labour was used 
to reproduce social relations then making money was a necessity for sociality, while in 
employment labour was expended for money which was later used for social relations24. 
Employment was thus seen as a precursor to social activity. It is worth reminding the reader 
that building a pot in chalinj was work, and as I shall later discuss, gambling itself was 
categorically not (cf. Sykes 1999; Sexton 1982). 
 
Work Not work 
Production Transaction 
                                                 
22
 For other definitions of work in Melanesia, see Sykes (1999). 
23
 See chapter four for an account of bisnis leaders. 
24
 Gang mates called stealing their ‘work’, which fits this model because afterwards the money was used 
to distribute between themselves and with others. 
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Gardening Marketing 
Employment Business 
Building a pot Gambling 
Table 3.1: Activities that fell under the remit of ‘work’ and ‘not work’. 
 
A sharp distinction was thus made between two economic activities which we might equate. 
Gorokan residents resisted the notion that all money-oriented activities distanced people from 
each other and should be classed as work; in so doing they once again complexified the adage 
addressed in chapter one: that money makes people distant and abstracted. Having made a 
critique of this notion previously, and set out the bifurcation of work and not work in Goroka, I 
will now introduce an important confluence within the sphere of not-work: card gambling and 
marketing were the same form of attraction. I am now attempting to flesh out a model of 
gambling and marketing and its relation to money in Gorokan terms. 
 
 
Marketing and Card Gambling, Kindred Modes of Attraction 
 
The symbiosis of markets and gambling was immediately apparent on the streets each day. 
Where it was safe for card gambling (i.e. away from the eyes of police, under houses or on the 
street corners of settlements), a market table was almost always beside a game. ‘Career’ 
marketers said that when people play cards they get excited, they shake, their thoughts are 
elsewhere, and so they want to chew and smoke more often. Furthermore, both betel nut 
chewing (cf. Mosko 1985) and smoking (cf. Reed 2007) were said to make the skin hot and 
thereby efficacious, and to make the mind think clearly. Both these attributes were thought to 
increase one’s concentration and skill at card playing (see chapter two). Money also made 
people both hot (cf. Mosko 1999) and efficacious (cf. Hirsch 1994: 698), and so the communion 
of gambling with the market table nearby created an intense and enjoyable space of exertion.  
 
Often the marketer would be playing themselves, and my survey indicated that 87% of betel 
nut marketing households also gambled locally. In fact just under half of all local gamblers (511 
of the 1064 found in my survey) came from the 32% of households who marketed betel nut, so 
marketers and their co-residents were the paradigmatic gamblers. Marketers habitually 
combined the playing of the game with gestures of generosity, donating betel nut and 
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cigarettes to losing players from their own table. They said that this was important in order to 
make those who lost bel ese (lit. ‘stomach calm’, i.e. at ease), and described their presence in 
terms of a service to players25.  
 
As I discussed in chapter two, playing cards was synonymous with the kona (lit. ‘corner’), 
which meant both a player within a game and the meeting of streets, as in a street corner. 
Street corners were vital intersections; many people spent a large portion of their days on 
street corners, particularly those who used maket (lit. ‘market’) as a source of income. Street 
corners could even define a town: a fo kona taun (lit. ‘four corner town’) was a common idiom 
belittling smaller urban centres, implying they had few meeting places. On almost every one of 
the many corners in Goroka, marketers sat behind mats or small purposely constructed 
wooden tables all day long, selling their wares, interrupting flows of people with their money 
and deriving benefit from them. They were the model of a kona man (‘corner man’, see 
chapter two), and were often known as skilful at cards because they knew the craft of being a 
corner better than anyone. Card gamblers followed their example when they aimed to be a 
kona man, a person able to deduce the cards another person requires, to withhold them, deny 
the win, and give themselves a greater likelihood of success.  
 
The coterminacy of card gambling and marketing was not simply one of practical proximity or 
apprenticeship; they were also responsive to the same forms of magic. As discussed in chapter 
two, magic was an additive to one’s skills, but it is instructive that certain additives covered 
marketing and gambling as one. Alex, an elderly man, sold magic a stone’s throw away from 
Kakaruk Maket. One day as we were talking he sifted through the paraphernalia used to 
attract young girls, heal broken bones and the like, and dug up a pair of artefacts (a bright red 
seed unknown to me and a piece of bark from an undisclosed tree (the ‘active ingredient’, so 
to speak)) which promoted success in both marketing and card gambling. When I asked why 
they were both affected by the same magic when other things required different substances 
he explained with this story: 
 
                                                 
25
 A marketer who was losing sometimes dug into their market takings to win their money back. However 
people usually prefered to acknowledge the separation of marketing money from card money, and would 
give a marketer a luk (‘look’, meaning free round, see chapter one) when they ran out of their playing 
money, leaving their takings intact.  
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You find a tree in which birds who are normally only seen alone gather in, the tree 
in which it perches, the power of this tree will be nice. Many of this bird who are 
normally scattered will flock here and eat and eat and eat. Get something from 
this tree, some bark or a leaf or whatever. You need to rub it then put it in the sun 
to dry. Then you rub it on your skin and keep it by your skin and try playing cards 
or try marketing26…  
 
Here we see that marketing and card playing could be influenced by a tree that was attractive 
in itself, bringing birds that are normally loners into social conjunction. The material could be 
directly transposed onto one’s own attractive potential. Alex continues: 
 
…If you see this bird then you know that they [cards or people or money] will like 
you, and you will win. The tree has the power to kisim [‘get’/‘receive’] generally, 
not just to kisim this bird. So whatever you want to kisim, it can kisim it for you. 
They work with market and cards because these are both things for kisim. They are 
the same kind of thing...  
 
Seeing the bird somewhere nearby suggested that the piece of the tree you were holding was 
working, and its attractiveness could be used in any activity that involved acquisition. Alex 
explained how it worked: 
 
…The flower of this tree makes these birds from all over come to it. As a person if 
you hold this, then cards and people and money will like you. With marketing you 
will sit down and all the people will like you and then they will buy things from you 
quickly. With cards too, your blood will be clean. You lick your finger, then rub the 
thing between your thumb and index finger, and it will go inside your finger and 
move the dirty blood and pull in clean blood. Once the clean blood is there, these 
things will like you27. This thing is power28. The tree is a pull-power man, it has 
kisim already. Your face will then light up, and all people will like you because your 
                                                 
26
 The importance of skin is discussed in chapter six. 
27
 See chapter two. 
28
 The Tok Pisin word pawa was used widely in Goroka and, as here, referred generally to agents who 
exerted control over others (cf. Mihalic 1971). 
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blood is clean. And so with marketing all the people will continue to come. It is 
good for cards as your blood travels in your arm in many ways and then it meets in 
your fingers… This cleans your blood, and makes it light up.  
 
Held close to the body or in one’s wallet, the object would make your skin glisten, face become 
bright, and clean the blood in your fingers, so people, cards and money would be attracted to 
you. Note that money was not separated as an ultimate end; it was just one of those things 
enticed by a person’s inflated power of attraction. Just as Charlie asserted, neither people nor 
magic geared themselves toward money and profit in individual transactions, preferring a 
more comprehensive attraction rewarded over time.  
 
Efficacy and agency in gambling was discussed in chapter two; here the quote from Alex is 
used to demonstrate the interconnectedness, or better, the indistinction of marketing and 
cards as methods of getting/receiving. As reported for other areas of Papua New Guinea, 
money related activity and especially trade “resulted in the emergence of spheres that are at 
once separate but merged through the sharing of a uniform scheme of practical logic” (Mosko 
1999: 43). Unsurprisingly then, terms that were used in gambling reflected those of marketing 
and vice versa. Just as the kona informed people’s conceptions of players within a card game, 
to maket (‘market’) was applied to the offering of cards to another in the course of gambling 
(see chapter two). Marketing a card was to offer what one had for others to use as they could. 
It was also to project future dispensation toward oneself.  
 
Now that card gambling and marketing are revealed as having been somehow equivalent in 
the eyes of Gorokans, it is necessary to develop further the way in which the transactions 
involved in marketing played out a market-‘logic’. To do so I divert the reader’s attention to 
the produce markets, where marketing took an intermediate form between street marketing 
and wholesale betel nut marketing.  Here the giving of freebies was curtailed by a competitive 
atmosphere, but one in which product differences were visible, unlike in wholesale betel nut 
markets. By so doing I hope to create a more coherent theory of marketing as ‘not work’ but a 
process of elicitation that was essential to sociality. I can then take this understanding to the 
uniquely Gorokan betel nut markets, where they were again metamorphosed, creating space 
for chalinj. 
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Produce Markets in Passing 
 
At the game I caught Kripel (our street seller and chalinj competitor with the distinctive jester’s 
hat) just as he bit into a ripe tomato. He bought a couple from the Main Market as a snack on 
his way to Chuave Maket. When Kripel purchased them he had to contend with a style of 
marketing that was somewhat different from his own. Fresh produce markets in Papua New 
Guinea have been the topic of some explanatory modelling (see Modjeska 1985; Strathern 
1992a), and my findings will be familiar to those versed in the debates. The maket-‘logic’ of 
produce markets is a necessary background to their illegal cousins.  
 
As against Kripel and his fellow street marketers, who were confronted with obligations to give 
free comestibles, sellers remained quietly by their produce. Vendors never bargained with 
buyers over price, and competition among sellers appeared absent. Prices were remarkably 
uniform and inflexible. Instead of weighing what the buyer chose to purchase and then fixing a 
price, as is standard in the UK, sellers divided their produce into units containing anything from 
a single discrete fruit or vegetable, a pair or few together, or a pile or bundle of a given 
foodstuff, always of a single species (see Modjeska 1985; Epstein 1982)29. Street betel nut 
marketers on the other hand sold single betel nuts for a single price. Likewise produce 
marketers’ groupings were made to conform to a single price: ten toea, or sixty toea, for 
instance, and marked with this price. Prices were uniform throughout the market so Kripel 
could not have hunted for a good price. Rather than concentrating on the ratio of quantity for 
quantity, sellers foregrounded the quality per unit offered at a standardised price, and this was 
what Kripel will have had his eyes open for.  
 
Comparative advantage was gained by sellers discerning the usual rate for tomatoes, and 
arranging their tomato groupings in such a way as to give the smallest or worst quality single 
or group of tomatoes for the eighty toea (perhaps) they asked for. Unsurprisingly then a juicy, 
ripe, unbroken tomato was often paired with an unripe, overripe, bruised or split tomato 
under a single price. Kripel therefore appraised the overall value of the tomatoes together for 
                                                 
29
 See Mackenzie 1991: 129 for an example of conflict arising from the same system of measurement 
when confronted with those of employees at the nearby mining company. 
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the given price, something he did not demand from his customers. Once groupings were fixed, 
Kripel could not negotiate, only buy or pass by. The sellers together set the terms of trade 
while the buyer gauged the value of particular vendor’s tomato combinations.  
 
Forty three years after Epstein’s original observation in Goroka’s Main Market, it remained the 
case that “almost all of these vendors give the impression as if they were completely lethargic 
and could not care less whether or not they made a sale” (Epstein 1982: 188, fieldwork 1967-
9). Sellers would also rather take their produce home or throw it away than reduce their prices 
at the end of the day. This is not to say that sellers held a superior status to buyers as 
Modjeska adjudges (1985: 158), instead marketers stressed the agency of customers like Kripel 
to buy or not buy from them or anyone else. Sellers sometimes gave an extra small item to the 
buyer on top of what they had bought after its purchase, such as a pair of carrots to go with 
Kripel’s tomatoes, imparting a sense of generosity and relationship making, and this continued 
particularly when one repeat bought from a specific seller, Kripel knew this well as a marketer 
himself. But sellers avoided giving things for nothing like street betel nut marketers, and 
seemed far less interested in giving people a deal. Other sellers complained to Kripel that he 
buys from only another person all the time to elicit a sense of obligation towards them. Past, 
current and future relations are always ready to break through the veneer of uniform 
commodity transactions. This is because while prices were fixed, customers were always under 
pressure to oblige to the people who created the units of produce and did their best to make 
those units seem like they advantaged the buyer. 
 
Unlike street betel nut sellers, who could be male or female, women made up the majority of 
vendors in produce markets; they were the primary cultivators of marketable produce like 
tomatoes, various spinaches, sweet potatoes and fresh fruit. Since the introduction of coffee 
and its higher returns, male interest in fresh produce marketing dwindled (Jackson 1976: 180; 
Beneddiktsson 1998: 164). At such a crowded location, marketers and especially women 
marketers feared conflicting relationships with each other; therefore a coordinated price 
strategy was seen as required for sellers in order to allay allegations of unsociability and fix a 
minimum level of monetary payment. So, in taking their produce to a big open market, sellers 
recognised the power of obligations to known persons and attempted to avoid being held 
hostage to them by selling their products in a relatively anonymous setting. Safely conceived 
to be submitting to the general will of others to fix a fair price, sellers could not be blamed for 
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giving ‘freebies’ to customers like Kripel. Within this veneer of standardisation they could then 
generate esteem through the quality, size and number of products offered within a given price 
band and direct them to particular persons through generous acts. So we must, I think, 
understand the price-per-unit strategy in terms of the pressure exerted by the collective of 
sellers on individual sellers rather than as one that was oriented to swindling potential buyers.  
 
Marilyn Strathern reimagines a counterpoint to what she calls the ‘barter model of value’ 
(1992a), which sits very comfortably with what I saw in Goroka. A ‘barter model of value’, she 
says, assumes an a priori unitness to objects of trade, and thus substitutable and comparable 
relations between sellers and buyers. In her formulation, people are composite collections of 
other peoples’ actions, so in order to act they must be elicited into giving a part of themselves 
by a social other and thereby come to define their own being as singular along with the item30. 
I see this evidenced in the bundling of produce with a unit price. The collection was offered as 
a unit (say K1), but was always rearrangeable into different units by making different 
combinations. Importantly though, this was not done in consultation with the potential buyer 
but prior to or between interactions with them, and always hidden or downplayed31. 
 
The unitisation of collections of objects was offered to the customer as an evaluation of the 
overall value of mass along with quality, which remained to be confirmed by Kripel. Two 
tomatoes were only a potential unit until it was realised by Kripel who elicited its unitisation. 
Otherwise the objects would have shifted into other arrangements for a given unit price and 
remained composite possible combinations. As such they may have returned to the seller’s 
house with them at the end of the day as a composite part of household production and been 
consumed within the composite household rather than suffering the indignity of having had 
the agency of one’s own attempts to evaluate or enumerate interfered with32. Strathern’s 
theory also allows for the gifting of ‘freebies’ by sellers, as an extra incentive to overvalue their 
                                                 
30
 See chapter two. 
31
 See Holbraad 2005 for a comparable encoding of relations within a price. 
32
 This stance on the side of sellers seems widespread: Epstein’s Tolai (East New Britain) researcher 
ToKalaman even came to blows with a Chinese buyer who repeatedly attempted to bargain with different 
sellers at Rabaul market (1982: 200). I see the Chinese buyer as violating the sovereign power of people 
to set forth the valuation they desire, which led ToKalaman into an empathetic rage. Epstein then found 
that the whole research team were incensed by the idea of bargaining or haggling, each contributing to the 
fine that was given ToKalaman in solidarity. 
 130 
 
produce-units in the future and to ensnare them into relations of obligation rather than as 
separated pre-unitised transactors who are ‘quits’.  
 
This analysis conflicts with certain assumptions about the development of market economies, 
where comparable and substitutable relations are supposedly set up through money. This is 
because Kripel was not simply comparing products, but unitisations, and sellers tried to 
influence Kripel’s perceptions of them and their unitisations by showing generosity. In the 
process the flows of exchangeable objects that Charlie was so erudite about took on particular 
values at the moment when a transaction was achieved. Buying things with money was in 
Goroka an act of confirming and accepting unitisations, creating value for the money and 
leaving a residual value in the obligations of that buyer-seller relationship. 
 
Buyer-seller oppositions were fragile and constantly in danger of collapse, for example Kripel 
the neighbour who was at once the tomato buying customer: Kripel appealed to the 
obligations of neighbourliness and thereby undermined the ‘customer’ relation that the 
marketers collectively worked hard to achieve, in which the seller would have appeared 
generous for giving Kripel free things33. As a marketer himself, Kripel was well aware that 
appealing too much to these obligations could hurt his sales later as they in turn called upon 
their neighbourliness for free betel nut, so everyone trod a fine line. Without the good will that 
came with a transaction that was thought to favour one party, transactions lacked value. There 
is thus a sense in which even seemingly one-off transactions projected obligations into the 
past and future as they created value, and as we shall see later, truly individual transactions 
were only really apparent in the betel nut markets, leading to a completely different set of 
marketing tactics, and, in turn, the challenge game.  
 
 
Kakaruk and Chuave Markets 
 
Betel nut, the deep red energiser and animator of street life, was a trade in which one could 
potentially make a lot of money, and hence the central locations of betel nut trade in Town 
were places where money was said to ‘flow’ most strongly. Bringing together the analyses 
                                                 
33
 See also chapter six. 
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from the previous two chapters, I have focused on the manipulation of flows of persons, 
money and cards to elicit value; yet flow involves a temporal element I have barely touched 
upon. For street marketers, local card gamblers, and produce marketers there was a familiar, 
leisurely rhythm and flow such that Charlie and Kripel could feel sure of their generosity being 
repaid in good time. As they moved to the places of concentrated marketing, the speed of flow 
increased. The intensity of the betel nut markets often invoked highly energetic descriptions of 
flowing money and the need for the same kind of vigilant opportunism Kripel and Charlie 
exhibited, but even more acutely (see above quotation). The money in Kakaruk Maket moved 
so fast that when the Twin Towers (centre of world capital trade) collapsed in 2001, Kakaruk 
became ironically known as the new World Trade Centre (see figures 3.8 and 3.9).  
 
 
Figure 3.8: A painting of Kakaruk Maket by local artist Simon Gende, 2009. Simon emphasised the 
busyness of the market, and packed in as many morally admonishable activities as he could, including: 
adultery (top right), young women dying their hair (to attract wealthy men), marijuana smoking and 
selling (middle and bottom right), card gambling (bottom middle), inter-gender beer drinking (middle 
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right), dart gambling for beer (top middle). The title of the painting (bottom centre) is Nupela World 
Trade Centre (‘New World Trade Centre’) 
 
 
Figure 3.9: A painting of Kakaruk Maket by local artist Tatius T. Mohupa, 2010. Tatius likewise 
emphasised the busyness and morally questionable activities taking place, but also the plethora of 
marketers. Included are corrupted children (centre right), women neglecting their children (bottom left), 
casual prostitution (top centre), selling drugs (top left), and gambling (top right). 
 
The squelching commerce of betel nut markets was quite a sight. Traders made the hazardous 
journey down the Highlands Highway to the coast and then scoured the villages of the 
lowlands for their prize, returning in convoys and straight to the markets while their bounty 
remained fresh. Jubilant returnees often drank and gambled copiously as the money flowed 
into their pockets throughout the next few days. Others came to the markets to sell or buy the 
traders’ betel nut, to drink, to gamble, or just to be part of the excitement. Places which were 
home to radically accelerated flows of wealth were exciting, dangerous and morally 
ambivalent places which in turn influenced the mental state of their occupants. I suggest that 
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the betel nut markets acted as central places in the money-thoughts of Gorokan residents34. 
The market was more than just a centre of trade in betel nut; it was a powerful imaginary 
space which stood for the illicit, bad thinking and immoral. 
 
As if to pierce this alcoholic haze the most flamboyant selling tactics of all occurred in Kakaruk 
and Chuave markets, where only the very best at selling operated. In an inversion of the 
regular street practice of downplaying their success in order to demonstrate their generosity, 
most of the sellers in the markets sat above their mats with a huge pile of money between 
their legs, either neatly arranged or impressively disorganised. Within a crowded marketplace, 
where Kripel and the others went specifically to get a good price and good quality betel nut, 
the money demonstrated the quality of the betel nut they had to offer. Money evidenced the 
quantity of past transactions while the betel nut continued to flow out of their bag and onto 
the mat, leaving no visible sign of success. It was the money that indexed the value of betel 
nuts. 
 
                                                 
34
 In so doing I foster their analogy to the equally central imaginary and ideological World Trade Centre 
in New York with its former complex abstraction of transaction and subsequent place as both symbol of 
sin and aspiration for combatants in the ‘War on Terror’.   
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Figure 3.10: A betel nut seller displays his takings and different betel nuts he offers on his mat in Kakaruk 
Maket. He will have offerred more betel nuts per K2 from the pile on the left because their quality was 
lower. The opened ones were piksa (lit. ‘picture’) betel nut used to demonstrate their quality. 
 
Unlike produce, betel nut was not grouped into bundles in Kakaruk or Chuave, they were 
arranged in a pile, designed to demonstrate the attractiveness of the betel nut in its 
abundance. A year or so of judging betel nuts taught me that while there were certain traits 
telling you they will not be good (like being too tumescent), it was by no means easy to judge 
quality, so money performs this function. Each great pile was marked with a price, usually K1 
or K2, but you did not get the whole pile for this amount. The thin veneer of a standard charge 
was exposed as sellers shouted out how many more they would offer you for the price, which 
immediately struck one as very different to produce marketers. A potential customer had 
perhaps tried the product, gained a rapport, and a fee for a number of betel nuts from a given 
pile for a given price has been offered by the seller. The buyer was then able to pick their own 
from the pile, though suggestions of sometimes dubious quality were often given by the 
salesman. This arrangement allowed for sellers to compete amongst each other, offering ever 
higher numbers of betel nut while keeping the price fixed.  
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The showiness of the traders was quite a distinguishing feature. Other marketers were at pains 
to hide their money, to emphasise their lack of it and their generosity in spite of their poverty. 
Wholesale betel nut marketers’ willingness to show off came along with the wide scope of 
their trade. Many village and street corner marketers of betel nut from the surrounding 
province travelled long distances to obtain this valuable object of trade. As such there was 
more acute uncertainty of seeing customers regularly. In a parallel inversion of the practices in 
the produce markets, sellers therefore called out to people and gave them free betel nut 
before they bought. They were forced to show friendship even when they fully expected not to 
see the person again. The betel nut markets, as places of accelerated monetary flow, highly 
undifferentiated products, and customers of disparate origins, required a single transaction 
based strategy, and it was the presence of money piles which indexed this to customers while 
exaggerated generosity ensnared strangers used to transactions with a future. In so doing 
vendors quickly cultivated a relationship where customers could see value created in sellers’ 
unitisations (see table 3.2 for a full breakdown of differences between the three forms of 
marketing). 
 
For repeat customers like Kripel and Charlie, relationships played a serious role in getting and 
keeping their trade. Kripel explained to me how he had many acquaintances in the market, 
who gave him a good deal, but equally even if they did not have good betel nut he still had to 
exercise judiciousness in his buying habits to avoid ill feeling. Betel nut sellers in the markets 
were good salespeople precisely because of this ability to manipulate people; they were the 
ultimate speculators on the intentions of others, and generators of instantaneous value.  
 
Practices Street betel nut 
sellers 
Produce marketers Betel nut wholesale 
vendors 
Freebies? On-going After buying Before buying 
Displaying 
wealth? 
No No Yes 
Pre-unitised 
goods? 
Yes Yes No 
Units sold One betel nut per 
unit 
Set bundles per unit Variable bundles 
per unit 
Frequency of Frequent Infrequent Very infrequent 
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transactions 
with known 
customers 
 
Attitude to 
customers 
Friendly Disinterested Aggressively 
friendly 
Nearby 
competitors? 
Few Many Very many 
Differentiated 
products? 
No Yes No 
Table 3.2: Breakdown of marketing practices across the three forms discussed. 
 
One might be tempted to consider wholesale betel nut marketers more individualistic, and 
their rapport as less genuine; after all they were not oriented toward repeat transactions. J. 
Robbins and Akin for instance impress the need to contextualise "the perhaps universal 
process whereby money gives rise to individualism in terms that are particularly Melanesian. … 
[M]oney creates Melanesian forms of individualism by bolstering already existing kinds of 
individualist power at the expense of other, more socially constructive kinds of agency. 
Individualist forms of agency are not entirely novel, then, but money strengthens them and 
allows them a wider sphere of influence" (1999: 31). While individualism would be a clumsy 
explanation for the selfish or flamboyant acts of betel nut market sellers, perhaps an emphasis 
on individual transactions in Goroka has some analytical potential as a contrast. Concentrating 
on individual transactions certainly allowed for a level of freedom and boisterousness in 
people’s interactions with each other in this setting. As I will presently argue, individual 
transactions were foregrounded in the Challenge game associated with the betel nut markets, 
but with cooperation in building bets it seems individualism cannot cover the full story.  
 
 
Chalinj Revisited 
 
Having set up a particular Gorokan marketing/card playing ‘logic’ of money based on principles 
of flow, attraction and generosity, and varying due to likelihood of repeat transaction, I am 
now in a position to try to demonstrate that an extreme manifestation of this market ‘logic’ 
can be apprehended in chalinj games through a discussion of four of their attributes. The 
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reader will recall that a chalinj game was very fast and involved queuing up money to bet one-
on-one with an incumbent while bystanders joined in to make the pot even. Because 
incumbents did not usually lose all their money, they returned to the game with what 
remained and the pot builds up over time as money is concentrated into a few hands. 
 
The first aspect to consider in the light of maket-‘logic’ is that the pot was deliberately built up. 
To do so the game was reliant on the nature of its market, its big-money flows and the short-
termism prevalent there. Many of the players were betel nut sellers and traders, who had 
access to large amounts of money in short time frames. Traders could lose and then return 
with more cash only a few short minutes later. Building bets and the desire to do so indexed a 
willingness to cooperate and intensify monetary transactions. This was considered work, while 
the game itself was not. Building the pot could be conceptualised as ‘work’ as it involved effort 
and yet was antecedent to social reproduction, to winning and losing, friendliness and 
animosity. The ability to leave with your winnings and not feel pressured to distribute to 
others was a central ideological attribute, it turned making the bets rise into an exertion and 
thus ‘work’ as opposed to an inevitable consequence of people’s desire to win money back.  
 
Second, while the pots built, both wholesale betel nut marketing and chalinj games placed an 
emphasis on individual transactions. People liked chalinj for this reason, citing the ability to slip 
into the crowd as a reason for hosting the game in the market. Chalinj contrasts with continual 
attritional gameplay and mutual support that was seen in street marketing or group gambling 
games outside the betel nut markets, which were not work (cf. Maclean 1984). Flamboyant 
and intense but above all short-termist marketing was matched by concentrated short-termist 
gambling. Anticipating this short-termism a big pile of money sat in the centre, enticing and 
beguiling. Just as the piles of money at betel nut sellers’ feet indexed the fecundity of their 
produce and sales, generating value by demonstrating their reliability, so did the pile of money 
for the game. The money in the centre at a chalinj game indexed the value created by people’s 
work in concentrating money. Though nobody said so explicitly, one could thereby understand 
a challenge game as replicating the marketer-customer relation, in speeded up form: the 
incumbent is the marketer with all the money, the challenger is the customer who by a turn of 
fate could be the one in the chair with all the money, using it to attract customers just as they 
were once attracted. The game remained constant while people could interact with it with 
short term transactions. It aped the betel nut market’s version of market ‘logic’. The only 
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difference was that the money pile could have been yours; its destination was not 
predetermined35. It was the ultimate iteration of the ideology of possibility and vigilance which 
the markets embodied.  
 
Third, chalinj placed numerous partners in play against each other in succession, one 
remaining, and the other discarded. This is very much like the act of wholesale betel nut 
marketing in its relentless pace of individual transaction, where the only moment to best an 
opponent was the immediate one. Speed, in the form of individual transactions, was the 
variable which changed from the street to the betel nut market, and corresponded to the 
increasing anonymity of transactions and the impulse to replicate a sense of continuation. It is 
appropriate that a place where the anonymity of social others, or rather the lack of obligations 
toward them, allowed for the social acceptability of a game which was so utterly, 
antagonistically, one on one. In a place where one did not know their neighbour, and where 
money was moving so fast anyway that one lost attachment to it, such an unsociably 
provocative game could be sufficiently de-fused. As I mentioned above, the building of pots 
was crucial to generating continued one-off interest. 
 
Fourth and finally, there was the faculty to join in the betting of other persons, to make 
collaborative bets. I would suggest that this activity represented the latent collaborative 
element of everyday marketing and life in Goroka. Supporting another person through mutual 
betting is a version of the transactional empathy forming the baseline upon which challenge 
games elaborated. It allowed challenge games to be antagonistic as there were enough players 
supporting each side to prevent conflict. This was a common motif in certain forms of 
gambling which I shall explore in chapter five. 
 
Through the four aspects I have just discussed, it is thus possible to understand this game as a 
manifestation of a particular form of calculative logic with money which was in a complex 
relation with its social surroundings, and as continuous with the ‘logic’ of marketing and card 
playing throughout Goroka. Through it I would suggest that the attainment of money and its 
persistent and constant use did not remove the empathy from social life in favour of cold 
hearted calculation. Instead the empathetic or emotional was fore fronted and specialised in 
the figure of the marketer whose ability to adjudge persons and their capacities to reciprocate 
                                                 
35
 See chapter five. 
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was done through the medium of money, and the chalinj gambler who fed off marketing as an 
activity. So while the urban betel nut markets of Goroka were for many the ultimate source of 
money – where money overflowed - it failed to have total control over persons, and in fact 
performed another, Melanesian elaboration. Instead of betel nut markets becoming 
impersonal places of capitalist commodification, they instead became centres of radical social 
engagement of the generally attractive kind. 
 
In completing this section, I would like to suggest that the restriction of this game to a single 
site says something about Gorokan residents, immigrants from other provinces and the 
character of Eastern Highlanders. Those involved in the markets would often tell me pointedly 
that “there are no coastal people here, they do not support one another and they are greedy. 
We like to support others and help lift a man up and increase his name, while coastal people 
will be jealous of their own brother”. Or they would say that “we in the Highlands are not 
bothered about money, we can gamble because our kin are all around, we know that money 
will still come from them; coastal people get money from maybe one corner, but we know that 
money comes from many corners, so we just play without thinking”36. It would be easy to 
understand Challenge games as representing a gambling equivalent to incremental 
competitive exchange famous further up the Highlands, with a growing pot and one-on-one 
contestation. Yet this was not what my informants emphasised. It is true people in Goroka 
believed games like Challenge were played with much higher frequency and bet sizes further 
up the Highlands Highway, but they did not see themselves as different from other 
Highlanders. Instead those further up were believed to play this game more often because 
their lands are filled with gold, oil and minerals, which caused money to overflow all the time. 
Goroka’s economy meanwhile was based on coffee, which did not yield the same riches37. As 
such we can understand Challenge as a game of short term abandon associated with Highland 
people’s love of showing generosity with money, which was paradoxically a form of work. At 
the same time these people were stimulated by the quantity and speed of money’s flow to 
engage in outlandish betting practices.  
 
                                                 
36
 The word ‘corner’ (kona) has one of its most interesting inflections in this statement, taken to mean 
sources of wealth, persons known to the receiver, and can recursively show the source of money as itself 
a manipulator of transactions. In other words, it is a fractal or composite signifier. 
37
 See prologue. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the reader has been on a journey which Kripel, Charlie, and I made on many 
occasions: from the street corner to the betel nut markets, passing by the produce markets on 
the way. I moved through the everyday rhythms of reciprocity and transaction, always 
gathering pace. I left the firm knowledge of the settlements and streets, mingled with 
strangers, and encountered one off transactions. I tried to demonstrate that a certain 
perpetuity persists across this transect while making room for obvious differences. Gorokan 
market-‘logic’ takes numerous forms in my discussion, but none of them are reducible to 
nascent commodification. Money and town life stimulated a central place of short-termist 
concerns which took a peculiarly Melanesian character. While transactions and reciprocation 
may multiply in Town, thoughts with money were still understood as intimately connected to 
its sources and prospective uses.  
 
I conclude by meditating on how the Town and the ‘stranger’ (man/meri yu no save lo em, lit. 
‘man/woman you do not know of them’, see chapters four and six) figure in theories of money. 
It is somewhat orthodox to see the Town is the initiator and co-combatant with money for the 
alienation of self from other persons and objects. The advent of the Town and the stranger is 
often seen as “a form of limit-defining, [they are] abstracted from the visible objects of 
economics just as mathematical thought abstracts something from the mechanistically 
conceived environment” (Spengler 1926: 481). Spengler continues to elaborate on the Town 
and money’s relation to mathematical thought (and what I characterise as market-‘logic’):  
 
“money corresponds exactly to abstract number. Both are entirely inorganic. The 
economic picture is reduced exclusively to quantities, whereas the important point 
about “goods” had been their quality. …“This style of thought soon gets hold of the 
waking-consciousness of the entire urban population and, therefore, of everyone who 
plays any serious part in the conduct of economic history” (ibid: 482-484; see also 
Simmel 1990 [1907] and below).  
 
And yet, as we have seen, there is nothing inevitable about money and Town reducing 
economic thought to a matter of simple quantity, at least in Goroka.  
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The indigenous distinctions between categories of work and marketing further destabilise the 
abstraction of people from their labour. Work as the prerequisite for social efficacy (be it 
gardening, employment, or building a pot) was opposed to the ‘career’ transacting of 
marketers, gamblers and those involved in business. Therefore the attainment of money and 
its persistent and constant use did not remove the social from social life in favour of 
calculation. Instead the social was fore fronted and specialised in the figure of the marketer; 
their ability to adjudge persons and their capacities to reciprocate through the marketing 
medium created value in the process of eliciting intersubjectivity with customers. The reader 
will recall that I have defined value for the purposes of this thesis as a single scale of 
measurement where people rank items in terms of their effectiveness as against other items, 
and that that value can be increased if the perceived effectiveness of the item is also increased 
by carrying with it a sense of obligation. 
 
Simmel said that "[w]e are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life, from the point of view 
of consciousness, consists in experiencing and judging values, and that it acquires meaning and 
significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an 
infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance." (1990 [1907]: 60). I argue that such 
awareness was actually intrinsic to the daily thoughts of Gorokans. In Goroka monetary value 
was considered relative to the situation of each individual exchange, including the assumed 
valuation of others and their goals and responsibilities, and thus value itself was expanded in 
definition and released from its mooring to objects. I find that my material in both chapters 
one and the present chapter stress the need to reincorporate the caveat qualifying Simmel’s 
model: the imperfect market. What is happening in Goroka was imperfection assumed rather 
than a general acceptance of broad applicability with limited distortions. A Gorokan market 
was fleshed out from the beginning with all the other agencies of persons and things: magic, 
attractiveness, kinship, jealousy, purity of thought, singularity of intention, projection of the 
future. Price and quantity were only a part of this, where motivations to maximise these 
aspects above others constantly shifted from transaction to transaction, dependent upon 
perspective and priorities.  
 
From here on in, as we leave card gambling for the more expensive and more collective forms 
that gambling takes, I build on the attribute of speed by examining just how the value of 
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money is driven up or down through the efforts of powerful individuals and collectives 
interacting with slot machines and sporting events. In the next chapter I develop the sphere of 
transactions that I describe here as ‘not work’, by focussing in on A. Strathern’s notion of 
“finance”. By looking at successful ‘big-men’ and their gambling habits as “finance”, the role of 
transaction as a mode of creating good will is developed into a technique for developing 
existing forms of social inequality. 
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Chapter 4 
 
To be a Big-Shot:  
‘Big-Men’, Pokies and Money 
 
 
 
This article is on a jarringly different scale to the material of the 
previous chapter; it calls for unity among Highlands ministers in 
an effort to retain Highlanders’ control over key ministerial 
positions. Following a reported fracture in the then ruling 
National Alliance party, and a possible reshuffle of the cabinet, 
Highlands ministers put pressure on then Prime Minister Sir 
Michael Somare not to underrepresent their region. The 
regionalism of Papua New Guinea politics comes through, as well 
as the fragility of political parties, where political orientation is far 
less important than the opportunities that parties present to 
members. The article is typical of political reporting in the 
national newspapers, where readers detect the voice of a 
prominent person barely between the lines. Calls for unity are 
also familiar in the highly competitive world of Highlands 
leadership. This time the opinion was voiced by my adopted 
father: local ‘big-shot’ and “prominent leader” Tom Liam; I know 
him as Daddy Tom. His story is intimately linked with gambling, 
but in forms that seem far removed from the contexts I have 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
 
This chapter moves away from everyday card gambling, where 
you will not see Goroka’s political elite, who argued that pokies 
(slot machines) better fit their status and their wallets. I argue 
that pokie joints were places where novel forms of leadership 
emerge in the context of conspicuous consumption and the 
Figure 4.1: Newspaper 
clipping from Papua New 
Guinea Post-Courier, 
Friday February 12 2010, 
p5. 
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process of denuding money’s value. Leaders like my adopted father coalesced in rhetoric and 
in transaction at the pokie joints they frequented. I see pokies as part of a growing list of 
“finance” sources that allow contemporary big-men across the Highlands to transact with each 
other in a manner that brings variant strains of big-manship into relation. In the context of the 
thesis I am moving away from everyday statements and efficacy-testing through cards to 
describe some of the inequalities that were readily apparent in Goroka but have remained 
unvoiced thus far. In the last chapter I described an exceptional game that was open to all, and 
its relationship to fast money; I now draw the reader’s attention to another high stakes game, 
one which was as unexceptional as kwin and bom (see chapters one and two) but which was 
restricted in its clientele, marking some Gorokans apart from others on the basis of ‘big 
money’ and ‘big-manship’.  
 
At the time of my fieldwork there were five pokie joints dotted around the centre of the Town 
area (see figure 0.5 in the prologue), close to government buildings, banks, shops, nightclubs, 
the airstrip and houses of wealthy residents; places where wealthy people are likely to be. 
With an estimated average of 20 machines in each joint, around 100 pokie machines serviced 
an official population of 26,311 (Papua New Guinea National Statistics Office 2002). On a busy 
day the largest joint banked K16-17,000 in revenue1. Nor was Goroka alone, in Papua New 
Guinea as a whole there were 130 pokie sites and almost 2000 machines in total (National 
Gaming Control Board pers. comm. 2010)2. Annual revenue from pokies was K250 million and 
rising.  
                                                 
1
 At the time of my fieldwork, One British Pound was worth approximately 3.7 Papua New Guinea Kina. 
2
 The pokies themselves are owned by companies of ‘White’ or ‘Asian’ origin and placed in the care of 
establishments often run by Papua New Guineans, but nevertheless the companies retain a large amount 
of control over the opening times and the running of the establishments. Following the Gaming Control 
Act of 2007, each day all the revenue from pokies goes into a trust account held by the National Gaming 
Control Board, from which 46% of gross profits are submitted to the national government as betting tax; 
14% goes to a ‘Community Benefit Fund Account’; 5% goes to the National Gaming Control Board for 
running costs; 10% goes to the owners of the machines (known as the ‘operator’) and the final 25% goes 
to the owner of the premises (the permit holder). The intersection of different types of business creates 
tensions, as the more fluid cash flow of Papua New Guinean businesses (see below) meet a rigorous 
accounting procedure and international gaming machine operators used to exacting numerical accounting 
and centralised control. Such frictions are laid stark by the computer operated system: its inflexible 
accounting procedure tells the central office in Port Moresby knows exactly how much money should be 
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In Papua New Guinea pokies date back to 1994; speaking in the ethnographic present, many of 
the machines in Goroka have not changed since their arrival. Television screens display 
symbols that spin and stop each turn; for a player to win the symbols must align in certain 
combinations. Unlike card games, a player is not faced with groups of competitors and piles of 
money, only a silent machine and a numerical display of their score, winnings, and bet sizes. 
Pokie machines do not take money directly, this is given to an operator in a separate booth, 
and then the player chooses a machine parked against a wall. Players face only their machine, 
cutting out direct competition with people. Machines are not understood to have their own 
wills; instead they are thought to be “controlled in Port Moresby” (the capital). As they see it, 
Moresby sets the time and place for wins and losses, but not the person who will be playing at 
the time, and decisions made on-screen can outwit a machine’s “programme”. Pokies’ 
immunity from local influence and connection with Port Moresby makes them highly 
attractive3. One part of the attraction is the national scale of the gambling: players can imagine 
themselves as equivalent to high-flyers in the capital, and with equal opportunities for success. 
Another part of the attraction is that the singular nature of gameplay precludes expressions of 
amity/antagonism within the game4; instead pokies highlight inequalities between those who 
can afford to interact with the machines and those who cannot. A high price tag makes pokies 
unaffordable to many, and pokie joints are most often frequented by either people who have 
just come across some money or the comparatively wealthy, most notably ‘big-men’.  
 
As we shall see during the course of this chapter, the internal logic of pokie gambling is both 
similar and in crucial respects different to card gambling. I have argued that the internal logic 
of all gambling games (including the size of bets) models the types of sociality that surround 
them; pokies are notable for modelling existing inequalities. Machines set up situations that 
play into the hands of ‘big-men’, because they absorb their attention and allow them to act 
nonchalantly toward money. While winnings and losses play out on-screen, the action occurs 
                                                                                                                                               
in the account, requiring that amount to be banked. The Papua New Guinean management of one pokie 
joint kept two sets of bookkeeping ledgers so that they could mobilise money for other business ventures 
like entertaining, or to compensate those who lose large amounts of money, and made up the rest from 
their personal funds.  
 
3
 See prologue for a discussion of the same attributes for cards. 
4
 See chapter one for a discussion of why this is desirable in the case of card games. 
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between ‘big-men’ and ‘followers’ and ‘big-men’ and ‘big-men’ while they face their respective 
machines. Pokie machines allow this to happen, and so their internal logic is crucial even 
though it seems peripheral to the socially-significant transactions between people. I 
concentrate on the mode in which ‘big-men’ make use of the pokie machines’ internal logic for 
their own ends; the chapter therefore appears to shift scale slightly from the chapters that 
characterise cards. People’s differential access to money and support outside of the pokies – 
and the fact that pokies make profits from players rather than recirculating money – mean 
that inequalities that exist outside pokies are marked within pokie joints. I therefore proceed 
with a description of ‘big-manship’ in Goroka as a means of marking “financial” inequalities 
before moving into the way this plays out within pokies. 
 
 
‘Big-men’ and “Finance” 
 
It is fair to say that Melanesian ‘big-men’ hold a special place in anthropology (see Sahlins 
1963; Lindstrom 1981). They have contributed much to kinship studies, theories of social 
organisation, political/economic anthropology, and theories of the gift (see Godelier 1986; 
Godelier & M. Strathern 1991). Big-manship ethnography was a novel and radical challenge to 
unilineal and state-ist ideas of power borne out of anthropology’s African boom. The term has 
travelled beyond its Melanesian roots, and ‘big-men’ are today found in the neolithic and iron 
ages, among the Innuit, the Spanish, and inside the boardrooms of multinationals (Brown 1990 
citing van Bakel, Hagesteijn, and van de Velde 1986).  
 
The term sprang up following indigenous usage: some early ethnographers of Melanesia 
described the leaders they encountered as ‘big-men’ because it chimed better than ‘chief’, 
with its hereditary associations (see Chowning 1979: 66-67; Read 1950: 216). It gained 
anthropological prominence when Marshall Sahlins published his productive if sweeping article 
Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-man, Chief (1963). Sahlins evolutionary model posited a west-east 
political progression from small Melanesian meritocratic polities led by ‘big-men’ to large 
Polynesian hierarchical polities led by hereditary ‘chiefs’. Qualifications and critiques of 
Sahlins’ characterisation soon followed, as new ethnographic material showed a wealth of 
political systems in both “regions” (see B. Douglas 1979; Lindstrom 1978; cf. Hays et al. 1993). 
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A sense of how ‘big-manship’ developed within Highlands ethnography will give the reader a 
clear background to the pokies context I describe afterward.  
 
Highland Papua New Guinea ethnography was emergent at the time Sahlins’ article was 
published; its influence fed back upon the field, and a number of ethnographers found 
Highlanders the archetype of Sahlins’ big-man systems (see Feil 1987), while others 
strenuously denied it (see Sillitoe 1979:48; 2010). Through their debates a more careful 
gradation of Melanesian and Highlands leadership patterns began to emerge. Some preferred 
a distinction between big-men and great men (Godelier 1986; Godelier & M. Strathern 19915); 
others favoured a sliding scale of big-manship based upon polity size and use of resources (A. 
Strathern 1969; Lederman 1990). All agreed that ‘big-manship’, insofar as it did exist, was most 
pronounced in the Western Highlands among Melpa and Enga speaking peoples. These 
peoples practiced the most elaborate of ceremonial exchanges with live pigs and in so doing 
their ‘big-men’ appeared most distinctively and yet meritocratically in control of their group. 
East and southward of this epicentre, ‘big-manship’ progressively diminished in line with the 
decreased scope of ceremonial exchange. Meanwhile increasing use of Tok Pisin and English in 
Papua New Guinea meant indigenous use of the term ‘big-man’ was joined or replaced by a 
plethora of other names of distinction (in Goroka these include ‘leader-man’, ‘boss’, ‘big-shot’ 
and ‘chief’, see also Martin 2010), while anthropological critique actually entrenched the ‘big-
man’ as either ideal type or straw man (Lindstrom 1981).  
 
The claims I make about novel forms of ‘big-manship’ build upon the work of Rena Lederman 
(1990: 3), herself elaborating on the lead taken by Andrew Strathern (1969), and I begin with 
the framework he provided. A. Strathern’s comparative approach took speakers of Siane 
(Eastern Highlands), Simbu (Simbu District), Maring (Madang District), Mendi (Southern 
Highlands), and Enga (Western Highlands), and looked at the different forms of ceremonial 
exchange they practiced. This he compared to the emphasis they placed on home production 
or “financial” partnerships between ‘big-men’ and outsiders. “Finance” meant men 
strategically extending credit to each other (especially outside their kin groups) in the form of 
pigs and shells that they called upon at a later time. Among Melpa and Enga-speaking peoples, 
                                                 
5
 Godelier’s model of big versus great men based upon the payment of bridewealth versus sister exchange 
respectively, would put Gorokans firmly in the big-man category. I therefore do not concern myself with 
this argument here. 
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these financial arrangements created long interwoven paths of obligations6. ‘Big-men’, who 
were the most credit-worthy, effectively guaranteed the transactions of others and gained 
status as a result (ibid: 57), becoming "nodes" of "redistributive exchange systems" (Rubel and 
Rosman 1978:290). A. Strathern suggests that with greater scope for “finance”, comes “greater 
scope for men to establish pre-eminence in exchanges” (A. Strathern 1969: 45), garnering 
supporting contributions from clan members who gain eminence synecdochally through them. 
In the Eastern part of the Highlands, A. Strathern says, killing pigs before distribution barred 
the pigs from financing further transactions, and this in turn prevented the chains of exchange 
seen among Melpa and Enga-speaking peoples7. Without this, he implies, ‘big-men’ could not 
become preeminent. 
 
Rena Lederman (1990) draws on A. Strathern’s contrast between Eastern and Western 
Highlands, picking on the fact that in the Southern Highlands (further west still from Eastern 
Highlands) large prestations of pigs do not link together in chains, as in Enga tee and Melpa 
moka, and are not identified with particular ‘big-men’ but rather situationally organised 
factions of men. At the same time the ‘big-man’ complex is less apparent in the societies of the 
Southern Highlands (Sillitoe 2010), leading one to suspect (following A. Strathern’s argument) 
that they lacked the requisite forms of “finance”. In contrast to A. Strathern’s hypothesis, 
Lederman observes that among the Mendi where she worked and more broadly in the 
Southern Highlands, people actually had even more developed systems of “finance”. She 
points to the fact Southern Highlanders use “finance” extensively to bring together pigs for 
prestations, and doing so is not limited to nor dominated by ‘big-men’ (see also Lederman 
1986: 204-5). As opposed to “finance” simply growing proportionally to ‘big-manship’, ‘big-
men’ are constrained by widespread “finance” that compromises clan solidarity and limits the 
supporting contributions of clansmen to ‘big-men’, who depend upon these contributions to 
build their ‘names’ (Lederman 1990: 8-9). She argues that therefore it is culturally 
circumscribed forms of “finance” and ‘big-men’s’ dominance over it, that allows them to 
                                                 
6
 The increased use of shells as wealth in this part of the Highlands was also given as a reason for a 
greater emphasis on “finance” (A. Strathern 1985:103 following Feil 1984). However, since money had 
replaced shells throughout the Highlands by the time of my fieldwork, I do not concern myself with this 
contrast. 
7
 For a discussion of how Leadership has changed in among Melpa speakers, see Stewart & A. Strathern 
2005. 
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become particularly big; “pushed to an extreme so that everyone is doing it, “finance” is no 
longer simply a means by which big-men break loose from the production constraints of their 
local groups” (ibid: 11). 
 
Eastern Highlands ‘big-manship’ and ceremonial exchanges were also distinctive from their 
westerly counterparts: they did not organise competitive gifts of live pigs, and their ‘big-men’ 
seemed more consensus oriented. Pig exchanges were expected not to impoverish one’s 
competitors: givers negotiated the size of festivals with opponents to ensure pay back was 
possible (S. Robbins 1982; Salisbury 1962; see chapter five). There was also an ethic of group 
solidarity where intra-group transactions should not be monitored for exacting reciprocity 
(Salisbury 1962); some said limiting the capacity of ‘big-men’ to build up a following through 
personal debt (A. Strathern 1969: 50). Without incremental exchange, Eastern Highlands 
leadership was gained through accomplishment in warfare, through oratory and the ability to 
show respect while bending others to one’s will (Read 1959; Newman 1965; Salisbury 1962).  
 
In Goroka and the Eastern Highlands (and unlike among Melpa and Enga to the West) older 
people were and are given the title ‘big-man’ out of respect (see Hawkes 1978). There is a 
sense in which all senior men are de facto big-men, whether they have achieved prominence 
or not. Read (1959) and Salisbury (1964) are nevertheless careful to demonstrate that people 
perceive a difference between seniors and ‘true big-men’, whose personalities are 
distinguishable. Salisbury also differentiates between aspiring big-men which he terms 
“executives”, and the really big-men, whom he refers to as “directors” (1964: 236; likewise A. 
Strathern 1966). In this chapter I primarily refer to “directors”, or “truly big-men”, as Hawkes 
describes them (1978: 163). 
 
Investigating what it takes to be a ‘big-man’ among the Gahuku-Gama, Kenneth Read (1959) 
points out that “such qualities as aggressiveness, the possession of special skills, knowledge or 
wealth which we usually cite as prerequisites for achieving authority in the traditional social 
systems” are not necessarily those which produce a leader. Instead in these “essentially 
equalitarian, consensus-oriented societies” successful leadership is achieved by men who are 
able to convey an air of autonomy (1959: 425; see also Salisbury 1964). The Guhuku-Gama 
leader attracts influence and followers because of his ability to be admirable, balancing their 
two most important values: strength and equivalence. According to Read “[l]eadership 
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requires a man endowed with a considerable measure of self-confidence, a person who is 
yielding or assertive as the occasion demands… able to judge and to wait for the appropriate 
moment to act, who can… manipulate public opinion and if necessary defer to it without 
relinquishing either his control or his individuality… Such men… are essentially the more 
‘autonomous’, individuals” in a society oriented toward group solidarity (Read 1959: 427). 
Essentially, in the context of constant kinship demands and relational obligations, to be 
autonomous is to encompass the wills and demands of others and make them seem your own. 
Their ability and awareness that they bent the rules and others’ wills meant that leaders Read 
spoke to described themselves as “bad men” (ibid: 434). 
 
My adopted father Tom Liam (of Simbu origin8 but having lived his life in Goroka) fitted this 
profile well: his voice was loud; his body broad and tall, with a reputation for great strength. 
Tom’s attitude to all things and people was of friendly gestures but studied indifference to 
others’ agency, either agreeing with or ignoring your words; confrontational if pressed. It was 
as if he could suck up all you had to give with a few words. This strength lay alongside his 
ability to respect your wishes, and to do so in such a way as to exceed your expectations. Tom 
Liam always described himself to me as a ‘bad man’, exactly as Kenneth Read heard all those 
years ago. He was strong, aware of the necessity for the pretence of equality and he broke the 
rules skilfully toward his own ends. He was also a great transactor, managing debts and 
controlling others through his “financial” prowess.  
 
‘Big-men’ like Tom Liam have new skills: a generation of Gorokans have grown up with the 
theatrics of an urbanised form of leadership that requires urbane skills. Town dwelling, in all its 
complexity, breaks with anthropologists received notions of “finance” (or the lack of it) 
defining forms that leadership takes. Today ‘big-men’, or as they like to be variously called: 
‘boss’, ‘leader-man’, or ‘big-shot’, are business men, official political leaders, civil servants, 
                                                 
8
 Using material by Brown & Brookfield (1959), Brookfield & Brown (1963), and Criper (1967), A. 
Strathern thought that Chimbu (Simbu) exchange patterns were more highly organised than their Eastern 
Highlands neighbours (1969: 51). They practiced some extra-clan “financial” arrangements, but these 
were usually in the use of land for home production of pigs rather than direct access to pigs themselves. 
Simbu also held periodical pig killings rather than the exchange of live pigs, preventing the large-scale 
build-up of “finance” in interconnected chains. This contrast is historically important, but I argue that 
with pokies the proclivity of finance masks any detection of different “financial” arrangements and allows 
‘big-men’ to dialogue across such boundaries. 
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coffee plantation owners and sporting celebrities (cf. Martin 2010). Tom owned a slot machine 
joint, two clubs and had large coffee holdings. New opportunities for income, “finance”, and 
consumption (including gambling at pokie joints), I argue, makes Gorokan ‘big-men’ 
comparable with other styles of ‘big-man’ in the Highlands and allows ‘big-men’ from different 
areas to talk the same language: money. They receive money from many ‘corners’ (see 
chapters two and three), and use it to interact with followers and other ‘big-men’ in novel 
transactions that create a network of personal followers outside of their kin groups. Gorokans 
now make a distinction between ‘big-man’, which is applied to both seniors and “directors”, 
and ‘boss’, ‘chief’ or ‘big-shot’, which apply to the “directors” alone, giving a sense of the 
financial weight they ascribe to contemporary leaders9.  
 
Lederman frames her argument by suggesting that variations among Highlands societies’ 
approaches to “finance” give us a key to grasping socioeconomic change:  
 
“[O]ur expectation concerning regional cultural variation ought to be the same as that 
with respect to socio-cultural change: understanding either requires close attention 
to how people make (a) difference. Both variation and change are occasioned by 
culturally specific kinds of creativity, transformative extensions of historically given 
modes of acting in and on the world to unfamiliar circumstances (Wagner 1981; 
Sahlins 1985).” (ibid: 12; see also Sexton 1982; Gordon and Meggitt 1985). 
 
Following this lead it is the forms of, and access to, “finance” that concern me in this chapter; 
especially with respect to pokie players and the shifting leadership patterns engendered 
among them. I argue that Gorokan (and possibly wider) use of terms like ‘big-shot’ show a shift 
in “finance” arrangements (see also Martin 2007; 2010). The above newspaper article, for 
instance, expresses an emergent regional solidarity among big-men with respect to sources of 
“finance”. Increased scope for “finance”, I contend, enables local leaders to play the part of 
‘generic Highlands big-man’, mixing elements that appear categorical in earlier ethnographies 
                                                 
9
 The self-application of the term ‘big-shot’, and its positive connotations, distinguishes its usage in 
Goroka from that seen in Rabaul (East New Britain) by Martin (2007; 2010). There is a consensus among 
these Tolai peoples that ‘big-men’ no longer exist, and that ‘big-shots’ ignore customary obligations in 
the pursuit of money. In Goroka however, ‘big-shots’ are thought to be contemporary iterations of the 
‘big-men’ of the past precisely because of their innovative success in a number of different fields. 
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of Eastern, Western and Southern Highlands, cementing distinctions between themselves and 
those who are described simply as “normal”. The ‘big-shots’ that I interacted with during my 
fieldwork often either grew up or trace origin to other areas of the Highlands, or at least 
transacted with Highlanders who would otherwise be considered different types of ‘big-man’. I 
therefore take the ‘big-man’ category as a (convenient) given (dropping the quotation marks). 
In looking into the forms of inequality that are prescient to Gorokans this chapter develops my 
previous analyses by investigating the connection between unequal access to “finance” and its 
perpetuation through pokie playing. In what follows I frame my material by describing a single 
evening in which my adopted father met me inside the pokies.  
 
 
A Night at the Pokies 
 
As Tom Liam arrived at the Bird of Paradise Pokies Lounge in the centre of Town, word rippled 
across the two rooms. It was 6.30pm on Friday 26th November 2009, outside twilight had given 
way to dark and the bustling streets were all but empty, the final stragglers making their way 
home. Pokies were the dominant form of night time ‘entertainment’ during my stay, despite 
an unofficial night-time curfew imposed on Goroka by fear of rape and theft. It left many 
indoors, and those who stayed out either braved the streets and walked (the strong), or had 
the use of a car. Night-time travellers were stereotypically male, with some exceptions. Tom 
Liam often walked; his name preceded him, few would dare cross him, and the six of us 
together were the largest entourage that night10. Safe in their company, I spent many a night 
walking or catching a lift between joints. 
 
                                                 
10
 Before European colonisation it seems the ability to roam without being harmed was still a sign of pre-
eminence (Salisbury 1962: 101). 
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Figure 4.2: Tom Liam (front) relaxes in the bar area of the Bird of Paradise Pokie Lounge, his bodyguard 
John looks on. In the background two big-men shake hands. 
 
When pokies came to Papua New Guinea in 1994, the National Gaming Control Board decided 
to price out those on low incomes to avoid the exploitation they saw in Australia, starting at 
K20, rising to K30, and finally K50. Low earners still play, but there is a consensus that pokies 
are the province of the well-to-do. The K50’s and K100 notes (worth approximately £13.90 and 
£27.80 respectively in 2009) that circulate in pokie joints gave the impression of success, and 
made pokie joints into dazzling, heady places to be. This is not to say that pokie joints were 
luxurious palaces of consumption, they were often shabby breeze-block structures barred by 
welded steel and patinated with peeling paint. Bare, strip-lit rooms full of battered machines 
beckoned with the shifting lights of their television screens. The electric atmosphere which 
bedazzled occasional participants like me accompanied the personalities as they swaggered in, 
out and around, rather than residing in the site itself. So, as the betel nut markets were places 
of fast games and fast money (see chapter three), pokie joints were places of bikpela man (lit. 
‘big-men’) and bikpela mani (lit. ‘big money’), such was their entwinement. 
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Figure 4.3: The Bird of Paradise Pokies Lounge at opening time. 
 
That night, while Tom watched Australian rugby league on the television (his team, the 
Rabbitons, were playing), I hung around a broken pool table in the bar area, talking with a 
middle aged man called Alwin – a schoolteacher I met only once11 - about the people who 
come to pokies. It was 7.30pm. I had observed people giving when they won, so I decided to 
follow this line of questioning. After struggling to get his point across, Alwin promptly snatched 
a pen from his friend’s shirt pocket and the notebook out of my hand. He scribbled two 
diagrams down, which I have tidied up below12. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of goods ‘in 
the past and in villages’ and figure 4.5 shows how big-men distribute slot machine wins in 
Goroka today. I think they neatly outline the problematic of this chapter. Alwin explained that 
in the past wealth items would come into a community and go to the leader. It happened in 
public, and the leader would distribute in public too. The leader in the village or ‘before’ (as 
Alwin put it) had to give or he would lose ‘honour’ (Alwin’s word). He therefore distributed in 
public to emphasise his fairness.  
 
                                                 
11
 Strangers often approached me in my fieldwork, incongruous as I was with notebook, betel nut and pale 
skin. 
12
 The diagrams are not exactly as they were in my notebook; the segmented circle was added for clarity 
while retaining the spirit of the diagrams and description. 
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Figure 4.4: Past/village distribution patterns. People are represented by triangles; the larger triangle 
represents the big-man who was the recipient of the wealth. The segmented circle is the wealth brought 
into a community, it is out in the open and therefore public. This is why the wealth is equitably 
distributed among all present. 
 
In retrospect this model fits exactly with both the descriptions of Eastern Highlands pig killing 
festivals by earlier ethnographers and the model put forth by A. Strathern (1969): the big-man 
of each group acts as spokesperson and distributor for their group, each of whom feel entitled 
to a return based on their own, home, production (see Salisbury 1962; S. Robbins 1982).  
 
According to Alwin, the gambling winner (figure 4.5) is instead surrounded by friends, language 
mates, colleagues and helpers (what I have called the entourage, i.e. a mixture of kin and non-
kin), and may choose whether to give to them or not. Pokies offer different circumstances and 
distribution decisions to big-men. In my notebook Alwin wrote in English: “the difference 
between a village leader and a modern gambling leader is a gambling leader has the honour to 
say 'yes I give' or to keep. The village leader has the obligation to give with any reason or 
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circumstances”. Alwin’s gambling situation is still considered public, but links between people 
are ambiguous and not purely kinship-based, and the hold that winners have on the money 
they won is strong. Those around a winner are associates rather than intimates until the 
winner chooses to make an associate into an intimate by donating to them. Doing so, Alwin 
said, confers ‘honour’ on those receiving at the expense of others who receive nothing. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: A contemporary gambling big-man’s distribution at pokies. The triangle surrounding the 
segmented wealth object represents the modern gambling big-man, who has control over the wealth. He is 
therefore able to refuse some of the people coming forward to receive gifts. 
 
What makes this description pertinent is that choice, Alwin thought, has led to three types of 
public gamblers, defined by what they do when they win: one type puts their winnings in their 
pocket and goes; the others give it to their helpers, friends, language-mates and colleagues 
when they win. Of those who choose to distribute, one buys people soft drinks, and they do 
not give too much. This person will be a big-man, doing good by distributing while exercising 
judgement. The other will buy beer, two cartons of it, and give it to all the people. This person 
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is a “true man”, but ultimately doomed to lose out. Alwin’s ideal types show that shifts in the 
way wealth comes to big-men at pokies allow them to set up relations that extend beyond 
their clan networks. It is an opportunity for what A. Strathern called “finance”. People may 
choose who to invest in at a broader level than before, and may receive at that broader level. 
Crucially the truly generous man, who might previously have been a leader in the Eastern 
Highlands, would be the loser in these circumstances. Nowadays big-men must exercise 
greater judgement. Having identified a qualitative difference people see between gambling 
big-men and their predecessors, I now discuss in what sense some punters at pokies are ‘big-
men’ and where their wealth comes from, before returning to distribution practices’ role in 
distinguishing contemporary big-men. 
 
 
Big-Men & “Lesser Men” 
 
According to my survey, the average fortnightly income per household in Goroka was K510; 
pokie playing households earned K717. As one would expect, high income people tend to live 
in higher income areas. Amongst settlement dwellers (who have a lower average income) 
surveyed, only 1% of residents over 16 years old admitted regular pokie playing. In a high 
income part of West Goroka, 8% of over 16 year olds (women and men) regularly play pokies. 
In West Goroka 48% of those who leave their community to gamble go to pokies (only 4% of 
the corresponding settlement gamblers go to pokies). So pokie players living in Goroka tend to 
be those who live in the higher income residential areas. Focussing in on the 52 households in 
this sample who played pokies, we see that 15 (29%) also contained a high level professional, 
or a public servant (19 or 37%), a high level manager (7 or 13%), ran a successful business (7 or 
13%), or have large interests in the coffee industry (3 or 6%); only two households had none of 
the above.  
 
Yet the relationship between financial success and leadership is more complex than these 
statistics show, as is leaders’ relationship to pokies. After speaking to Alwin at the bar I 
stepped inside the pokie room of the Bird of Paradise Pokies Lounge and joined John13, a 
                                                 
13
 John was a settlement dweller in Piswara (lit. ‘fish-water’), he grew up in Goroka and was a regular 
member of Tom Liam’s entourage. John was down on his luck, having been a councillor but now without 
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member of Tom Liam’s entourage. I asked John to go through the people playing at that 
moment and tell me what everyone was known for, and who the big-men were14. This always 
revealed a great knowledge of other people’s affairs: 
  
Income Status 
Landowner upon whose land a natural gas project is taking place ‘Big-man’ 
Supervisor at a coffee processing company ‘Normal’ 
Businessman who owns a pokie joint in Kundiawa, Simbu 
Province 
‘Normal’ 
Former Health Extension Officer now working with a large 
development bank 
‘Big-man’ 
Public servant ‘Big-man’ 
Former magistrate ‘Big-man’ 
Quality controller for a coffee exporter ‘Normal’ 
Headmaster of a large high school ‘Big-man’ 
Real estate consultant ‘Big-man’ 
Coffee exporter ‘Normal’ 
Four people were not identifiable for John, but were not local 
big-men according to him. 
 
Table 4.1:  Pokie players and their status at the Lahanis Pokies Lounge, 8.30pm on 26
th
 
November 2009. John used the word ‘normal’ for those who were not a ‘big-man’, it simply 
meant that they were equal to the others, but not special (see below). 
 
For John, some financially successful business persons, such as the pokie joint owner, were 
considered lesser leaders than for instance a former magistrate. It is not so much that wealth 
equals leadership these days, because being wealthy, while alluring, is not admirable unless 
that wealth is mobilised in particular ways. Both Alwin and John indicated that big-men are still 
defined by the way they manipulate wealth. A good illustration of this is the use of the term 
maniman (‘money-man’). In Goroka maniman means men who have become very wealthy and 
are able to contribute to whatever they want without having to consider it. Untroubled by the 
need to prioritise their gifts to some events over others, these individuals cut an ambiguous 
figure as good people to know but not necessarily to emulate. In a perverse way, the maniman 
has had his capability for autonomous decision removed by having too much money: giving to 
                                                                                                                                               
work for a number of years. Ben and John had campaigned together, John for district councillor, Ben for 
member of parliament. 
 
14
 As I asked a member of the entourage at different points in the night every time we went out to pokies. 
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an event displays no skill because money is of so little value to them. They do not participate in 
financial arrangements because they do not need assistance15.  
 
Nevertheless, John’s assessment shows that big-men usually have a high profile job in public 
service or in well-known businesses. They also invariably own one or many businesses such as 
a pig-rearing enterprise, beer shops or pool table manufacturing. The separation of waged and 
business enterprises is key, as most use their wages to support their families, and their 
‘businesses’ (often lacking comprehensive accounting procedures) are used to make all sorts of 
other ventures. In chapter three I described how employment is ‘work’ while bisnis (lit. 
‘business’) is not; this is because the freedom of business allows the businessman to 
manoeuvre their money in a flexible way, utilising kin and other forms of relationship.  
 
Business ownership is highly regarded in Goroka, but cannot be understood in the standard 
sense. Most are makeshift trading companies set up on the basis of a favour, giving a person 
preferential access to goods or customers. Typical examples are security businesses, which 
often begin when a person gains a contract to provide security for a business/government 
premises by a known associate, starting a business to provide the service. Once up and 
running, the business as property is owned both collectively and individually. Individually 
through use and development, collectively in that its success and ultimate end belongs to the 
whole clan (cf. Wagner 1974; Finney 1973). Successful big-men can rely upon their kin and 
supporters to help their business flourish, setting up further deals with associates and other 
companies and guaranteeing their custom. At the same time demands will be made upon the 
business ‘owner’, and involve participating in unprofitable activities or donating money to 
various activities. The person and their ability to contribute are not separated from their 
business dealings and therefore business is a mode by which people do “finance”. For this 
reason many Gorokans reflect that short term success in businesses is easy, but sustaining or 
growing them is hard because their success is dependent upon the obligation-balancing skill of 
one big-shot (see Finney 1968; 1973).  
 
Part of the issue was that money which came from businesses, like winnings from gambling, 
was said to be fri mani (lit. ‘free money’). It was not owed directly to another and was 
                                                 
15
 The maniman closely resembles Tolai use of the term big-shot (Martin 2007; 2010), which in Goroka 
seems to have kept the positive associations of its predecessor, big-man. 
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therefore free in the sense that it may then be used as a form of “finance” by businessmen in 
their search for renown. Businesses conform to the ‘market-logic’ described in chapter three 
(though I take that point no further here). In accordance with the need to bridge networks of 
people beyond orthodox business arrangements16, money was often given to existing and 
potential supporters (as well as other big-shots, see below) during daily gifting or at the pokies. 
The hope was both that the recipients will frequent their businesses and ultimately come to 
the big-man when they have a life crisis, enchaining them securely in their web of reciprocal 
support.  
 
The success of one’s business, participation in traditional exchanges and contributions to 
others are intimately bound up together in the creating of one’s ‘name’. The reverse is also 
true: the power of one’s name attracts customers to one’s business. Tom, who owned a pokie 
joint himself, used his name to bring customers in, and that, he thought, depended on his own 
presence at other pokie joints. Fame, garnered in part by lavish spending at pokies, feeds back 
into its own system. Often the strain of such demands and the uncertainty of business meant 
aspiring big-men could not sustain their success, and found themselves brought down by the 
demands of others and/or a lack of frugality, including over-indulgence at the pokies. Being a 
‘truly big-man’ is to tread the fine line of popularity and social distance by employing 
innovative and traditional transactional methods. In other words, deploying “finance” 
judiciously through whatever means are available.  
 
At pokies, while big-men fixated on their machines, men of lower standing – those people 
whom John described as ‘normal’ – bobbed between them. Big-men are thought generous just 
for coming to pokies, for fraternising with those of a lower ‘level’ and for meeting them as 
equals. ‘Normal’ men accompanied leaders as bodigard (‘bodyguard’), eskot (‘escort’) or in 
order to halpim em (‘help them’), rarely playing themselves. I shall characterise them as 
followers and, as they described themselves, “lesser men” (liklik mangi, lit. ‘small boy-
children’). These “lesser men” took positions standing by a player, encouraging them, watching 
intently or taking orders from their player for beer, cigarettes, betel nut, to put another K50 on 
the machine or take the winnings out for them. Big-men say followers protect them from 
                                                 
16
 This is not to say that corruption, as we term it, is not rife in the so-called mature economies, but it is 
precisely because we maintain a distinction between proper business activity and corruption that does not 
apply neatly to the Gorokan context. 
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thieves, jealous people, poisoned drinks, and allow them to concentrate entirely on the 
game17. Sometimes it seemed they expressed emotion on their behalf as well.  
 
While player’s attention remains on the game, followers come and hover, flitting between 
leaders they feel they can approach or remaining loyal to the one. When people characterise 
pokies as a game, it is this singular attention they focus upon. People liked it because you play 
wan-man wan-man (lit. ‘one-man one-man’, i.e. separated from other gamblers and making 
one’s own decisions), or they did not like the wan wan (lit. ‘one one’, same meaning) 
unsociability of the game. Acting alone is typically associated with ol waitman (‘white people’), 
and contrasts with acting wan-taim (lit. ‘one-time’, with others), which is stereotypically Papua 
New Guinean. Acting on one’s own is to act without assuming that one’s actions are based 
upon relations with others, and doing so is seen as a critique of traditional Papua New Guinean 
sensibilities (Reed 2003; see J. Robbins 2004; M. Strathern 1999; below). While ‘gamblers’ eyes 
remained fixed to their screens, they still played to an audience reflected through the gossip of 
“lesser men”, and would often change location if they thought there were not enough fellow 
big-men around. The importance of playing wan wan shall become increasingly significant in 
the final analysis. 
 
Keeping your concentration means money passes to followers who go buy beer, betel nut or 
cigarettes on big-shots’ behalves; the follower will receive some in turn. If they hand over 
small monies, big-men rarely ask for change. Small winnings are also given to followers to keep 
them satisfied. It is thus possible for “lesser men” to benefit monetarily from pokies without 
playing themselves. In their immobile singularity, big-men are a magnet for “lesser men” who 
do not care about the big-man, only the money, and close followers have the job of guarding 
big-men from these chancers. It is thought that some very shrewd people make their entire 
living from being sponsored to play or by being around the pokie joints ready to benefit from 
other people’s payouts, but they are looked down upon because they have no loyalties. To 
prevent pokie joints from being swamped by these beneficiaries, access is strictly controlled by 
iron gates and security personnel. 
 
Despite obvious status disparities between big-men and others at the pokie joints, there was a 
strong rhetoric of equality. Big-men perpetually said that they are all equal here, big and small 
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 When we were alone leaders often bemoaned these same people and characterise them as beggars. 
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associate freely. Like many parts of Papua New Guinea, in Goroka “hierarchy and equality 
[are]… coexisting modalities of a single system” (Flanagan 1989: 261). Equality in Goroka is an 
achieved state. One is nurtured during ones early years, and this is seen as a debt incurred on 
one’s behalf by the nurturers, particularly the mother (see also M. Strathern 1988). Boys also 
incur significant debt to their clan when they contribute to bridewealth. When boys have 
repaid the debts sustained while growing up and finding a wife, then they are men, and 
notionally equal. Only then is one able to gain a name for oneself (see Read 1959). Pokies, 
frequented by adults and particularly men, are primarily a place for those who have already 
come to equality, giving them the freedom to invest their income as they choose (though not 
without obligations). Stressing equality in pokie joints is saying that ‘we are equal in our 
potential’: amongst us anyone can excel by their qualities. This is in keeping with previous 
accounts that stress the “equalitarian” nature of Eastern Highlands societies (see Read 1959; 
Salisbury 1962). In the past literature on exchange, it was those men who had made good their 
debts who could participate in “finance” without being scorned by their own kin (A. Strathern 
1971), and at pokies people seemed to suggest, often too emphatically, that they were all 
equally able to do so.  
 
 
How to Play… Pokies 
 
After the rugby league game, aware of the necessity to play and display wealth, Tom Liam 
made his way beyond the partition, scanned the room and found a machine he fancied. He 
pulled out his wallet and thumbed through a wad of notes wedged inside. People would often 
delineate big-men from those who ‘came with only K50 to spend’18. Men who go to pokies are 
thought to do so with amounts and denominations of money corresponding to their size, and 
Tom was well aware of this when he flashed his cash19. He handed one of his K50 notes to 
John, who sauntered over to a booth in the far corner of the room. Inside a young man was 
hunched in his chair.  
                                                 
18
 Size of notes and size of men is in turn reflected in the iconography of notes themselves. The typical 
large value note of K50 being the only one which carries a picture, that of current and founding prime 
minister Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare, the archetypical national level leader (cf. Foster 1995a; 1998). 
19
 In chapter six I discuss how hiding money is important in everyday life, making Tom’s display a 
particularly potent statement. 
 163 
 
 
Over at the counter John slid the note through the letter-box sized hole in the plexi-glass, and 
said “12”; the machine that Tom chose. Behind the translucent wall, the operator, ‘Tax’ placed 
the K50 in his till and glanced at his computer screen, where he clicked an icon, then punched 
50 into the keypad and pressed return. 1000 credits immediately appeared on screen over at 
Tom’s machine, the series of buttons below the television screen began flashing, and he 
wasted no time making his first bet. The screen displayed three rows of five card-like symbols 
carrying either numbers or pictures on them. Each turn the ‘cards’ appeared to spin irregularly 
downward, slowing to a halt from left to right, aping slot machines with moving parts. Figure 
4.6 decodes the information on display. 
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Being a ‘big-shot’ Tom Liam tapped the buttons that committed him to the highest bet in 
credits: 70 (K3.50), giving him a chance of winning the maximum on a single spin: K10,000. 
After several spins (his bets yielding no returns) Tom switched to staking 50 credits. A number 
of lines immediately yielded returns, doubling his credits. Realising his tactics were working, 
Tom took a gnarled toothpick from the corner of his mouth and jammed it between button 
and its border, forcing the machine to play on automatically. He stood four feet back, folded 
his arms and looked on without expression.  
 
Tom Liam, playing 70/50 credits with a toothpick, was considered a real ‘gambler’; but two 
machines apart was a man playing 3 credits, and he was thought to pilai laki (lit. ‘play luck’). As 
I discussed in chapters one and two, luck means good fortune without implying any cause. 
People who ‘play luck’ hope that the little money they brought will be enough to see them 
make a win. Stereotypically these players only attend pokies during daytime; with less money 
to lose they play slowly and timidly, betting small amounts on many lines often, all the time 
trying to ‘mastermind’ the game (see chapter two). Their limbs are said to shake from nerves, 
but their defining characteristic is that they play alone without help, often deliberately in 
secret. This was borne out by my records: on average nine machines would be playing during 
the day, with only eleven people present, so there were very few people accompanying those 
playing. They had a set budget as a result of their solitary play and were characterised as 
‘working class’20 people who come in during their lunch break, played for an hour, and 
sometimes return after work. ‘Gamblers’ like Tom Liam were said to play at any time they 
want; they were business men and thus not tied to working hours. Usually this meant they 
came at night and particularly on the weekends. The average number of people in the pokies 
area during a night while I was present was 39, while the number of machines playing was 13, 
and many more were big-men than during the day.  
 
The ‘gamblers’ that dominated my nights also bet differently to pilai laki pokie players, for 
instance ostentatiously putting K150 on a machine at one time just to save them walking back 
to the operator. They played more than one machine simultaneously: by this point in the 
evening Tom had started playing the machine between him and the ‘working class’ man, and 
                                                 
20
 Note that working class is usually a statement of high praise, and these people who have employment 
are considered to be on a higher ‘level’ than the unemployed majority (see chapter three for an analysis of 
work and employment in Goroka). 
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was tapping rhythmically on its buttons, having left the toothpick to play for him on the first 
machine. I once saw four machines played at once. Followers said ‘gamblers’ play fast (i.e. run 
through their money quickly by betting big) because they have more money, and are assured 
that lose or not, money will still come to them through their networks and their businesses21. 
They only rarely resorted to the cautious tactics of working people. Both types of player 
wanted to win, but many believed that big-shot ‘gamblers’ don’t particularly care if they lose, 
an image they were careful to propagate. In contrast to their working counterparts, these 
players usually acted insulted at the suggestion that they had a budget, which is to say an 
absolute limit. ‘Luck’ (laki) is ideally an irrelevance to the real ‘gambler’ because he believes he 
has enough money to wait out the next win. Some thought that these business men’s skins 
were covered with money (mani pulap lo skin blo em, lit. ‘money full on their skin’, see chapter 
six) so they play without concern, just to relax. Big-men in particular say they feel relaxed 
playing pokies precisely because they play wan wan, against a machine that has no connection 
to the obligations that lead their actions outside of the pokie joint. As successful members of 
their ‘groups’, these leaders are constantly confronted with requests and demands, while the 
machine is disinterested and acts without any pre-existent relationship to the player. 
 
Despite ‘gamblers’ apparent nonchalance, both sets of players played to win, and to do so they 
had to interact with the machines. Having explored efficaciousness in gambling during chapter 
two, here I discuss only what is particular about playing Pokies. Choosing paths connecting 
symbols was important because during a spin with bets on multiple paths, the player may have 
won credits on one (or more) paths but lost credits on all the other routes (again see figure 
4.6). Sometimes players lost more than they won on a given spin, and this made players 
ponder whether they should have bet lower on that spin or on fewer lines. Players adjusted 
their strategy to avoid wastefulness, just like Tom, who switched from 10 credits on all seven 
lines (70 credits) to 10 on five lines (50 credits). All the choices the machines present gave 
players the appearance of effective decision-making, so many thought that you could outwit 
the machine. 
 
                                                 
21
 See also chapter three on betel nut wholesale marketers’ propensity to play because of their ‘fast’ 
incomes and many ‘corners’. 
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By coming to understand the ‘pattern’ between card symbols on the screen, over time the 
players get closer to mastamindim (‘masterminding’ see chapter two) the machines22. With 
pokies this means correctly judging fortuitous or forbidding signs amid the symbols, noticing 
combinations that have appeared before. More idiosyncratic knowledge of these patterns 
makes up a player’s individual aidia (‘ideas’, see chapter two). This information was kept secret 
from other players in order to secure wins for oneself and prevent the machine from adjusting 
to one’s style of play. Such ways of playing were sometimes thought to be intrinsically unique 
to individual players and would not have had an impact on another’s chances of winning23. 
Deciding when to come to pokies also came under one’s aidia, and depended on a wide array 
of factors from recent wins and losses at certain joints, machines and times, to whether one 
                                                 
22
 Adding to the complexity, some configurations led to bonus rounds. There a player was asked to 
choose between two options and given information on the past pattern of results. Choosing heads or tails 
for a televised coin flip and being told the last four results (e.g. heads, heads, tails, heads) is a typical 
example. 
23
 When they did describe tactics, they often said that those tactics only apply to them, and so were of no 
value to me. A few people did divulge their tactics and I give a few examples now from the most popular 
type of machine (bearing in mind that they are not intended as guides to anyone but themselves): 
 
1. If three or four ‘J’ symbols come up then it means that goalpost symbols will soon come in force 
and lead to a bonus round.  
2. If you make bets of 35 credits, this will induce goalposts to come.  
3. If during this bonus round the player kicks an animated ball past the first of a series of lines 
indicating successively larger wins, this portents sizeable winnings.  
4. If the shoe or whistle symbols are spread around and on their own then it means that many 
people have been playing the machine and therefore the machine has adjusted itself and will not 
pay out, but if the symbols come along in clusters of two such symbols then it will pay.  
5. If you see a shoe and a ‘J’ on the same screen, it is a good sign and you should bet heavy to try 
to win big.  
6. The same is true if you see a lot of 8's.  
7. If he sees two or more A's then he should bet low as he will not win.  
8. All machines, he said, will tend to pay out at the end of each month. 
 
These few examples demonstrate people’s intellectualist approach to pokies, as things that can be learnt, 
but which are ambiguous enough to allow people to theorise upon them (see chapter two). Again as in 
chapter two, the secrecy involved in working out your very own strategy meant that people’s activities 
were often mysterious to me. 
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was in the correct frame of mind and financial position to play24. One factor I did not mention 
in chapter two is that people’s aidia together made up their stail (lit. ‘style’). Tax, the operator 
who sat in the booth when John came over, had thought a lot on the subject of tactics and 
stail: 
 
Despite the machines being in control of payouts, the thinking of a man can overcome 
the machines and make them pay-out, they can overpower them with their style, by 
masterminding them. To do this they have to be good at doubling up [during bonus 
rounds], and they collect 400 or so each time. Different styles are required to beat 
different machines though. I want to find out how the machines work, but I don’t 
know; the technicians do though. Sometimes I come in early and just look hard at the 
screens and machines to find a pattern. But we [the staff] are still unclear. 
 
Tax was talking from an everyday person’s, or pilai laki perspective, but ‘gamblers’ tactics 
often went further; they encompassed these strategies and took other persons agency and 
pattern into consideration, something never brought up by those who pilai laki. Tom said that 
if you play heavy like everyone does, with bets of fifty or seventy credits all of the time, the 
machine will not pay out as it just acts as if it is normal, taking the money from these leaders 
as it does all the time. Instead he changes his betting pattern so that it is enticed to give to 
you. Tom used his sensitivity to others as a framework for understanding how a machine might 
work. He seamlessly added that he does this kind of thing on all other occasions as well; that 
this ‘style’ of his is in his blood, he was born a leader25, and he cannot change it. He said that if 
you are a man blo givim (lit. ‘man belonging to giving’, a generous man), then you will just give. 
He said that if he has money, all the people will know and it will flo raun (‘flow around’). Tom 
melds his understanding of people, and how to transact with them, with those of the 
machines. I think this demonstrates the focus that big-men have on the social context of 
pokies, despite their insistence that they relax in front of machines and do not worry about 
others. 
 
When money comes back out of pokies, then the focus on others becomes obvious for all to 
see. As long as there is a residual 1000 credits on the machine (equivalent to the original K50) 
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 All the above points are explored in detail in chapter two. 
25
 Here Tom Liam is referring to his heredity; his father was a big-man before him. 
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then the player can take out any multiple of K10 (200 credits) at any time by returning to the 
operator and asking for the money. Tom and other big-men used this feature to keep the flow 
of money coming. For the last two hours or so Tom had been putting money in the machine, 
and despite losing much, he did not miss an opportunity to buy beer for his followers when his 
score crept up. In chapter one I described how gambling brings money into the open, 
decouples it from obligations and frees it up to distribution, and this is the case for big-men 
even when they are losing. The way big-men think about interacting with the machines and 
followers appear as a type of “financial” game, and even more so with other big-men. 
 
 
“Financial” Winnings 
 
At 9.45pm, on a single spin, Tom won K1,500, and remained stony faced. Reaction among 
‘gamblers’ is often understated. Just like big-men preparing their distributions and displaying 
their wealth in its abundance (see Read 1965; Salisbury 1966: 124; Burns, Cooper & Wild 1972: 
107; chapter five), they show their potency in their disregard. Followers, other big-shots, and 
unknowns went and congratulated Tom Liam with a hand on his back and a quiet quip in his 
ear. Now began the most potent language of “finance” at pokies: the distribution of winnings. 
Tom chose to collect his own loot from the operator. At the booth he asked Tax to give him 
K100 in K20’s, K400 in K100’s, and the rest in K50’s. He immediately gave the five K20’s to John 
and the four other followers who helped him while he played; I was given K100 in two K50 
notes, as a visitor and a relative. Tom gave Richard, another of the followers, a further K50 to 
buy two jugs of beer for us while Tom drank from a bottle of red wine.  
 
We all left the pokie room together and sat down in the bar. Then Tom sauntered back, and I 
raced to the viewing window to see what was happening. He put his head round the pokie 
room entrance and handed K50 to his friend and fellow big-man, which he called his pokies 
met (lit. ‘pokies mate’). Ahead of most kin and affinal relationships, and above all other 
relationships thrown up in Town life, a pokies met received more money than any other person 
when someone won. I sometimes asked people what they would do if they won and it was 
completely up to them who to meet and who to give money to; I was surprised to find that 
most informants filter out all but their immediate family and the pokies met. I learnt later that 
a family unit will accept much smaller amounts relative to big-men because they consider 
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themselves to be ‘acting as one’ during the moment of distribution, and wish their collective 
name to travel with the outsider. People indicated that their distribution stands as a metonym 
for their kinship network as a whole, their individual actions will give them all prestige if done 
well. It was not necessarily the big-man who had to give away and stand for the group, anyone 
could, and their generosity reflected well on the kin-group as a whole without singling out an 
individual, paralleling Lederman’s (1990) material. Yet there is a general acceptance that big-
men should take the responsibility for such distribution, and so they retain the collective 
emphasis that characterises Eastern Highlands distribution events. 
 
When I asked why Tom gave to this man separately, he said he received money when this big-
man won in the past. Giving money at the same time as us as would cause all the other people 
to be jealous and they would ‘beg’ for money, he said. This statement demarcates the pokies 
met from those ephemeral followers who are simply ‘fed’ by Tom Liam’s money, and who are 
thought to be categorically below Tom’s ‘level’. 
 
This pokies met relationship begins by mutual acknowledgement of each other’s presence 
within the pokies. An initiatory gift of money or beer acted as a test of either equality or 
inferiority. Able to sustain reciprocation over time, they became a pokies met. Tom might have 
given money to this man in front of his dedicated followers (and I saw him do so on other 
occasions) because a pokies met should be made to feel above (and thus categorically different 
to) others because of their previous gifts. Doing so in the presence of others also lets him know 
that the money was attained by gambling. People said that then the two will become linked in 
others eyes and will figure more prominently in others thinking of them. Participants said that 
because the money’s origin was gambling, a pokies met has a greater hold on it, as their 
relationship is based upon the same class of relation as the one that the winner has to their 
winnings. They are socio-spatiotemporally linked (cf. Munn 1986). The more politically minded 
the man, the more they tended to prioritise the pokies met, and hence political elites seem to 
be more prolific ‘gamblers’. 
 
Two socio-spatiotemporal limits affected the size of gifts between a pair of pokies met. First of 
all, some ‘gamblers’ thought their obligation to a pokies met was restricted to pokie joints 
alone, and when they are not playing nothing exchanges hands. Within an evening though, 
news of winners travels quickly, not only inside the Bird of Paradise Pokie Lounge, but one day 
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to the next and from one pokie joint to the next. That night when we moved to the next joint, 
called Lahanis, Tom gave away money to each pokies met he encountered. There is always a 
time-depreciation to one’s gifts because winnings soon become other kinds of money. If the 
pokies met were met early on, before others, then a winner should tell them that they won 
and give money to them; if the win was not fresh, Tom could avoid giving the pokies met 
money and revealing his win. Their status quickly diminished as other competing valuations 
came to prominence. The money ceases to be winnings and subsides into other monetary 
forms, severing the potential links it can make through space-time. 
 
Secondly, the pokies met relationship is intensified by the Pokie joint. Its heady atmosphere of 
big-men, for whom money (supposedly) flows so easily, makes the value of money go down 
and the gifts rise. Pokies represent one extreme of the value spectrum because all the 
transactions involve big money. Money is said to have no value inside the pokies, as Richard 
(who had been sent for beer), made concrete to me:  
 
Inside the pokie joint, K20 is normal in there, it is like 10t or 20t. Outside the pokie joint 
K20 is too big, too much to give to a person without thought, you must give it for a good 
reason; inside they give K20 without thought. Outside, people don’t deal with money 
alone, inside we play and we deal with money, so a man will win and he will be happy 
and he will give without thought. Money has no value at pokies. 
 
Pokies are places where people feel happy to sherim natin natin (lit. ‘sharing nothing nothing’, 
to share prolifically without concern26) because of the relatively low value of money. While 
Tom was quite frugal with his distribution, those whose experience of windfalls is limited often 
joyfully give away all their money. I saw Alwin’s description of a ‘true man’ come true many 
times, big-men happily taking the money and referring to the giver as foolish behind their 
back. 
 
With money freed up for distribution by the act of gambling, even big-men are not above 
asking for money from other big-men when they hear the news. In Lahanis Tom asked another 
for money when this pokies met won K480; he received K20. The devaluation of money was 
apparent in the mock argument that followed. Tom said “this money is not for food, you 
                                                 
26
 See chapter one for a brief discussion of word reduplication. 
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should give more”. Tom played in veiled antagonism with the grammar of monetary 
denominations: K20 is a lot of money for a meal, and would only be given to a big-man for 
such a purpose, whose appetite is thought proportionate to his standing (see Read 1959: 422). 
Tom played on the fact that they were inside the pokie joint, where the need to consume and 
circulate money is of a higher order. Tom Liam argued that showing regard to him at pokies, 
considering his size and power, requires a larger denomination. K50 is the minimum because it 
is enough for a game of pokies. Really big-men like Tom say they only deal with each other in 
K50 notes and above. “Lesser men” can give big-men lower notes, down to say K20, but they 
say receiving below K10 could be taken as an insult. From among the bravado emerges a 
language of regard complete with styles of oratory. The syntax is provided by the notes which 
set the terms of gifts. Amounts given then evaluate the size of donor and recipient. Above the 
threshold set by location and interlocutor, people indicated that the size of a return gift of 
winmani (‘winnings’) is not dictated by the original donation in absolute terms but by the 
proportion of their win the other gave.  
 
A pokies met is desirable not least for the large amounts of money it could lead to and the 
stabilisation of one’s monetary fortunes in an unpredictable sphere. In fact some informants 
likened it to insurance: if the partner is more fortunate than oneself, then one will benefit 
from them; yet if one is more fortunate than the partner, then it is a pleasurable thing to give 
and a marker of status that insures oneself. The money given is by no means free or 
disinterested, it is considered to be like an unofficial loan, invoking bad feelings if it is not 
returned if and when the recipient wins later. The reader will notice that unlike with followers, 
this form of reciprocity is far more exacting. The pokies met is an expression of leaders’ 
autonomy from each other, as equals who might create pokie friendships rather than 
members of a corporate group who are obligated to each other by default. As a form of 
“finance” it is analogous to that found in the Western and Southern Highlands (A. Strathern 
1969; Lederman 1990). 
 
I suggest that it is the lack of direct competition between big-men on the gambling front that 
allows alliance-making gifts to flourish. Unlike the card games discussed in previous chapters, 
pokie machines are thought to be beyond local people’s control. Those who prefer cards 
emphasise that you play against people, and the money flows between them, but with pokies 
you play against a computer that you have no control over. Big-men tended not to play cards, 
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instead betting on pokies or horses, and they usually lauded the fact that in both cases you 
play individually (wan-man wan-man or wan wan), and that no one can interfere with you. As I 
discussed in chapter two, Gorokan notions of efficacy are wide ranging, including negative 
thoughts of others directly affecting the dispensation of cards and money towards a person. 
Big-men feel they are the subject of much jealousy, and the inability of jealousy to affect 
pokies is a strong reason to favour them27. Not only does one play individually against a 
machine, but they are also not obliged to compensate losers when they win, so they feel they 
have more freedom to spend the money as they wish. In Goroka, as elsewhere, acting wan 
wan is to act without the assumption that a relation is leading one’s actions, and doing so is 
seen as a critique of the constraints of kinship (see Reed 2003; J. Robbins 2004). In pokies 
playing wan wan against the machine serves as a critical starting point from which to extend 
relationships with the money that gambling brings out. In this sense acting alone is a pretext to 
another, more self-controlled form of relationality. The pokie machines act as a kind of 
laundering process for relation-making. 
 
Another factor aiding the mobilisation of more elaborate forms of “finance” is that a big-man 
remains with the machine where they may appear perfectly indifferent. More often than 
giving money to other big-men directly, followers are given money by a winner and told to buy 
drinks for or give money to particular big-men. Followers allow big-men to look both ways, at 
the machine and their relational obligations to pokies met. Desiring to gift each other but 
preferring not to engage each other directly, big-men launder their money through an outside 
agency into a state which makes gifting acceptable and not overtly antagonistic. Big-men often 
likened pokies to a golf club (there is a golf club in Port Moresby where big-men and politicians 
famously play28), where big deals are made as the result of ‘small’ gifts between associates, 
and while big-men’s concentration appears to be elsewhere. They see themselves as laying the 
foundations for national level politics by building up “financial” relationships with important 
personages. In reaching out to this broader scale of politics, big-men in Goroka create novel 
“financial” arrangements that intersect with the machinations of big-men from other areas, 
                                                 
27
 Machines are thought to be set in the capital Port Moresby. People recognise that the machines are 
exploitative, but the distance and clandestine nature of the machine’s setting means that the machines are 
not thought to be set against individual players; this makes pokies distinctive from cards which may be 
manipulated by other players using certain forms of magic (see chapter two). 
28
 There is also a golf club outside of Goroka; a relic of colonial times. 
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establishing themselves as big-men or big-shots through an inventively generic capacity to 
transact through business while mobilising kinship relations. Big-men in Goroka have broken 
through the ‘traditional’ constraints upon the use of “finance” by utilising new potentials for 
income and laundering their money through consumption at pokies. They aspire to national 
politics as they reinforce business interests through consumption, which itself demonstrates 
the strength of their kinship network, comprehensively moving the terrain of big-manship into 
new territory. They say that whereas before they fought, now they drink beer together and 
play pokies, and suggest this is a good thing. As they do so they become a tighter mesh which 
aims to protect and expand their collective regional interests. Therefore I see the newspaper 
clipping with which I began the chapter as in part a result of a communicative language of 
“finance” which is made evident at pokie joints.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whether or not Gorokan ‘big-men’ used financial methods in the past, I argue they certainly do 
now. I excavated where and how big-men in Goroka got money from innovative sources: 
government projects; business services; coffee production; wages and rental collection. These 
sources of money are then used to “finance” their transactions with followers and other big-
men, and in the case of businesses, how they balance on the same system. Not only do 
Gorokan big-men do “finance”, but every aspiring big-man recognises that “finance” is the key 
to their success. I argued that pokies provide a place where big-men can meet and transact 
with each other, displaying the extent of their resources and providing a jovial atmosphere in 
which to compete and ally. Pokies are good for this because they are not susceptible to 
jealousy and they allow big-men to act distracted and diffuse otherwise overly competitive 
exchanges.  
 
My exploration discloses analogies with Lederman’s material in the Southern Highlands, where 
everybody seemed to be doing “finance”. According to her model, this should put a brake on 
big-manship as individuals do “finance” for themselves at the expense of clan leaders. Yet in 
Goroka it seems that multiple sources of “finance” and the skill required to manage them 
effectively mean that some men are able to rise above their competitors. Men who realise 
they lack the sources of “finance” to compete prefer to benefit as a follower than break their 
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own bank. In this they resemble Melpa and Enga-speaking people’s method of synechdochally 
identifying themselves with the success of their leaders (A. Strathern 1969). Pokies, a costly 
enterprise, acts to weed out those whose sources of funding are not secure, as well as those 
who cannot exercise the requisite degree of judgement in when to quit and how much to 
distribute.  
 
Two tiers emerged. On the lower tier followers are dealt with in a manner that is in keeping 
with Eastern Highlands attitudes to dealing with insiders without exacting reciprocity. On the 
higher tier reciprocity is exacting but set down by the particular type of “finance” that is 
offered to pokie players as they consume their money on machines. Thus it seems that 
elements of each ‘form’ of big-manship come into play at pokies. Gambling in the Gorokan 
setting automatically creates a certain set of potential relationships that accentuate Gorokan 
concerns; in this case pokies drawing out the inequalities that people attempt to build 
between themselves and others. People are potentially in relation to other gamblers as a 
result of the shifting fortunes that make up gambling, and gambling therefore potentialises 
exchange relationships because it creates and makes visible differences between people. One 
could say that the value of money is corrupted within this space and in this process, being 
devalued from its normal state of absolute value. But as I attempt to show throughout the 
thesis, this state of fluctuation is in fact the status quo in Goroka. 
 
In the following chapter I investigate a parallel process, the bringing of monies together, which 
develops further the links between “traditional” collective and leadership action with the 
aesthetics of money as they appear through gambling. This time I concentrate upon the State 
of Origin competition and the large communal bets that people make upon them, and how 
they relate to contemporary iterations of that more famous example of bringing wealth 
together: the paying of bridewealth.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Origin of Pooling 
 
 
In the last chapter I suggested that distribution relationships between big-men and their 
fellows and supporters at pokies, revealed an emergent realm of finance management. Here I 
continue the theme by examining the aesthetic involved in pooling wealth objects; looking at 
how collective transactions come about in contemporary Goroka. Big-men play a role, but 
even when they are not included, the pooling ‘logic’ persists in their absence. I first describe a 
brideprice I witnessed in 2009 as a contemporary exemplar of ‘traditional’-style pooling. Yet 
the chapter is not about brideprice, at least not explicitly. Rather I use my experiences of 
brideprice as a foil for looking at how wealth items are typically brought together. The real 
focus is on collective bets. Pooled bets arise when the State of Origin rugby league competition 
happens in neighbouring Australia. I analyse the instances of pooling around both ‘traditional’ 
events and bets in a search for what unites them. I argue that what underlies both is the added 
value that accrues to wealth when it is united from multiple sources. I aim to add this to the 
compendium of indigenous transactional formalisms compiled in the thesis. Through their 
comparison I hope to draw out how gambling can inform our conceptions of brideprice and of 
other instances where wealth is brought together for exchange.  
 
As with pokies in chapter four, it is no coincidence that the State of Origin competition is 
played elsewhere. Its externality again means the result is beyond local influence. The lack of 
preordained givers and takers during betting (contra brideprice), allows the piece to shift focus 
onto what seems important to people in both circumstances: the aesthetics of accumulation 
and opposition. It is precisely because people seem to enjoy nothing more than when 
affiliation is as contingent as the difference between liking one team or another, that I can 
examine pooling as an end in itself. It shows once again that formerly exogenous gambling 
appealed to Gorokans, and was incorporated by them, because it allowed them to do 
imaginative things that elaborated upon indigenous priorities.  
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In the course of the chapter I avoid debating whether underlying similarities mean that pooling 
bets are “traditional”; or whether their differences make them “modern” (see Foster 1995b). 
Instead I focus on an aesthetic of accumulation and opposition, trying to show it as trope that 
transcends historical positioning. Pooling is seen as a pragmatic model for action. I maintain a 
running analogy with Lorraine Sexton’s (1982) account of Wok Meri (lit. ‘Women’s Work’1) 
groups in the Goroka District and eastern Simbu Province (see also Dickerson-Putman 1994). In 
the 1970’s new transactional forms like Wok Meri appeared to subvert men’s traditional 
control over wealth2. Along kinship links acquired through marriage, women pooled their 
meagre savings and loaned parts of the total to other groups, encouraging them by example. 
New groups became their instigator’s “daughters”, and the transfer of wealth between 
“mother” and “daughter” was stylised as the giving of money (symbolised as a girl and often 
accompanied by a doll) in marriage to the “daughter” group, who gave bridewealth in return. 
Having pooled sufficient funds, Wok Meri groups held “washing hands” ceremonies where 
they gave a second bride and acquired more bridewealth from “daughters”; they also received 
loans from neighbouring groups. Money was then distributed among the “mother” group’s 
participants who often pooled their money again to make large purchases like trucks. I 
maintain an analogy with Wok Meri because this then-novel practice helped Lorraine Sexton to 
think about the ‘logics’ of pooling from a fresh perspective. Now, thirty years on, Wok Meri 
provides a background to the kind of transformations that Gorokan people have experimented 
with over the years and which can now be seen in pooled bets and brideprice ceremonies. 
When Gorokan people routinely collect and act, they fashion a social reality which is of its 
moment, consuming the old and new in the only time that is relevant to action: the present. 
To deal with the material presented here I found it necessary to employ a set of shifting 
principles and preferences guiding the accumulation and redistribution of wealth and persons, 
and in this approach I take inspiration from Roy Wagner’s work (1974; 19913). Yet perhaps 
owing to its seeming naivety, why people pool the way they pool, and whether pooling itself 
could be thought of as more important than the event that brings people together, remains 
                                                 
1
 For an analysis of “work” as antecedent to transaction in Goroka, see chapters two and three. Below I 
also analyse Wok Meri in these terms. 
2
 I was unaware of Wok Meri groups at the time of fieldwork, and so I am unable to say conclusively that 
they are no longer present in the Goroka area. They were never mentioned to me during fieldwork, and 
other fieldworkers have been unable to find people aware of their continuing presence (Busse Pers. 
Comm.).  
3
 See prologue and conclusion. 
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largely unexplored. Instead of employing a top-down approach, in my account the outward 
form of exchange is imagined as if through the back end of a kaleidoscope, where the 
fluctuating pieces conjoin over time to produce the patterned form that is so often seen when 
you understand exchanges from the top down. There are analogies in my approach with the 
work of Eric Hirsch, who has been concerned with the enactment of centrality among the 
Fuyuge (Central Province, Papua New Guinea): 
 
“The Fuyuge … create the need for a centre through the indigenous concepts of 
'branches' and 'base': the branches create the need for a base (a person of 
excellent qualities who is perceived to have 'holding together' capacities) even as a 
base must be the support for branches (other men, women and children). 
Centredness, therefore, is related directly to the perception of branches (as 
analogous to roads), and the need for it is continuously re-created in every 
expansive, extending-out activity. At the same time, the base is made visible by 
the number of branches it supports. Fuyuge sociality and personhood … is a 
continual process of re-creating the contexts (performances) where these 
concepts are made concrete and visible, and where efficacy can be achieved. 
(Hirsch 1994: 692). 
 
I explore the aesthetic involved in the oscillation between (exchange) event as unifier and 
people as otherwise separated, and in this respect the approach has its roots in a M. 
Strathernian approach to sociality (M. Strathern 1988).  
 
My analysis (employed throughout the thesis) abstracts ‘logics’ from concrete situations to 
give a players eye view, rather than completing an abstracted model of transactions. In this I 
took inspiration from Erving Goffman, Jean Piaget and David Graeber. Goffman’s (2002 [1959]; 
2006 [1969]) formalist analyses investigate very fine-grained decision processes among 
situated actors within a Western social context (though Goffman remained elusive about his 
model’s wider applicability). It is his attention to the decision in context that is stimulating, 
though I understand my ethnography to reveal a different ‘logic’ borne out of dissimilar logical 
frames. In this I follow the work of Piaget (1952), who understood each logical system of 
reference as unexplainable without a more encompassing regime of thought, a process which 
stretches ad infinitum, each logic exhaustible and incoherent without reference to the level 
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above it. In this he cites the importance of Kurt Gödel’s (1986 [1931]) proof of mathematical 
un-provability, a text which is of particular importance to my work on indigenous mathematics 
(Pickles 2009). I understand bets as a working logical field of Gorokan action, containing 
elements which are only understandable with reference to more encompassing ideas. The 
analogy between the aesthetics of collectivising brideprice payments and bets is an attempt to 
expose this more encompassing idea and explore its limitations. In other words I am looking 
for the limits of the logically prior idea of pooling bets/gifts and why, despite their apparent 
differences, they may be subject to the same ‘logic’. At the end of the chapter I therefore 
revisit some of my previous material in the light of pooling. It is at this level that I take 
inspiration from Graeber (2001), who employs the same technique to uncover a cross cultural 
anthropological theory of value. I am also seeking a model that can comprehend attitudes to 
money as variable and universal. I differ in that I seek only a Gorokan model, recognising that 
subject and object are complexly implicated in Gorokan thought and that this thought is more 
revealing as anthropological critique than as a node within a universal understanding of value. 
I do however regard action as the primary vehicle for understanding how value is created in 
Goroka, which is the great strength of Graeber’s theory, and the work of Nancy Munn (1986) 
who inspired its direction. In chapter two I considered action, in the form of transaction, as the 
primary vehicle for knowledge in Goroka, and I follow this approach here (see also Gell 1988). 
 
First then I briefly describe the aesthetic of collectivisation and redistribution at a brideprice 
ceremony, and then introduce the State of Origin as a good event to bet with. I use this as a 
starting point to analyse the bringing together of bets during the State of Origin Series. I make 
no excuses for the fact that betting, in all its forms, is the visual idiom that inspired and 
informs all my descriptions of Gorokan life, including those that look like traditional exchange 
forms like brideprice. The analysis might equally work the other way around, I simply chose the 
method I found most revealing (cf. M. Strathern 1999). 
 
 
Pooling – Some Familiar Scenes 
 
Eight weeks after I arrived in Goroka I had seen little that reflected the books I read. No 
initiations, no men’s houses, no large exchanges of any kind. I had met only one pig, holed up 
in a small wooden cage behind a house in Banana Blok settlement. Instead I saw extravagant 
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displays of wealth at pokies, learnt a couple of card games and some Tok Pisin, and ignited a 
lust for markets. My Melanesian “fieldwork experience” was already somewhat unusual.  
 
On the day in question I emerged from my room at the National Sports Institute (NSI) at nine-
thirty, after a night at the pokies with its inevitable hangover. I sat on the veranda drinking 
coffee and smoking my first cigarette of the day. From the path leading outside my door Amy, 
a passing employee, warned me that something was happening in the employees’ compound 
and that there I would see some “real culture”4. Caffeine and nicotine dispensed, I lurched into 
action, notebook in hand, clunky camera swinging my right combat pocket grotesquely; 
arriving at the first house in the compound just in time to help an unwilling, surprisingly pink 
sow backwards off a tractor trailer. The pig had been bought for K700 from a piggery whose 
stock and trade is such occasions5. I was instantly named official photographer:  
 
                                                 
4
 Amy was always keen for me to leave Goroka and see the “real” Papua New Guinea, and this type of 
suggestion was entirely unremarkable throughout my time. As such my experience of people’s ideas of 
what authentic “culture” is fits broadly into existing ethnographic descriptions (see Foster 1992, 
Otto1992). 
5
 At the time one Papua New Guinea Kina was worth £3.70. 
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Figure 5.1: An ‘Official Photographer’s’ eye view of some clan members and one porcine participant at a 
brideprice ceremony. Immediately behind them an earth oven was being prepared. 
 
Engulfing the few familiar faces were others my eyes recognised as rural relatives to one 
another. I approached Pasde, Head of Kitchen at NSI, in charge of supplies and catering for 
those using the Institute’s sporting and conference facilities. Pasde was from Lufa District, 
south of Goroka, and evidently central to proceedings. It was the major instalment of the 
brideprice for his third wife6. The bride-to-be was from a neighbouring hamlet only a few 
minutes’ walk from Pasde’s own. In preparation for the arrival of his betrothed’s kin, an earth 
oven behind his house was prepared in which lamb flaps, sweet potatoes and edible leaves 
were steam-cooked. It was presided over by men while women killed, prepared and boiled 
                                                 
6
 Though most Highland groups accept polygamy, this was in fact Pasde’s third consecutive wife after 
two previous marriages had failed. Correspondingly the price expected was lowered, though this is not 
always the case (see S. Robbins 1982). I was unable to ascertain exactly why the price was lowered, 
possibly because the two are from very nearby one another and have many overlapping ties. 
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chickens. The kin group’s culinary contribution was to be augmented by NSI’s kitchen, where 
staff prepared among other things a delicious fried rice dish with tinned pork. 
 
Meanwhile Pasde, a couple of his male clan-mates, and an old friend and colleague from the 
NSI, were pondering the arrangement of gifts to the bride’s clan, trying to make the pile seem 
full and lavish. Their concentration was absolute. Massive uncooked sweet potatoes provided 
height; bunches of special-occasion bananas on the perimeter accentuated stature with 
abundance; a bundle of sugarcane, one of taro and the two or three unmistakeably phallic red 
pandanus fruits were artfully organised about them and a bemused chicken lay with bound 
legs at the very front. Finally four boxes of rapidly defrosting lamb flaps augmented the stack 
on one side. The arrangement was made all the more critical because as a third marriage, this 
was supposed to be a relatively cheap affair, and so the desired abundance was all the more 
difficult to portray.  
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Figure 5.2: Two of Pasde’s brothers (left and centre) and an elder of Pasde’s clan (right) discuss how to 
arrange their gifts to produce the appearance of abundance. Behind them is an earth oven, some female 
clan members, chickens and their heads. 
 
When NSI staff, spouses and family arrived, further gifts were added to the pile, whence it was 
reordered into three different groupings. Two were aimed at the two mothers of the bride 
(Lauren’s father had two wives), one was given a larger pile because Pasde said this mother 
visited less often and therefore received less from him, so he had to show her a lot of respect 
at this time. The third pile was for general collection; all were beautifully arranged, and looked 
suitably plentiful, at least to my eyes.  
 
Lauren had been living with Pasde for a couple of years as a trial marriage, but that day she 
arrived anew with her kin on the back of a truck. Her head was adorned with costly Princess 
Stephanie black bird of paradise plumes, but it was only their hypnotic swaying that could be 
seen behind a throng of men and women. At the front of the train a stretcher bore another 
large pig, but this time it had been slaughtered, splayed and cooked, and laid in front of the 
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visitors as a gift to their hosts. The visitors seemed hostile and unimpressed by the culinary 
bounty awaiting them, as they should before hard bargaining begins (see also Read 1965). 
Behind his gifts, behind his clan that was its backdrop, Pasde was leaning against a wire fence 
trying not to look nervous. According to his local custom neither groom nor bride should play 
an active part in negotiations. NSI staff sat or stood on the side, toward the groom, as 
interested gift-giving parties but side players and relative outsiders to proceedings. I judged my 
place was with them. 
 
In the negotiations over price that followed (speeches went back and forth six times before 
agreement) all the food was but icing on the cake, the real item of interest was in a pocket out 
of sight7. Of course it was money, which has long been the principle vehicle for brideprice 
payments in Goroka. The debate was entirely over money, and contributions to the event 
were measured by their relative value in Kina. Pasde had taken written notes of all the 
contributions of food and money, and compiled a spread sheet the following day as aide 
memoir. When I heard about it he kindly allowed me to copy it onto my computer:  
  
                                                 
7
 See chapter six. 
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BRIDE PRICE CEREMONY CONTRIBUTION LIST   
NATIONAL SPORTS STAFF & FAMILIES   
NAME  CASH FOOD VALUE 
IN KINA 
TOTAL 
Mrs L.  200    
N.S.  180 1/2 carton lamb flaps 76  
Mrs B   1 banana,1 chicken 50  
Mrs N.  20    
V.   2 chickens, yams & sweet 
potato  
100  
E.   1 chicken, 1 pandanus fruit, 
1 banana 
60  
N.O.  50 Taro 10  
Ms O.   Absent   
Ms N.K.   1 chicken   
K.M.   2 chickens, 1 banana 70  
O. K.   1 chicken, 1 banana 50  
U.K.  20    
T. E.  10 1 banana 30  
P.L.   1 banana, 1 chicken 50  
N.B.   1 banana, 1 chicken 50  
U T.  6    
L.M.  100    
P.   1 chicken, taro 40  
K.M.  10    
K.H.  50    
Total  646  586 1232 
FAMILY AND OUTSIDE HELP    
N.   1 carton lamb flaps 140  
L.   1 carton lamb flaps 140  
O.    140  
B.   1 carton lamb flaps 140  
K.  20 yam, taro, pandanus fruit 70  
E.   1 carton lamb flaps 140  
C.  100    
Uncle J.   2 bananas, 1 bundle 
sugarcane 
60  
Papa E.  20 Taro 20  
N.   1 chicken, 1 banana, sweet 
potato 
50  
M.`s mother   1 carton lamb flaps 140  
Z.   1 banana 30  
T.D.   1 banana 30  
B.,E.,L.  200    
K.  120    
S.  20    
Pasde  2000 1 pig 700  
Sub total  2480  1800 4280 
Grand Total     5512 
Table 5.1: Pasde’s Excel spread sheet of his brideprice. It is basically unchanged: names were changed 
and abbreviated by the author; in a few cases Tok Pisin terms were translated and obvious typos 
corrected. 
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The reader will note the columns: “Name”, “Cash”, “Food”, “Value in Kina”, and “Total”. “Value 
in Kina” converted food into its equivalent in cash, which was added to the cash contributions 
to make the “Total”. The “Grand Total” was K5,512, divided into cash contribution (K3,126) 
and food items (K2,386). Items of “Food” were understood to have a cash value that 
transcended their circumstances, and cash value was the primary mode that Pasde chose to 
understand his gifts (see also M. Strathern 1975; 1999). In this respect the spread sheet 
resembles the accounting procedures of “bookkeepers” for Wok Meri groups; Sexton describes 
how the “bookkeeper” took note of cash contributions, not as a mode of exacting reciprocity 
between the individual and outsiders, but as a method of delineating and marking precisely 
the stake which contributors made to the total collected, and thus what they should receive 
when their own group distributes their receipts (Sexton 1982: 187-8). Much of Wok Meri 
procedure took the form and rhetoric of a marriage, while today accounting for money at 
brideprice ceremonies resembles Wok Meri practices. For instance in talking about his future 
efforts to return the generosity shown him, Pasde stressed that he would base any future 
donations upon the cash value of the gifts received, irrespective of their original nature as 
porcine, special foods, or cash, though this may guide the form his gift takes. He was far more 
assertive on this front with NSI members than with kin. With kin Pasde had many overlapping 
obligations, so the brideprice was a less reliable guide to his future contributions; he expected 
he would give appropriately to each future event instead.  
 
It had been a struggle for Pasde to gather money together because it was his third brideprice. 
He himself raised K2,000 in cash and bought a K700 pig, almost precisely half the value of the 
full brideprice, and was anticipating a regime of street selling and earth-oven cooking (which is 
cheaper than cooking on a stove) to recoup costs over the next months8. Pasde’s close kin or 
‘pooling unit’ (see S. Robbins 1982: 92) only contributed a fraction of what the cost would have 
been upon Pasde’s first marriage. A ‘pooling unit’ for S. Robbins is partly defined by pooling 
wealth to give to people outside of their own unit (ibid: 86). Pasde’s ‘pooling unit’ had this 
time given only K480 in cash, K1,100 in food items. Their cash contribution was beaten by 
Pasde’s colleagues (K646)9, who had acted as if they belonged to the ‘pooling unit’ by raising 
K1,232 in bride wealth (including cash and food), even though many of them were only there 
                                                 
8
 See chapter three. 
9
 Not so in the case of food items (K586 against K1,100). 
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because, as Pasde put it, it would be “rude not to invite them”. Pasde would now be expected 
to contribute to other events at NSI though he was not close to the individuals involved. This 
suggests the need to act as a ‘pooling unit’ was facilitated by proximity and the moral 
imperative to pool rather than any pre-existing kinship relation, even though Pasde separated 
them in his notation. Indeed the definition of a ‘pooling unit’ seems less important than the 
principle of inclusion, unless one counts NSI itself as a member of the ‘pooling unit’, which 
Pasde clearly did not.  
 
During the brideprice ceremony most of the money was pooled in one pocket. I say most 
because the groom’s party were usually expected to increase their offer, and they had a wad 
ready in another pocket that was “reluctantly” handed over along with the initial offering. 
Likewise “bookkeepers” at Wok Meri meetings suspected of fiddling were often forced to 
empty their pockets (Sexton 1982: 186). In the brideprice it seems wife-givers forced wife-
takers to ritually reveal what is always assumed to be kept in reserve, forcing the partner to 
reveal the potency of easily hide-able money (cf. Graeber 1996)10. Cash amounts, which should 
not be handled by the principle players, are nevertheless collected and collated to be used in 
an exchange by two parties. It would be ridiculous to suggest for instance that each 
contributor give their money individually to the other side, a point which shall become 
prescient later in the chapter. Sexton found the same to be true for Wok Meri, where loans 
made between individuals of different groups would deliberately have their personal 
possession of the debt or credit hidden by the two corporate Wok Meri groups (Sexton 1982: 
188). It is the ‘logic’ of pooling money and its hiddenness in the collective individual that 
remain across the chapter’s examples.  
 
Aside from the incorporation of employees, the account of brideprice negotiations given here 
is not at all unusual; analogous earlier situations were found further up the Asaro Valley 
among for example the Auyana (S. Robbins 1982: 89-93), and in other areas of the Highlands 
(see Brown & Brookfield 1959; Fiel 1987). Nor is it unusual all across New Guinea to see gifts of 
abundance of all types, or to see wealth collected and accounted precisely (Rubel & Rosman 
1978; see Young 1971 for a Massim society). My point may seem banal, and/or abstract to the 
point of uselessness; one need only refer to Mauss (1954) to know that largesse is very often a 
matter of large gifts. Rubel and Rosman make a similar assertion – that there is always a 
                                                 
10
 See chapter six. 
 188 
 
prestige attached to the size of exchanges – based on their comparative study of Papua New 
Guinea peoples (1978: 277). 
 
One way in which D.K. Fiel singled out Eastern Highlanders from Western Highlanders, amid 
their common interest in exchanges, was the former’s “aggressive undeveloped love of things” 
(1987: 234-5). Among ethnographers of the Eastern end of the Highlands, Salisbury found the 
Siane “ebullient materialists” (1962: viii); Newman described the Gururumba as “thing-
oriented” (1965: 51); Kenneth Read thought the Gahuku-Gama “materialists … to the point of 
exhaustion” (1965: 60). Aggressive gifting and self-interested accounting seem particularly 
pronounced in this area. As I mentioned, S. Robbins, working among the Auyana (upper Asaro 
Valley, just north of Goroka) found it easier to define groups formally as “pooling units” (1982). 
S. Robbins decides upon the term as a matter of functional expediency, and does not develop 
the notion of pooling as a guiding aesthetic. Indeed, while searching through the literature, 
amid details of sugarcane stands and exchange patterns, surprisingly little attention has been 
devoted to the act of bringing together itself, much more on the formalities of what needs to 
be reciprocated, when, and by whom, following Mauss. They peered through the top of the 
kaleidoscope at the patterns produced, but did not consider the way decisions were made. It is 
in this regard that the Wok Meri material stands out, because of the novel way that pooling 
was achieved and the exacting accounting, which may have caught attention because of its 
refracted proximity to “western” accounting procedures (Sexton 1982: 167). My focus on 
bringing things together came from my broader interest in collective betting, rather than 
formal rules for reciprocation.  
 
In each instance of pooling cited above, display was central and exact tallies kept. There was 
regularity and aesthetic pleasure in bringing together valuables for an exchange, and they 
were formative in self and opposition building. Nothing new is presented here, my concern is 
to see what might be gained by refocusing the questions and embracing naïveté: why is it 
necessary to display? Why is it preferable to draw in as many people as possible within each 
group’s proscribed social demarcations? Why involve your colleagues Pasde? Was it not too 
complicated? M. Strathern asserts powerfully that exchanges act to define one group as 
against another, a proposition that I and others take somewhat for granted (J. Robbins & Akin 
1999: 36). But what are the limits of this necessity for inclusion? How are collections brought 
into being for and by the situation, materials and actors involved? When is this principle of 
 189 
 
inclusive pooling not applicable and when is it imperative in a socially diverse situation such as 
contemporary Goroka? I now explore these questions by drawing parallels and differences 
between the brideprice situation described above and another, more unorthodox situation of 
collaborative pooling during bets made over the State of Origin rugby league competition. I do 
not claim that betting and bridewealth are equivalent, far from it, but the aesthetic of 
collection arose once more at this time in a way which invited placement alongside 
‘traditional’ agglomerative situations.  
 
 
Origins of Origin 
 
Pasde’s brideprice was sandwiched between State of Origin games. These are great Papua 
New Guinean spectacles and the county’s largest gambling events, but the games happen in 
Australia. Rugby League is the third most popular sport (by attendance) in Australia, behind 
Australian Rules football and horse racing (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005-2006). Australia 
is divided into six states, each with a strong sense of identity and sporting preferences, and 
sport is an important conduit for expressing differences between, and gaining bragging rights 
over, other states. In some sports professional players periodically return to the states from 
which they claim origin, to play for that state in inter-state competitions. The only such 
competition that makes an impact in Papua New Guinea is Rugby League’s State of Origin, 
where games are played between New South Wales (the “Blues”, because of the colour of 
their shirts) and Queensland (the “Maroons” for the same reason). The contest’s current form 
dates from 1982, when it was agreed that regardless of players’ team affiliation, they were 
only eligible to play for the state in which they were raised11. The relative prominence of the 
sport in Australia, their domination in international competition, and the knowledge players 
have of each other through their association at club level, mean some pundits argue that State 
of Origin hosts the highest quality rugby of any competition12.  
 
                                                 
11
 It was a pragmatic move by Australian Rugby League because at this time nearly all rugby league 
players played the game in New South Wales. There has been an inter-state competition in Rugby League 
since 1908. 
12
 An analogy here might be the regional Champions League football competition in Europe, whose 
quality of football is often regarded as better than that of the international World Cup. 
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Australia was colonial administrator for parts of (what is now known as) Papua New Guinea 
since 1920, and the whole territory since 1945, relinquishing control in 1975. They brought a 
number of sports into the Highlands region in the 1930’s with the gold rush, but the one that 
really caught on was Rugby League, mainly as a spectator sport; it was played predominantly 
by expatriates until the late 1960’s. Rugby League is now (uniquely) the national sport of 
Papua New Guinea (see Foster 2006) and in the Highlands it is an obsession. Goroka is a 
leading centre for Rugby League, with a highly successful local team (the Goroka Lahanis) and a 
wealth of talent that supplies other provincial teams.  
 
Robert Foster rightly draws a link between nationalism and Rugby League in Papua New 
Guinea in a way that replicates the colonial relationship (2006), but the fascination Highlanders 
have for Rugby League and particularly the State of Origin competition warrants further 
ethnographic attention. Nowhere else is “League” held in such high regard, even in England (its 
country of origin) it remains relatively provincial. Yet the ethnographic literature on rugby 
league in Papua New Guinea is sparse (but see Wilde 2004; Foster 2006, and short references 
in Imbun 1995; Skeldon 1980; Standish & Standish 1974).  
 
It would be simplistic to put the popularity of State of Origin down to historical happenstance: 
a colonial connection, Australian domination of Rugby League and its hosting the (arguably) 
apical competition would warrant attention from any nation whose people had taken 
wholeheartedly to Rugby League. Gorokans cited both quality and the history of the game as 
explanations for State of Origin’s popularity, but most often the idea of playing for one’s place 
of origin captured their imaginations. Gorokans’ immigrant/local/naturalised statuses 
resonated strongly with those of their Rugby League idols. Gorokans also identified with 
distinctions made in Australia between the two teams as either urban or rural. New South 
Wales (NSW) is Australia’s most populous state and contains the country’s largest city, Sydney. 
Its “Blues” are therefore often described as “city-boys” in Australia, and hence siti lain or taun 
lain (lit. ‘city set/lineage’ or ‘town set/lineage’) in Goroka. Queensland is comparatively rural 
and contains some famously rugged terrain, so the “Maroons” are “country-boys” and in 
Goroka ples lain (lit. ‘village/home set/lineage’). These categories animate Gorokans; they 
express connections with their home villages, the town, or with aspects of their personalities 
through their preferences. For example Gorokans said that there were many more fans of 
Queensland than NSW because Goroka is comparatively rural. 
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State of Origin’s popularity must also be seen in conjunction with another competitive forum 
deriving from Australia: pokies. State of Origin is the theme for the most popular pokie 
machines in Goroka (and Papua New Guinea), making up 80% of all machines nationwide 
(National Gaming Control Board pers. comm.). The State of Origin competition is so popular 
Gorokans sometimes called it a ‘religion’, and it is little wonder that gambling machines 
depicting it are more popular than others. Yet I do not think the causality is unidirectional: 
analogies between the two were common among informants and had no particular direction, 
so I now briefly discuss attributes they are thought to share.  
 
In chapter two I said that for Gorokans most events were subject to the influence of others 
and forces which could never be fully comprehended. In Chapter four I introduced the pokie 
machine, which was valued for the fact that people could relax their minds in its presence, 
more or less sure that their fellow Gorokans were unable to influence the game against them, 
because they were machines whose “program” it was beyond their powers to control. Many 
Gorokans expect corruption and local people to influence things in their own country. They see 
themselves as morally weak in opposition to the supposedly stret tok (lit. ‘straight talk’) and 
tok tru (lit. ‘speaking truthfully’) that they attribute to ol waitman (lit. ‘white people’). Papua 
New Guinean rugby league competitions are thus thought to be problematic as betting events. 
When I asked people why they do not bet on their own rugby league competitions, they would 
usually cite corruption.  
 
State of Origin (in both forms) is beyond Papua New Guinean’s perceived capacity to influence. 
While numerous players playing in the State of Origin were considered ‘black’ and therefore 
thought to be more closely related to Papua New Guineans13, those players were not subject 
to the strains of the wantok sistem (lit. ‘one talk system’, sometimes referred to as 
‘wantokism’, meaning preferential treatment through pre-existing ties, see Ayius 2007; Brigg 
2009) in Papua New Guinea, brought up as they were in Australia. One joke (told as a true 
                                                 
13
 In Goroka many believe that African and other dark skinned people are of the same line of ancestry as 
Papua New Guineans (as opposed to ‘white people’ who are usually thought to be more distantly related), 
and assume that they share a similar outlook on the world. 
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story) that arose around Origin time displays this quite well: a sore loser from the coast14 
destroyed their television set by throwing it out of their window and into the sea, and people 
laughed and said sapos yu lus bai yu mekim wanem, kalup lo balus na flai i go lo Australia na 
paitim ol? (“if you lose what are you going to do, get on a plane to Australia and fight them?”). 
The misdirected attribution of responsibility to a broadcasting medium adds a comic layer of 
stupidity, when the correct action would be to resign oneself. Gorokans cannot imagine their 
own sorcery or wantokism affecting the result of State of Origin games, just like their pokie 
counterparts.  
 
As an essentially benign arena for competition, with only two teams, almost the whole of 
Goroka and the surrounding region picks one of them. Inevitably when fans pick one side then 
their affiliation cuts across all kinds of kinship, affinal, language group and colleague ties. Each 
year it is husbands against wives, fathers against children, and ego in league with affine against 
kin. Though the cross-cutting nature of State of Origin affiliations is not explicitly valorised, the 
possibility of competing against novel others is obviously enjoyable to people when they speak 
of specific instances. On the other hand, when talk turned to the violence surrounding the 
game, stories usually revolved around inter-marital conflict and murder resulting from 
opposed affiliations. As opposed to the comic destruction of televisions, news of this topic 
usually brought consternation.  
 
The fact that State of Origin cuts relations and radically reimagines ties was important from a 
Gorokan perspective. Like media-based sports fans everywhere, people chose their teams for 
many different, often un-geographical reasons, and people did not make (nor did I find) any 
correlation between one team and particular relatives. On the contrary, people often stressed 
their individual preferences for such-and-such player or style of play. Hence, on the day of a 
game, the atmosphere is one of exuberant collective identity, only divided in two. There was a 
special sense that on this day friendships and alliances were created anew and generalised 
upon frivolous, simple grounds, allowing novel camaraderie and in more serious encounters 
giving vent to unvoiced antipathies. It is hard to get across the excitement and ubiquity of the 
occasion, it seems the whole country stops and redraws itself, with national newspapers 
seemingly devoting half their pages to the Blues and Maroons for days either side of the 
                                                 
14
 Jokes portraying idiocy are often directed by ‘Highlanders’ against ‘Coastal’ people, showing a 
regional mentality. 
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showdown. Gorokans used Origin to forge some dormant ties and stage nascent oppositions 
with others, safe within an event that they (for the most part) recognised as arbitrary. Hence 
the jovial boisterous atmosphere watching State of Origin contrasted starkly with watching the 
local Goroka Lahanis team play in the domestic Bemobile Cup competition, where the 
atmosphere was quiet, tense, without betting, and subject to furious expletives and 
accusations from the crowd.  
 
When fans of Blues or Maroons bet on State of Origin games, they stressed that the 
competition was mediated by another who takes no particular interest in themselves, and thus 
their competition with others can appear good natured and not over-antagonistic (see also 
chapter four). Violence sometimes erupted, but this was put down to wayward morality rather 
than the negative influence of the game itself, and people cited the supposed lack of violence 
in Australia. Having given the origin of the competition and a little of people’s attitudes to it, I 
shall now proceed to an account of the betting allowed by it. 
 
 
Pooling – State of Origin Bets 
 
In 2009 the State of Origin contest was played on June 3, June 23 and July 15, around the 
middle of the Australian National Rugby League season (March – September) as usual. Having 
arrived in Goroka on 16 April 2009, I was fortunate enough to get a true sense of the scale of 
Origin and thus Gorokan gambling in the first few months of my research. This State of Origin 
series was on the verge of becoming historic, the Maroons had the entire Australian national 
back line as their own, and were chasing a record-breaking fourth successive Origin victory. 
Blues fans maintained hope, and on the day leading up to each game Goroka filled to bursting 
with excited youths and visiting relatives. Enterprising people painted patterns and logos on 
eager faces in acrylic paints of either blue or maroon, or sold flags in both colours along the 
roadside. The shade of your shirt, shorts, even your string bag, was taken as a statement of 
preference, and those who had them were sure to wear their replica shirts.  
 
I watched my first State of Origin game in the lecture theatre of the National Sports Institute, 
and the next two outside a man’s house in Kaunsil Kem with a crowd of settlement dwellers. 
There were five such houses, each selling access to a television, with 40 to 50 eyes glued to the 
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screen. Maroons triumphed in the first two games. The Blues’ experimental side did not find 
enough defensive strength and attacking penetration until the third game, by which point the 
series was already lost. The following year I consolidated my observations, as Queensland 
consolidated their victory with a whitewash and a new record for consecutive series wins. 
 
Gorokans said Queensland’s dominance affected the betting. They expressed either 
exasperation or unbridled confidence about the impending result, but many bet on despite 
suspecting a loss. Form is an important factor in deciding whether to bet, but games are 
considered standalone betting events, and nobody bet on the series. One reason for this is the 
event-ness of a game in series: a sequence of games represents multiple rounds with spaces in 
between for tactical renewal. While many sporting events occur on a regular basis, and some 
involve the same competitors each time, only a few have only two teams and swap locations15. 
Within this small category, only State of Origin is played over three annual games at short 
intervals. 
 
Like social groups exchanging women for wealth, many Gorokans think wins even out long 
term. People laud the three-game format because it gives losers a chance to win their money 
back. I think this stems from a desire to have as many replicable instances of wealth 
redistribution as possible. Gorokans feel that, bet or no bet, win or lose; they or their 
opponent will quickly get another opportunity to redress the balance. In this respect the 
game’s regular reiteration in winner-takes-all competition mirrors and models the oppositional 
structure of lifecycle events like the brideprice described earlier. It also mirrors the act of 
betting on a slot machine, which is effectively back at point zero after each engagement with 
it. It is unlike Wok Meri in this respect, where loans are thought supportive and opposition is 
stylised (Sexton 1982: 179).  
 
Most betting occurs in the afternoon and evening leading up to kick-off16. There was some 
commercial betting at the betting shop in the centre of Town, but the trade is paltry compared 
to private bets. According to a short survey of 38 NSI staff or family of staff, 58% made a bet on 
at least one of the three State of Origin games in 2009; many bet more than once on each 
game. Each bet averaged K32.30, which is second only to pokies in magnitude, and ranged 
                                                 
15
 Other examples being the Ryder Cup (golf) or the Ashes (cricket). 
16
 It was anathema to bet during play, as the contest was underway. 
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from a typical low of K5 and a typical high of K50.  Women bet, but men make the majority of 
bets. Both genders say it is men who play rugby and so they who are most interested. In a 
separate sample, discussed below, I found big-men bet an average of around K800.  
 
Many drank heavily in the three days surrounding games and fights occurred, usually after the 
game; two Gorokan deaths were attributed to State of Origin by locals in 2009 (one husband 
murdering their wife and one vice-versa). Sometimes drunkenness was tempered by its very 
consumption, in two senses: 1) parts of Goroka literally ran out of beer, and 2) in the days 
following, I more than once stepped over the sprawling unconscious bodies of sun-baked 
young men who were unable to collapse into shade. People bet with alcohol too: 1, 2 or 5 litre 
bottles of locally brewed strong fruit-wine (itself quite dear) along with cash. Within betting, 
drunken or otherwise, there is an unspoken ‘logic’ which, by my dissection, I think reveals 
underlying similarities to other exchange events. For reasons that shall become clear, bets are 
divided in two, those made: 1) collectively without a central character, and 2) between and 
around big-men.  
 
 
1. Collective Bets 
 
My clearest recollection of State of Origin is of Kaunsil Kem settlement, where I witnessed 
people pooling bets before the second and third game of 2009. I will describe three instances. 
The first occurred twenty minutes before the kick-off of game two. It involved a group of 10 or 
so teenagers, who rushed into the beer shop I was in, waved K92 (methodically fanned out to 
look enticing) in my face, shouting nainti-tu Maruns, yu bet! (lit. ‘ninety two [Kina on] 
Maroons, you bet!’ meaning they were betting on Maroons and I was to bet against them). I 
recall it well because I panicked inside, having been warned about the settlement’s volatility 
on Origin nights. The fanned notes, though not displayed with other items of wealth, were 
carefully arranged and physically advanced, fronting a group who were identifying themselves 
as a collective in relation to it. Someone explained that they had assembled this amount 
between them in order to entice potential adversaries. Their collectivisation anticipated and 
might elicit a competitor, anonymising contributants for a collective identified with a sum. 
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Figure 5.3: An attempted collective bet made by a group of teenage boys. 
 
The boys created a position from which a transactive counter might exist, just as Wok Meri 
groups cajoled others into forming “daughter” groups with the abundance they displayed at 
“washing hands” ceremonies (Sexton 1982: 189; see also M. Strathern 1988). When a 
“daughter” Wok Meri group was set up, they were defined by a sum given to the group as a 
group, rather than as individual mothers to individual children (Sexton 1982: 173). Precedents 
also existed among Auyana (Eastern Highlands); at their life-crises a “collection area” was 
made and wealth put in it without earmarking particular contributants; failure to anonymise 
oneself made the larger “unit” angry (S. Robbins 1982: 86). The boys set up their opposition in 
the very hurried, speedy, boisterous and aggressive way that epitomises youth (see Sykes 
1999; chapter two), but here I limit myself to the necessity for abundance in its creation. To my 
mind it would seem more difficult to attract people to oppose a high bet (K92). If the stakes 
are high, I would assume the bet is an expression of supreme confidence from my adversary; 
that would put me off. But the boys attempted to attract opponents by gathering a large 
amount of money and thrusting it raucously in others’ faces.  
 
The boys had faith in the aesthetic power of plenty upon potential opposition, and this 
resembles Pasde’s brideprice. The plenitude (and the distributive potential that is inherent in 
it) created the possibility of transaction. If the amount was large enough, it would draw 
another collective into existence to oppose it. In the brideprice situation the bride-giving clan 
exists in relation to the bride-taking one inasmuch as the latter receive the payment, while the 
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payment is only acceptable if it is large enough to satisfy the assemblage of people who 
designate themselves as the clan to receive it. The assumption on both the giver and receiver’s 
side, and both the bettor’s sides, is that more is better because larger imbalance invites 
stronger responses. It makes people consider engaging in its other side, sucking people into 
the transaction with centripetal force; imbalance tempting completion. One attempts to 
demonstrate not only that one can afford an expensive bride or a big bet, but that, give or 
take, win or lose, the relationship is intensified through transactions of pooled wealth. In both 
cases a breakdown is threatened if a suitably large amount of wealth is not provided to solidify 
the transaction, even though a large transaction will inevitably increase the responsibilities 
both parties have toward each other in the future. Like Wok Meri groups before them, and pig 
enterprises before that, Eastern Highlanders tend to see events like State of Origin as 
“corporate enterprises held in opposition to other, similar units” (Fiel 1987: 253; see Sexton 
1982; Read 1952; Watson 1983: 55).  
 
Likewise Wok Meri groups fretted over the size of their “washing hands” ceremonies, the more 
impressive they were, the more resolute “daughter” groups would become.  Wok Meri groups, 
like brideprice and collective bet contributants, used the desire to create large transactions as 
a mode of increasing their individual abilities to put together a large sum (Sexton 1982).  
Creating widely felt exchange was therefore more important than exchange between 
individuals.  
 
But these simple observations are well trodden ground in Melanesian anthropology. The real 
question remains: why collectivise the transaction? Is it just to make more potential for regard 
because individuals lack wealth? Is it just that, as Feil notes, when people have a little they 
prefer to pool to make their wealth seem a lot (1987: 253)? Later in the chapter we shall 
investigate larger and more personal bets between individuals, but another instance shall help 
to clarify why people bring things together for transaction without any seeming need. 
 
The second instance I recall happened among the crowd at a TV haus. After buying beer I 
walked over, paid the entrance fee for my companions and me, and sat on a tarpaulin with 40 
or so others. Five minutes before kick-off a middle-aged man (A) announced that he had K10 
he wanted to bet on the Maroons. A middle-aged mother (E) with two children in front then 
said they would bet K15 on Blues (thus far M10:B15). Another mother (F) exclaimed that they 
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had K5 to bet on Blues (M10:B20), while a young man (B) shouted excitedly he had K5 to bet 
on Maroons (M15:B20)17. One of my companions called Peter decided to act as third party, 
collected the bets together and looked after them; this was known as narapela bodi holim (lit. 
‘another body holds [it]’).  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Bettors attempting to set up a pooled bet and coming to different totals. 
 
Participants called out for someone to bet the difference. When no one came forward, the bet 
was broken up and Peter handed back the money. One would think that surely the K5 bettors 
(K5 Blues mother vs. K5 Maroons young man) would bet individually after the collective bet 
broke down (they were on potentially betting terms because I saw them gamble together 
regularly), yet this did not happen. At the time I thought it was incredible. I almost suggested 
it. I later realised that this was to do with the fragile community relations going on in the 
settlements; they did not want to bet against each other if they were in direct competition18. 
Not only was it polite to be as inclusive as possible, but bets which were not communalised 
when people were watching had no place (see below). Without a game that limits the 
participation of people (as in the case of bom, kwin or pokies, but not so in chalinj19) there is a 
necessity to include anyone who wishes to join in. To bet with a lone other was not equivalent.  
 
Instead of betting individually, they might just as easily have refused bettor F and the match 
would have been even (M15:B15). It seems the need not to refuse others who want to be 
included takes precedence over the transaction itself, which makes the transaction at least as 
much about the collective as it is about the win20. In other words pooling is a reason to act in 
and of itself; prior to betting. An historical parallel lies in Salisbury’s assertion that for Siane pig 
                                                 
17
 It so happened that bets were made on gender lines on this occasion, but this was not usually the case. 
18
 Another reason that chalinj games are not played in settlements (see chapter three). 
19
 See chapters one and two for bom and kwin, three for chalinj, and four for pokies. 
20
 Though I heard nothing to this effect, there might also be a desire to meet the aesthetic criteria of rugby 
itself: where bettors become a team for each side. It would be interesting to draw the analogy between 
teaming and pooling, but further research would be needed. 
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festivals (north of Goroka), their scale and timing came second to the need to initiate a group 
of new boys (1962: 93). Newman’s (1965: 52-53) description of Gururumba (upper Asaro) gives 
the impression of an almost baffling frequency of exchanges, with participants dividing 
themselves into host and guest, and thus giver and receiver, taking any opportunity to do so, 
even when it seemed superfluous. A similar priority was apparent at Pasde’s brideprice: the 
cost of the bride was reduced by the husbands pressing need to marry again. Equally the need 
to invite NSI staff members and for them to come and contribute was above the need to 
demarcate bride-giver and bride-taker precisely. The requirement to include was primary. This 
contrasts with Hagen and Enga, where economic considerations take precedence in 
conducting their exchange festivities (Feil 1987: 239) rather than the readiness of initiates21. 
 
In the TV haus, people were already in a collective, so it made sense to formalise that 
collective into an exchange transaction of oppositional sides. This is particularly important 
because State of Origin is also a tense and dangerous time where heavy drinking people vent 
frustration or extend sporting dominance into physical violence. Risk was reduced in 
distributed culpability. Bettors were less likely to refuse to pay up or pressurise Peter to give 
them their money back if there were many on the other side who might also be capable of 
violence.  
 
Now let us imagine that instead of breaking up because of unequal stakes, the bettors were 
joined by others who were able to establish an equivalent total, and the bet went ahead. 
Figure 5.4 represents this imagined scenario22. Taking the initial bettors as given, C and D 
staked a further K2 and K6 respectively for the Maroons, while K3 was placed on Blues by G. 
The bettors were thus organised into opposing camps, each contributing to a single pot. As 
long as the pots were even and the bet finalised (by Peter putting it away in his pocket; see 
chapter six) then the duality of the opposing amounts of money was eclipsed and they 
transformed into a single amount belonging to either one group or another, ready for 
distribution according to contributions. At this moment they resembled Wok Meri savings, 
brideprices, mortuary payments or any pooled ‘gift’. 
 
                                                 
21
 See also chapter four for a more extensive comparison. 
22
 I saw as much on different occasions and so meld these with the current example for narrative 
purposes. 
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Figure 5.5: The imagined successful conclusion of the TV Haus collective bet. 
 
When it was concluded, the initial bet’s conflicting nature was removed, becoming only a ‘gift’ 
whose direction had not been decided. This is its novelty: the direction of this ‘gift’ was not 
predetermined by an existing debt, instead it hung upon a contingent and uninfluencable 
event beyond the Torres Straits. The direction was willingly taken out of the competitors 
hands, and its destination could serve as instigator for compensation, drinking together and 
other merriment, or if compensation was not forthcoming then vengeful violence 
compounded by the sense of loss that comes from sporting humiliation. As I saw other times, 
one party doubles their money, but when they collect it they are impelled to distribute some 
of their winnings to the losing party in the form of consumables like betelnut or alcohol, and 
sometimes a portion of the money itself, usually imparted with the instruction to buy 
something consumable with it. 
 
The need to give was extended to those who were party to the transaction, though less 
strongly, so Peter was bought consumables too, and others expected at least a rolled cigarette. 
Drunkenness compounds a sense of entitlement and allows people to ask for gifts without 
shame (cf. Mosko 1999). Winners often use their collective winnings to buy something to 
consume together as a group such as a bottle of fruit wine, in which case the scale of the 
distribution is not conducted in proportion to the initial bet23. This was commonly done to 
avoid the need to distribute more widely. A band of winners, especially young men, could be 
very intimidating when drunk, and so recipients would often gain further if what they received 
was alcohol.  
                                                 
23
 See Sykes (1999) for a discussion of how over-consumption might alienate young people who are 
unable to participate in exchanges in their home villages because of their obligation to reciprocate with 
fellow townsmen. 
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In analysing the three instances together I find that the value of money is increased in its 
compositeness. The greater the number of contributors giving meaningful amounts of money, 
the greater the potential to attract money in opposition24. An illustrative equation 
representing the decision process of a person confronted with an imbalanced bet and the 
opportunity to join in would look something like this: 
 
(Ai  x m) =   X + (Bi  x m) 
 
Where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are bettors, ‘i’ is their importance to the person choosing whether to bet or 
not at that time (presuming for a second that this type of thing was quantifiable), ‘m’ is the 
amount bet. ‘X’ is then the attraction of the imbalance remaining in the bet. If ‘X’ is higher, 
then the desire to bet will be higher. I do not suggest that such decisions are formalised in 
Gorokan minds in such a way, I am merely illustrating how the attractive potential, or value of 
an amount of money, can vary according to the number of persons involved in the bet25. 
 
At the same time, within a bet there was a great need to use the money in terms defined by 
that transaction, and thus to redistribute it to people around them. The number of participants 
increases the need to consume the money in ways that all can enjoy rather than dissipating it 
into another version of its original distribution, hence the consumption of communal alcohol. 
This is desirable because collective consumption makes ties increasingly close (see Sykes 
1999). As in Wok Meri, money is most valuable when it is invested and where the person loses 
some control over it (Sexton 1982), but unlike Wok Meri, value is morphed into a process of 
consumption (see also Reed 2007). Money is consumed in the process by which its value is 
realised26. In terms of the equation X is increased in a larger communal bet relative to the 
amount of money needed to participate, and this consumption of money (because it will be 
                                                 
24
 See also chapters three and four. 
25
 Here I take inspiration from Goffman and his formalised decision based approach to gambling (2006 
[1969]), though my use is more illustrative than actual, a model for grasping emic action given our 
irreducibly etic perspective. 
26
 Sykes (1999) focusses on the personal realisation of alienation during consumption, my stance among 
(primarily) permanent Town dwellers is that people find value in these consumptive acts when they are 
their primary mode of transaction. 
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consumed in the distribution) can then be compared to other sharing based consumptive uses 
for the money. Therefore in this analysis I see money’s value as a result of the incorporation of 
other’s capacities into money. That the direction of the exchange is not controlled by the 
participants makes the incorporation of others into a collective amount of money safe; it 
defuses worries about people’s coercive capabilities over the money’s direction. 
 
As I have said, like other forms of gambling in Goroka, and unlike former novel transactive 
forms like Wok Meri, State of Origin betting cross-cuts kinship, language group and affinal 
relations as well as those based on colleague status, friendship and residential proximity. To do 
so in a group is to transgress existing ties and reconfigure the social order on a temporary 
basis, creating that exuberant atmosphere in transactional terms. As such money is subject to 
the aesthetic of pooling, which modifies its movements, restricting the flow in a large 
marketplace for bets because of the need always to create bonds with it. The movement of 
money is subject to the forces of distribution even before it is put into circulation, and in a 
group the pressure to distribute winnings directly is partially deflected onto others. Everyone 
was involved already and the pressure of giving to others was diluted by others’ involvement. 
Let us not forget that the need to buy betelnut, cigarettes and other compensatory gestures 
that happen during card games also apply here (see chapter one). This is because a communal 
bet, public as it is, already anticipates itself as redistribution. People may prefer their personal 
one-on-one bet not to be distributed, and hence they do it in private, as I discuss below.  
 
Similarly to the luk (lit. ‘look’, free game) given to players who lose at cards (chapter two), the 
possibility of a repeat performance and the willingness to bet again with an opponent is a key 
feature of State of Origin betting, and this comes out in a more pronounced way when looking 
at “individual” bets. I now turn my attention to the few who have particular people in mind to 
bet against, often year on year. If the bets are substantial, the fame of their betting 
relationship may increase participants’ renown. This renown in turn attracts smaller bets, and 
so even “individual” bets seem to take on a communal character.  
 
 
2. Big Bets and Satellites 
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Before the collective betting just described, many bets will have been cast between individuals 
across the Town. As well as revelling in the atmosphere, people make a point of ambling 
around the Town to see others and to be seen so that they may challenge or be challenged to 
bet. Random meetings are deliberately courted as a way of engaging in playful talk about the 
game and to participate in betting. According to the survey I conducted of staff at NSI, 58% 
made a bet of this sort for at least one of the State of Origin games. Six made small bets with 
kin, others with colleagues (5), language mates from their village (3); some in a pooled bet of 
the type I discussed above (3), some with neighbours (2); others with acquaintances known as 
supporters of opposing teams and big bettors (2); one with an affine and three with perfect 
strangers they talked to about the game. Once again we see betting cutting across all kinds of 
relationship, and even creating new ones. It even has a fractal quality, because whomsoever 
one bets with, everyone evokes the same opposition; a kind of national identity exists in the 
capacity to turn any two people into Blue or Maroon as two sides of an exchange (cf. Foster 
1995a; 2006). 
 
Unlike at pokies (see chapter four), betting partnerships were rare, and alliances tended to be 
ad hoc and based on proximity, with betting partnerships more a matter of etiquette in letting 
the loser have a rematch than a formalised relationship27. For some people one bet was not 
enough, and when a number of bets began to coagulate around individuals then interesting 
social forms took shape. Of these bets I have chosen to concentrate on those around big-men; 
during the festival atmosphere leading up to a game their outlandish betting was a favourite 
topic. 
 
Some big-men claimed that people sought them out and challenged them to bet. Whether 
they were in fact coerced by another into betting, it was always better to have been perceived 
to have been coerced, as it was a demonstration of fame. Therefore, as an outsider witnessing 
a ‘challenge’28, it was quite difficult to work out who was challenging who, and often both 
parties claimed to have been challenged.  The ambivalence over whether an event was elicited 
by oneself or another (see M. Strathern 1992a) allowed bets to appear exchange-like, 
complementing the analysis of chapter two. They cause wealth to travel in one or the other 
                                                 
27
 See Fiel 1987: 260 for a characterisation of Eastern Highland exchange events that matches this 
description perfectly. 
28
 See also chapter three. 
 204 
 
direction, without the troublesome problem of determining who is forcing the exchange upon 
the other29.  
 
Big-men often made a substantial bet (usually K800 or so30) with someone of equal standing. 
The year before my arrival two big-men, betting partners and arch fans of opposing teams 
gave K25,000 each to the local car dealership, telling the dealer to give the keys of a brand new 
Toyota Land Cruiser to the winner. The death of one of these men prevented a rematch in 
2009. Big-men were reputed to bet wives (though I never met any who claimed this). 
Polygamous big-men boasted of their secret wives, how these women lusted after them and 
how they now controlled them. Betting wives may have been bravado, but it gives some idea 
of the extent to which big-men were expected to have confidence in their own resources. 
There are yet more farfetched stories of Port Moresby big-men betting ships and aeroplanes. 
Whatever the extent of actual bets, the idea of magnified, even grotesquely outlandish betting 
tripped off the tongues of many, and big-men with big wallets that I spoke to were careful not 
to diminish this rumour, sometimes actively promulgating their involvement.  
 
When in 2010 I made a point of accompanying big-men to watch the games, I was quite 
disappointed. Many chose to watch quietly at home, away from the drinkers and from any 
pressure to make big bets. On the opening day of Origin 2010 the upmarket Bird of Paradise 
bar contained very few people, and their attitude toward the game was quite blasé. I switched 
between hotel bar and pokie lounge bar; the latter hosted a broader range of Gorokans, and 
had an above average crowd in watching the game. These people were altogether more 
boisterous, more drunk and exuberant, more like the TV Haus of 2009. They followed every 
play, jolted forward in glee or recoiled in empathy with each big hit. Even here, among a crowd 
that had become all too familiar over a year or so of negotiating punters and sports fans, there 
was no betting to be seen. I was disappointed.  
 
                                                 
29
 This is another reason that gambling is play, antithetical to work (see chapters three and four), because 
nobody claims to have worked in setting up the ‘exchange’. Wok Meri groups also describe their savings 
as a mode of work (Sexton 1982: 176), presumably because savings are wealth that has purposefully been 
kept antecedent to social life. 
30
 Perhaps not coincidentally this was the price of a large pig in 2009-10. 
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It is only clear to me in retrospect that the betting, to whatever extent it went on, was part of a 
battlefield of information that permeated the Town, while visible acts of giving, taking, and 
betting are usually concealed. Tactical modesty shrouded such activities when they happened 
and flamboyant exaggeration gilded deeds done. Hiding the extent of one’s transactions only 
serves to magnify their size in the eyes of ordinary people, and the effect is clear in joyful 
retellings of big-men betting all they had, even their wives, on a game of rugby played across 
the sea. Betting falls heavily on individuals of renown in Goroka. This burden, I argue, is quite 
unusual in a place where transactions take new but familiar shapes. While part of the aesthetic 
of measured and tactical pooling that I have discussed above, it shows how easily big-men can 
have their “finance” pulled from under them (see chapter four).  
 
Aside from a central bet, big-men were also challenged to many smaller, satellite bets. Their 
affiliation was known to most people, and “lesser men” often made their main bet (usually 
K10-K100) against them; for the big-man this was a sait-bet (‘side-bet’). “Lesser men” knew 
big-men had to accept or risk losing face, but above all enjoyed transacting with him and the 
memory this imparted. Figure 5.5 illustrates the relationship between large bettors and 
smaller bets as big-men saw them. They perceived the bikpela bet (lit. ‘big bet’) as feeding 
their reputation and the ‘side bets’ as a kind of duty. Explicitly they said if you accept “small” 
challenges then those people will come to you when they have a crisis, i.e. ask them for 
financial support for a ceremonial event (see chapter four). The sheer number and monetary 
amount of bets they drew quantified their status among other betting big-men. They pointed 
to an enlarging field of reciprocal support that big-men could rely upon. The money used to 
bet was part of on-going and enlarging reciprocal networks where the initial direction of the 
“gift” of winnings was less important than the tie itself. Even so, it would have been unwise to 
bet too much, so I think big-men preferred to retire from public view when they felt they had 
bet enough. 
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Figure 5.6: Two leaders (A and B) involved in a large bet for a car. A is in maroon representing their 
team, B in blue. Below it are smaller bets made by the big-men with “smaller” people. Note that each 
leader is surrounded by bettors of a different colour, and hence they stand to lose a lot of money should 
their team be defeated. 
 
Big-men said large single bets were more beneficial to their ‘name’, because news of such a 
bet would travel more widely. Like the flute-playing of a sub-clan whose member gave a large 
pig to a festival (observed by Read among likely ancestors of some of my informants (1952: 
19)), news of a big-man’s exploits allows kin members to bask in its collective glory. In this 
sense the single large bet was also a collective bet, even if big-men were at pains to assert 
their singular control over it. If they back the wrong team, it still reflects the financial muscle of 
their clan, and their ability to absorb its loss. Just like big-man-less communal bets, win or lose, 
the destiny of one’s winnings are compromised, becoming subject to all kinds of requests. 
While big-men as strong personalities can refuse requests with relative ease, it still makes 
sense to bet something like a car: it is less alienable than money, and can be loaned out or 
used to ferry people about without being taken from the owner. The key point is that the 
money was mobilised when it was committed to a bet and therefore represented a public sum 
by definition, because knowledge of it required distribution to at least some extent. The large 
bet, being public, is of the same order as a brideprice payment because it is by Gorokan 
definition already a collective sum in potentia.  
 
Yet the oppositional character is different from that seen in a Wok Meri group, a Chalinj game, 
at a pokie joint, or at lifecycle events like Pasde’s brideprice. The two big-men who were 
engaged in a big bet may have been friendly competitors in leadership, and the smaller bettors 
were supporters of their big-man. So far, so similar; however, supporters are actually in direct 
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competition with their patrons. Note the blue/maroon colouration surrounding each big-man 
in figure 5.5. A great deal of wealth may have arrived or departed, but the onus fell directly 
upon the leader, and not the leader as collective individual (contra Fiel 1987). Unlike pokies, or 
Wok Meri, or a brideprice, there is no financial support. Instead the aesthetic of accumulation 
takes on an extreme potlatch dimension. It expresses the capacity of a big-man to already have 
wealth, to have access to wealth outside his kin base, and/or to already have control of the 
wealth of his kin; he must be able to absorb both the actions of other big-men competitively 
transacting with them and his supporters simultaneously. State of Origin betting is therefore 
risky for big-men, so no wonder that talk of big bets outstrips observable cases.  
 
Across State of Origin collective bets, it seems higher value was placed on wealth that was 
composed of multiple contributions; that they were the proper form that transactions should 
have taken in group situations. Big-men, brides and groups of young boys alike, all seemed to 
want to bring people together in single transactions and create Gorokan style collective ties. 
Thus the collective bet was an aspirational analogue of the large bet made by a single big-man, 
itself an iteration of the oppositional ‘pooling unit’-making actions of bride-prices and Wok 
Meri groups. Yet the ambiguity of a betting ‘gift’s’ destination can lead to some unusual social 
forms, most notably the big-man as lone potlatcher. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On the day of a State of Origin game, towns and cities were divided along the lines of Blues or 
Maroons. I described how dividing the Gorokan social world on this novel basis was a radical 
reimagining of relations upon deliberately frivolous, cross-cutting lines. This created a 
carnivalesque atmosphere, which affects not only Goroka; it splits much of Papua New Guinea 
in a truly national event. This simple opposition can unite strangers against existing kin, 
something rarely seen in Melanesian ethnography (but see Reed 2003; cf. Foster 2002). One 
can imagine the opposition playing out at many levels, and I have focussed upon only one: the 
bet. I attempted to show that bets of this nature are like floating gifts, restricted to two 
directions, but only two. Within their dyadic form their destination was deliberately given over 
to an outside force, creating an ease that adds to the festival atmosphere surrounding games. 
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Free to put cause down to another, a bet became a gift to be consumed and enjoyed in good-
natured opposition. 
 
Having described betting in terms of pooling in reference to this one event, I think it fruitful to 
reflect back on the games described in previous chapters through the notion of pooling. The 
major card games in Goroka, kwin and bom, for instance, pool money in every round, and in 
chapter one I consider how within these games people might manipulate the pot with their 
contribution so as to attract it toward them. These games are also pooling events on a smaller 
scale. Yet one set of pooled wealth is not opposed to another, so they could not be described 
as oppositional. The money returns to the original “pooling unit” every time a game is won, 
but remains within the province of a single player to use as they please. Chalinj also pools 
money, and this time the pooling is oppositional, one bet contributed to by multiple parties 
against another of the same order. Yet chalinj is not winner-takes-all (as is the case in State of 
Origin) because the incumbent may decide how much they wish to bet from their overall 
winnings. This serves to increase the pooled wealth during the course of the day.  
 
Each of these games appears now as a variation upon the theme of pooling and then 
distributing. It is pertinent then to remind the reader that kwin, bom, chalinj, and State of 
Origin are considered indigenous-style games, even though the mediums they use (playing 
cards or a game of rugby league) are thought to be things from outside. The only odd one out 
is pokies, which is thought of as wholly coming from the outside, and does not involve pooling. 
It would be quite possible for people to pool their money for a game of pokies and then 
distribute the winnings, as they do during State of Origin, but this never occurs. Instead pokies 
are things from outside that should be transacted with individually (wan wan), as people 
believe one transacts with ol waitman (white people). This seems to be based upon the 
existence of an agent (the machine) that acts individually and requires a person to interact 
with it individually. Rather than paying attention to an external and thus fair medium for intra-
Gorokan bets (as in the case of the cards people play with or the rugby game they bet on), 
pokie players bet with the outside agent “controlling” the machines. Though I did not ask 
about the pooling-based distinctions between games, I find it striking that all the gambling 
events that involve pooling are thought to be indigenous-style games even when using 
exogenous materials and events; meanwhile pokies are considered manifestly exogenous, and 
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people do not consider pooling their wealth in opposition to it, perhaps because its agency 
interacts with them in an exogenous, non-pooling style.  
 
Through a range of events, I postulated that pooling is a far-reaching Gorokan aesthetic, 
recurring again and again at different times and during diverse events31. Collective exchanges 
in single transactions made transactions worthwhile, and thus had a distorting effect upon the 
potential for exchange of money. I have attempted – through explaining how and why people 
constructed the types of transactions that they preferred to make – to assemble a reasoning 
that might seem unproblematic for the Gorokans who made such transactions with both 
consummate ease and tense anticipation. At the same time the value of money was further 
“distorted” to account for these types of transactions which I have understood as embedded in 
the need to make social connections with money. The desire to spend money in betting, to 
consume it, manipulated money toward inclusion rather than excluding others through 
denominational difference (you have K10, I have K5). Collective bets and their composite 
counterparts in big-men’s bets (just like brideprices and Wok Meri), encouraged people to 
make money a part of a larger whole, and in so doing manipulate the properties of money 
itself32. I shall follow this line of reasoning into the final chapter, where I take winning as the 
starting point, and look at how money disappears inside pockets only to be revealed in a 
manner that is designed to exceed the expectations of a recipient. The disseminatory potentia 
of money is problematized because money may collude with winners, hiding in pockets and 
refusing to live up to ideals of wealth distribution. This final chapter also sums up the 
aggregate of possibilities brought forth by gambling and money in Goroka. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 It might even be possible to reread other ethnographies through the notion of pooling as aesthetic, 
though there is no space to develop the notion here. 
32
 From cursory observations of church fundraising and donations, the same aesthetic seems pertinent, 
though I have not included this in the thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Pocket Calculator 
 
 
This final chapter is both an exploration and a conclusion, using new material to reflect back on 
what has been said. Anecdotes often marshal material in a conclusion, they are used to bring 
ideas together and reflect on them anew. Having portrayed a summative, perhaps anecdotal 
instance of gambling in each of the previous chapters, I focus instead on a related arena for 
the manipulation of money – the use of pockets – as a way of illuminating gambling by 
revealing what it is not. Before that, it will be necessary to review the points I have made thus 
far. 
 
In relaying how gambling connected Goroka, I have discussed its history, breadth, and the 
kinds of ‘logics’ which surface in and around playing. Most local forms of gambling were 
explored1, from everyday card games to their flamboyant and speedy equivalents in markets, 
from nightly slot-machine “finance” to the festivals of gambling surrounding sporting events. 
Interwoven in the description were some ‘logics’ of money, contingency, sales, and 
accumulation. I have attempted to explode the definition of gambling from a means by which 
individuals make wagers on contingent events in the pursuit of a return to a method by which 
objects of value are gathered together and then differently distributed amongst contributors 
based upon principles other than their original agglomerations.  
 
I have drawn a number of conclusions, some of which were fully developed within the contexts 
of discrete chapters. In the prologue I introduced gambling and its spread into Goroka, 
suggesting that it offers a motif for relating. The material culture and rules of gambling were 
re-envisioned as a kind of imposed uniformity that allowed for interactions between members 
of a highly diverse and fluid populace. Gambling became a method for seeing urban space 
through a practice that unites it. I therefore relinquished an interest in formally defining 
Goroka as a bounded anthropological site, choosing instead to use the rules of gambling as the 
                                                 
1
 Excepting betting at bookies, dart games, and pool tables, which had to be left aside in order to give 
sufficient space for the existing material. 
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locus of formalisation throughout the thesis. Through the chapters that followed, I offered 
gambling-led characterisations of various phenomena and anthropological tropes.  
 
In chapter one I discussed shortcomings of some literature on gambling, where assumptions of 
chance-based determinacy turned people into dupes of the games, and games redistributed 
wealth above and beyond indigenous consciousness. Through an explanation of betting during 
five-player card games, I argued that the rules and mathematics of Gorokan gambling were 
instead consciously geared toward making subtle gift/acquisitive expressions by manipulating 
the value of money. I reflected on how this position adjusted assumptions of certain money-
theories, particularly that money is by definition abstract because the calculations made with it 
are number-based; and that abstraction always means distanciation from the human realm. 
Money was redefined as “marked paper and metal shapes whose numerical value is set as 
commensurable and fungible but whose actual value is set by the situations in which moneys 
are separated from each other at different times and places”. Throughout the thesis I then 
elaborated on ways that moneys had their values manipulated to elicit distinctions between 
people(s). 
 
Chapter two began placing the thesis within the ethnographic corpus, discussing Melanesian 
perceptions of causality, the opacity of others minds, and using the Kula as analogy. Via an 
exploration of the two most popular games in Goroka, I suggested gambling as a rule-bound 
arena for increased transaction in an urban setting. Through accelerated transaction, gamblers 
penetrate the assumed opacity of their own and others’ minds. Games model larger 
“relational” fields in the form of patterns, operating as an indigenous analytic. Relations 
between cards were analysed as abstractions of what has been called a “relational” life-world, 
and I posited ‘pattern’ as an indigenous analogue of the “abstraction” attributed to money by 
theorists discussed in chapter one, shifting the grounds for analysing Gorokan use of money. I 
showed that over time gambling games replicate and cultivate the speed of thought that they 
are thought to embody, providing a model for Melanesian social change. At the same time 
games foster either a ‘Melanesian’ approach or an un-Melanesian one, which meant people 
enacted social change processually by the games they chose. 
 
In chapter three I explored marketing and gambling together, on the revised assumption that 
both are likely to contain their own ‘logic’, a form of indigenous accountancy, and that it will 
 212 
 
have diverse manifestations depending on indigenously understood variables. I suggested that 
because value is projected during marketing as a mode of ensnaring customers into 
reciprocity, Gorokans think of ‘work’ differently; work is defined as prior to the transactive 
sphere rather than as activity that generates income. I used the ‘logic’ that develops to explain 
the existence of an unusual game by Gorokan standards, and its location in the centre of 
marketing, while showing how the ‘logic’ of gambling is contiguous with these other areas of 
town life. 
 
Having started expanding the scope of the thesis in chapter three, chapter four shows how 
pokies (slot machines) bring forth emerging forms of inequality as they cultivate innovative 
forms of “finance”. A new generation of ‘big-men’ use pokies as a medium to launder their 
money into gift-able forms. Pokies are only enjoyed individually, and this concentration allows 
big-men to escape from obligations, freeing up their money to be used as gifts beyond their 
kinship bases and expand their opportunities through alliance. I argued that pokies are among 
the places where ‘big-men’ break through ‘traditional’ constraints on Eastern Highlands 
leadership, connecting the thesis to national level debates over the corruption of elites. 
 
Chapter five examined collective bets around the time of the State of Origin rugby league 
competition in Australia. Through analogy with brideprice payments and Wok Meri groups, I 
discussed the process of “pooling money in opposition” as a recurrent theme in Melanesian 
anthropology. Yet pooled bets had a different, jovial atmosphere because the groups that 
were defined in the collective transaction were novel and un-enduring. I postulated that 
money which is composed of multiple contributions has a higher indigenous value than the 
equivalent from a single source, which united these bets with their “traditional” counterparts. I 
reconfigured the notion of betting into a ‘gift’ without a preordained direction, the important 
thing being that money, once bet, is freed for consumption. This was a different form of 
manipulation to the use of denominations to leverage gifts from others explored in chapter 
one. Instead of the money’s value being cajoled by using the material indivisibility of money, 
value resulted from the redefinition of people as collectively either Blues or Maroons and the 
amalgamation of different denominations in a single pot.  
 
In recapping my findings and analyses, I find that two points cut across different chapters, and 
these would benefit from being drawn together and further developed here. Firstly, I was 
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concerned to counter the idea that gambling is only self-interested acquisition, and that 
Gorokans were simply an example of a ‘gift-society’, two assumptions that turn Gorokan 
gambling into a social-scientific paradox. I therefore focussed instead on a wealth of 
transactions and how each subtly manipulated value in a way that Gorokans recognised, 
revealing a series of indigenous formalisms for monetary transactions. Gambling was seen to 
have a central place in excavating the capacities of monies, while valuation and calculation 
were seen as an everyday communicative language, rather than an economistically driven 
instance of universal commoditisation. It is the pervasiveness of these formalisms which I feel 
requires further attention. In this concluding chapter I turn the tables to see what gambling, 
which invites the analyst to think formally, allows one to excavate about other daily forms of 
transaction, and of gifting itself. I analyse the use of pockets as a vehicle for transactions, much 
as I did with gambling, and find that many of the themes of the thesis emerge in this seemingly 
unrelated part of everyday life. During the thesis I have characterised money in terms of flows 
of wealth that are brought forth by gambling. This is where money and pockets meet, the 
former being the irreducible form of wealth, the units of its flow, like the different size rocks 
that wear away the river bank. The latter are wealth’s vessels of aggregation, the tributaries 
and estuaries through which wealth keeps its course. A look at pockets shows how people hid 
the wealth that gambling reveals, illuminating gambling by showing what gambling must 
overcome in order to bring money forth. 
 
The second area of investigation that would benefit from further explication is my stance on 
social change. At the ethnographic level this thesis clearly adds to the literature on social 
change in Melanesia, simply because of the startling lack of urban anthropology in the region 
(but see Reed 2003; Goddard 2005). As a corollary, most economic anthropology in the region 
is based on village economics, so it is of clear import simply as a record of urban economic 
activity. On the level of analysis my approach to social change was driven by the idea of change 
that seemed built into gambling. In chapters one and two I used the Tok Pisin phrase paten 
senis senis (lit. ‘the pattern changes changes’) to illustrate the way in which games model 
social change in their own transformations. I did not, however, develop the parameters of that 
change. In my discussion of pocket use in Goroka I develop the idea that indigenous 
formalisms appear in many guises, and that their supersession is a necessary, even inevitable 
path for achievement in Goroka. In turn each innovation elaborates and creates new 
boundaries for future formalisms, and so ‘pattern’ come forward in a new guise.  
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Both of these points would benefit from a fresh perspective, and pocket-use provides an ideal 
opportunity in this regard. Like gambling, pockets were exogenous to Goroka; they arrived 
when gold prospectors and colonial patrollers came in the 1930’s wearing trousers, shirts and 
jackets (see Strathern 1992b; Nelson 1982). Just as gambling was predated by elaborate forms 
of redistribution, pockets encroached upon a highly significant localised tradition of gendered 
string bags looped by women. Carrying was also gendered: Mackenzie notes that in the Central 
Highlands (to which we can add Goroka to the east) women were the sole carriers and big-men 
were particularly notable for never carrying anything (1991: 128). Yet in 2009-2010 I 
encountered a pocket obsession among both sexes that rivalled gambling. There has been a 
move towards undersised, more pocket-like string bags. Many young men in Goroka now carry 
a small squared string bag so shaped to contain documents. Among women pockets are 
usually contained in shorts worn underneath their long, modest, flowing dresses. Big-men and 
small alike have visible pockets to carry the technological trappings of Town life (mobile 
phones, cash, cards), and both sexes talk about pockets.  
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Figure 6.1: Hariet, an astute gambler, in her long flowing dress, with shorts underneath. Her bag is 
notably deflated (see below). 
 
At gambling centres like Kakaruk Maket2, I often heard people speculate on whether one 
person or another had money in their pocket, or joked about times they won money, put it in 
their pocket and left without revealing it to anyone. Gorokans particularly liked to muse on the 
fullness of people’s pockets at places like betel nut markets, where money flows most 
prolifically, and they fantasised about the wealth within being released and spread around the 
                                                 
2
 See chapter three. 
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place. They might state – more in hope than expectation - that such a release would not 
concern those who parted with the money. This is a fantasy because pockets are primarily a 
device for withdrawing things from circulation, and people moaned of money disappearing 
into pockets so that they never received any. For the most part, people use pockets to avoid 
giving to others that which they would otherwise feel obliged to donate. In Goroka garments 
are often sought and bought because of their deep or many pockets, but others baulk at the 
overt display of pockets. Some people therefore stitch hidden pockets into their trousers so 
that they can have more of them without appearing to. It is not enough to hide things away in 
one pocket, because as I shall discuss, the pressure to give means that pockets need to be  a 
complex series of ‘vaults’, each with a different level of security and access. What emerges is a 
precise but malleable mode of concealment, and complex discourses on the appropriateness 
of pocket styles and quantities, and a symbiotic relationship between pockets and gambling. 
 
I discuss the way Gorokans associate pockets with the skin, a place where transactions make 
themselves apparent to others. I then describe how pockets are used to contain wealth items 
close to the skin in a way that prevents others from gauging their contents. The following 
section demonstrates the skill needed to maintain control over money in ones pockets when 
faced with overriding pressure to transact with others. Subsequently I explore the possible 
kinds of revelations available to those who use their pockets well. I argue that hiding and 
conventionalising one’s wealth allows pocket users to reveal and donate in a way that 
maximizes the surprize effect of their gift and its impact. Finally I reveal how people’s 
knowledge of these revelations as conventional strategies allows them to moralize pocket use, 
overshadowing pockets in turn. People observe another’s pockets and judge them self-
interested, contrasting themselves as someone who does not use pockets to hide their money 
and is thereby open to sharing, breaking the bounds of peoples pocket ‘systems’, or 
formalisations. I refer to gambling throughout as appropriate, and return to their shared 
‘logics’ at the end of the chapter. 
 
 
A Pocketful 
 
Gorokans say pockets are the best places to keep wealth because they are by various degrees 
pas lo skin (lit. ‘fastened to the skin’). Women often used this as a justification for wearing 
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shorts under their dresses. Skin (as opposed to eyes) is the primary index for assessments of 
moral standing (where glossy/greasy is good, while ashy/dry is bad, see O’Hanlon 1989). 
Among the Gahuku-Gama just outside Goroka, Kenneth Read found that good or bad skin was 
indicative of character; debts were kept upon the skin, loosening your own skin upon 
discharging and making good the skin of another (1965: 266). Knowledge of someone was 
couched in terms of having seen their skin, doubtless with reference to transactions; belonging 
to a group was to have one skin (ibid). In the Waghi area to the west O’Hanlon found the skin’s 
ideally glossy appearance could be rendered ashen by contact with women, by magic, or by 
morally compromising relationships (1989). So transgressions are manifest on the skin, which 
may be made attractive with the application of pig grease on ceremonial occasions.  In 
mourning Highlanders also famously cover their skins with mud that dries, demonstrating the 
physicality of their loss in their ashen appearance (see ibid: 122; Crook 2007b).  
 
In Melanesia at large, people’s insides are the locus for their ‘faculties of both reason and 
emotion, and their communicational capacity, the intentions and things with which they 
interact with others’ (Strathern 1992b: 249). The skin is the place where these capacities 
present themselves. It makes sense therefore that containers that can fasten themselves to 
the skin, with all its capacities, became special idiomatic places. Imagine then a pocketful of 
money, reassuringly fastened to the skin, with all the control that it brings. When money is 
released and made ‘public’ by gambling, where they could ‘see the face of money’3, it 
relinquished this reassurance and launch money into the contingency of others’ capacities. 
 
Marilyn Strathern gave the word skin special prominence in No Money on Our Skins (1975), an 
account of migrants from Hagen in the Highlands to the capital city Port Moresby. She reveals 
analogies with the Guhuku-Gama and the Waghi as she explains her title: ‘[p]eople at home 
have many things on their skins, all the traditional forms of wealth and valuable resources by 
which they make their name; the wage earner has nothing but money and in their eyes little of 
that since he finds it hard to deploy it in ways approved of by his rural kinsmen’ (ibid: XV). 
These urban migrants complained about having no money on their skins when they lack 
savings or ready cash (ibid: 314). The important distinction seems to be between money used 
as a consequence of being trapped in a city, and money which is on the skin, i.e. money under 
their control however it is spent (see below on ‘pocket money’).  
                                                 
3
 See chapter one. 
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In Port Moresby Strathern encountered first and second generation users of money and their 
notions of skin. In contemporary Goroka among second, third or even fourth generation 
residents money has been naturalised4. Nevertheless wealth in its current form should be 
close to the skin in order to remain as safely as possible under its possessor’s control. Magical 
substances which are used to attract money and to win at gambling are also best located in a 
snug pocket, so that it can act in conjunction with that skin and attract money towards it5. 
Pockets also provide a means by which wealth can act in union with the skin, and as we shall 
see, this gives people extraordinary feelings of potency and confidence. The pocket on the skin 
is a place of both concealment and contained revelation, so among clothed skins the pocket 
becomes the mediation point of flow between skin and world. Its importance plays out in the 
detailed tactics of pocket users. 
 
With typical self-consciousness, when I asked how people arranged things in their pockets, 
they immediately recognised the question, and often replied sistem blo me em olsem… (lit. ‘my 
system is like this…’). Some people learnt their ‘systems’ for distributing money about their 
person from family but many more invented their own systems and they all told me their 
methods in secret. Pocket ‘systems’ resembled the aidia (lit. ‘ideas’) that gamblers used to try 
to win, and which were kept secret because of their idiosyncratic efficacy, and which adjusted 
the ‘pattern’ of games. With pockets the ‘systems’ were various and secret because if anyone 
else knew how they arranged things, that person would be able to tell if they were holding 
back money, much as revealing aidia would compromise one’s tactics in gambling. In chapter 
five I described Pasde’s bride Lauren, who grew up in a village and was not used to organising 
her money about her body; she told me how she consciously worked out her own system 
when she married into Town. Now Lauren always puts money in her front two pockets; if she 
put it in her back pocket, she said, then thieves would get at it easily. When she walks around 
town, one side is used to buy things, and all monies start on that side. Then when Lauren gets 
change from shops, smaller notes go in another pocket, while K10 and above go in the first 
pocket. The second pocket is used to buy cigarettes, betel nut, and any other small purchases. 
 
                                                 
4
 See chapter one. 
5
 See chapter two. 
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Another pocket ‘system’ came from my marketing friend Charlie6, who surreptitiously 
demonstrated how he folds K2 notes in half, K5’s in thirds, and K20’s in quarters7, so that he 
can feel about in his one pocket and bring out the right money for the right occasion. When 
not marketing, smaller notes went in one pocket, larger in another. Within pockets numerical 
moneys are arranged for unmistakeable access, one kind of note folded one way, another 
differently, another order of magnitude in another pocket altogether, or left loose. Monies are 
pooled in pockets, but denominations play a clear role, melding the analyses of chapters one 
and five. Living in Goroka I found that I had unwittingly adopted a version of local practices, 
folding larger notes inside smaller ones and counting my way towards the middle so as to only 
bring out what was necessary, with one large note stashed away for shopping.  
 
Loui – who helped conduct my survey and appeared in the prologue – once told me how he 
organised money when I convinced him to tell me how he had spent a payment I had given 
him: 
 
My system for holding money in my pocket is to have the K20's covered by the 
K10's, then K5's, and finally K2's. I fold them in half and then I twist them around 
[into a cylinder, he demonstrated], so that the higher notes are in the middle. I 
invented this method myself in the sixth grade [age 12], as at the time my guardian 
used to give me K20 a day for food. When I am hiding the money in my pocket, I am 
not hiding it from others but from myself, so I don’t spend it . . . I wrap the notes up 
which I want to keep for myself, and I reach into my pocket and grab the loose 
money, that is what I do when I have to give to someone. 
 
This quote stresses that money hidden through careful arrangement is under the possession of 
its owner, while revelation automatically leads to spending (see Keane 2008: 475; Strathern 
1988, 1992b). Loui asserts that keeping hold of money should be within his powers, but he 
nonetheless clearly senses that he needs to be vigilant, because he feels pressure to give to 
others when he sees them. Organising the money in the pocket is a method of self-control 
                                                 
6
 Who appeared in chapter three. 
7
 Denominations of 100 to 2 Kina are made of a paper-like plastic, K1 and below are metal based. See 
Foster (1998) for the significance of different denominations and the pictorial representations thereon in 
the project of nation building. 
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while it is still possible to exercise it. In this light, it is possible to see that gambling, which is a 
tightly controlled mode of releasing money, which is tied into a game and is not subject to 
gifting until it has been won or lost, is a mode by which money can be safely revealed without 
subjecting oneself to accusations of inequitable distribution. Once again, gambling is shown 
not as simply acquisition without reciprocity, but a mode of self-conscious release for money 
at large. 
 
The supreme act of hiding is the stil-poket (lit. ‘steal-pocket’); this is hidden outside of people’s 
view, usually on the inside of a pair of trousers, and as close to the skin as possible. These hard 
to detect compartments are a sought-after feature of garments bought in second-hand clothes 
shops (the primary source of most Gorokans’ clothes), and as I mentioned some sow them in 
themselves. A stil-poket is used to hide particularly high value notes and/or money one cannot 
afford to lose. People showed me how they would autim ol poket (pull their pockets inside out) 
as the ultimate sign of poverty, while money remained safely stored in their stil poket.  
 
A stil-poket is also a measure taken against pickpockets, who are thought to roam the streets 
in legions. Pickpockets are thought to be the lowest criminals and are regularly compared to 
pigs and dogs because they only follow their own interests. Certain kinds of criminality may be 
valorised, but pickpockets are considered too cowardly to steal glamorously (cf. Reed 2003: 
71-7). They often cut the bottom of string bags with a razor and then following behind waiting 
for money to drop out.   
 
People seek deep pockets, because they fear others will assume they have a lot of money if 
their pockets are tightly packed. This is no overreaction as people (not criminals but 
acquaintances) often deliberately brush past pockets to cop a feel of what is inside. If they 
know the person well enough, if they are ‘one skin’ with them, they may brazenly palm the 
bulge. To my mind, the line between coercing someone’s money out and pickpocketing is a 
matter of overtness and not necessarily intention. This brings home Loui’s urgency about 
controlling his money. Noteworthy here is the Tok Pisin word lus, used to refer to coins i stap 
lus (lit. ‘coins that stay loose’, i.e. loose change not fastened to the skin), and also the word for 
losing, as in mi lus pinis (‘I have already lost’, as one often hears around gambling events8). 
Therefore linguistically at least, and certainly in people’s attitudes, loose change is already 
                                                 
8
 See chapter one. 
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somewhat lost or out of control, and people deliberately keep notes intact to avoid losing 
money. As I explored in chapter one, this was why Michael playing his K20 note was so 
dangerous and provocative: it could suck in smaller notes while giving eager players a target. 
 
Visible pockets can also be turned to the advantage of their wearers. In Britain money is most 
often kept in the gendered wallet/purse, but I found most Gorokans disliked and would not 
use them, finding the idea of having money all in this one spot to be too risky: if seen then they 
would be unable to hold back from giving to those who saw the money. Better to be able to 
bring out only what one intends to give to another and no more. Having a visibly deflated 
pocket can therefore strategically index having little money. My adopted father, the big-man 
Tom Liam, reversed this convention and used a wallet to confidently show disdain for those 
who hid money. This gave the impression of supreme nonchalance and resilience in the face of 
others’ jealousy (his son, who was not yet a big-man, said he was not yet secure enough to 
carry a wallet). His fat wallet was jammed in his back pocket every night we went to pokies; 
leaving no one in doubt he had money9. Even displays like this where wallets acts as symbols of 
status and highly visible cash-containers can be a bluff; some people’s wallets were diversions 
while money was hidden away elsewhere. 
 
On the whole women prefer to keep money inside their string bags: some loose, some in a 
purse, some larger notes inside a book to guard against pickpockets. But just like the wallet, 
the string bag is often a front; their noticeable string bags and lack of visible pockets disguise 
money and prevent demands. Wives of some big-men (formerly notable for the many tubers 
they brought home in large string bags) distinguish themselves by carrying only a bigshot bilum 
(lit. ‘big-shot string bag’), so called because it is too small to contain anything other than cash 
cards, mobile phones, and money. Such women no longer perform garden work, they support 
their husbands through effective money and business management, and women’s ability to do 
so is indexed in these over-small string bags, whether used for money or not. 
 
For market-sellers like Charlie many-pocketed combat trousers were the vogue; they are 
capable of hiding betel nuts from direct vision and thus police harassment while their 
protuberance tells everyone betel nuts are for sale10. Consequently money was relegated to a 
                                                 
9
 See chapter four. 
10
 See chapter three. 
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single pocket when Charlie was marketing. On other occasions pockets allow for faked 
donations to offering buckets at churches: I sometimes saw people conspicuously stuff their 
hand deep into their pocket, pull out a clenched fist and then open their empty palm deep 
down in the bucket to feign a donation. Gorokans know that pockets hide, but they imagine 
their insides contain money, and this makes them perfect everyday concealers (see also Keane 
2008; cf. Strathern 1992a). 
 
Concealing or showing off, money is distributed purposefully in pockets across people’s bodies 
with recipients in mind. The materiality and particularly the portability of money enable 
pockets to play the role of concealer, just as the materiality of money aids gamblers to reveal 
while effecting subtle value statements. Some prefer paper-money because it does not clink, 
others coins because they do not float up and out of pockets like loose change. Larger notes 
are used for major shopping purchases (and thus more likely end up in a stil-poket); smaller 
monies are dotted about them for petty street purchases and for gifting. Part of many people’s 
fortnightly routine is to buy goods in Town from shops which have more change, and then to 
take this change to the produce markets where it is often in short supply. Many hopefuls 
therefore hang around inside shops, eager to see associates reveal a large note in their 
presence and in so doing relinquish a portion of its change to them. 
 
The reader will notice that I have focussed on the individual possessor of money in this 
description, and throughout the thesis, and this is quite deliberate. Gorokans have a 
particularly autonomous attitude toward compartmentalising money, which a comparative 
example throws light upon. Jean Lave shows how in the United States money is distributed 
through checking, credit cards, bank accounts, and cash payments to family-enhancing ends 
(1988). Starting with unequal pay checks, families bring their money together in joint accounts 
where principle earner is by no means principle spender. Accounts act as unifiers for the family 
who realign pots of money into communal mutual support funds, categorising funds according 
to their destination as opposed to their source. Accounts stand as points of contrast between 
family and an assumed adversarial outside world made up of buyers and sellers (ibid: 134). 
This shall be familiar to many readers; it immediately speaks to my (orthodox if low tech) 
approach to arranging money at home: my partner and I combine a portion of our income in a 
jam jar which we use to buy all the things that we consume together. This and Lave’s example 
stand in clear contrast to how Gorokans spread their money about their person so that they 
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are always singly oriented toward others. The contrast deserves more elaboration for what it 
reveals about the importance of Gorokan pockets and gambling. 
 
In Goroka money is kept separate from others when possible, even husband from wife, mother 
from son (cf. Sexton 1982). All the action occurs between singular people, either in their bank 
accounts, hiding places at home, or on their skin in pockets. Money is usually held in cash11 and 
each gift is typically transmitted not as an attempt to make consumption mutual but with a 
specific purpose: baim lans blo yu (lit. ‘buy your lunch’), lukautim ol pikinini blo yu (lit. ‘look 
after all your children’). Separations make themselves apparent not only in these small gifts, 
but also in wider marketing and gambling practices, when for instance husbands and wives 
play against each other at cards, or support opposing teams: Blues vs. Maroons. This is 
unproblematic because while each often gives to the other, monies in a person’s possession 
are the province of that person individually. This does not imply that a person is free to do 
what they like with money, but money not yet given is importantly tied to its current owner for 
the time being. In fact the popular use of the term poket mani (lit. ‘pocket money’) among 
grown men and women shows this very well. Instead of being a (trifling) sum of money given 
to children (as in Britain and Australia), pocket money is a popular name given to all monies 
held on the person which are not already committed to another person. That people allocate 
money to themselves on themselves indicates both how intensely others claims to money are 
felt, and the necessity that such monies are still nominally under the control of people before 
they are given over or gambled. 
 
One’s ability to secure moneys’ distributive potential on the skin is thrown into relief by the 
coercive power of money not kept in check, which can direct its possessor (moni bosim yu, lit. 
‘money bosses you’). Loui continued his story about spending a windfall payment: 
 
…During the time that I had the money in my hand [a phrasing that suggests it was 
not yet hidden away safely], I was feeling high and unstoppable. … I felt in charge 
of my daily activities, but that changed on Saturday night or Sunday morning when 
I realised that I had nothing left. I was continually recalculating how much I had, 
                                                 
11
 People did use bank accounts for certain purposes, especially as a mode of preventing non-payments 
and excuses by setting up direct debits. This was often done to prevent husbands from forcing wives to 
give them money to spend rather than paying rent or other expenses. 
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and I kept telling myself that there had to be a wiser way, I had two minds to what 
I was doing, I felt like fifty-fifty, I kept telling myself to calm down and not go 
beyond my limits or my level. I was not worried about anything when I had the 
money; I felt like I could just not hold anything back.  
 
Loui was clearly exhilarated by the decisions he faced when he had money, and he was 
desperate to keep his money at bay with pocket calculations. At nineteen Loui was 
inexperienced when it came to windfalls, and this one clearly took control over him. He felt 
very disappointed with himself when it was all gone, waiting for me for hours at my house to 
give a confession I considered strange and unnecessary at the time. The beauty of a gambling 
windfall is that it is not subject to guilt when it is spent: there is no one to confess to because 
money won is neither earned nor received as gift. People are aware that they can become 
recklessly self-centred if they are not careful with the money they receive. The dangers of not 
controlling money lead to tactics for keeping money in ones pockets. I have called these tactics 
‘pocket calculations’ and I shall now make the claim that they are geared towards a particular 
logic for revealing money that speaks directly to gambling’s parallel manipulation of value. 
 
 
Simon’s Skills 
 
Some clue to the form that pocket calculation takes lies in the neat explanation given to me by 
Simon, a security guard who worked at the National Sports Institute where I lived. I was asking 
about the importance of having one of something when faced with the prospect of distribution 
(prompted by my observations with cards), and he responded by citing the deception made 
possible by pockets and money. Simon described an abstract scenario in which he had two 
betel nuts, and sat chewing one of them as I walked by, noticed and said ‘your mouth is red, 
you are chewing betel nut, give me one’. Simon knew he could say ‘I only have one and I am 
chewing it’, thinking of later when he will want to chew again. If he has only one of something, 
Simon says he feels fine saying no to people, but it is different if he has money in his pocket. If 
this was the case he would give away the betel nut, as he knows it will come back in another 
form.  
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In beautifully simple terms Simon shows that a thing that is singular may be refused to another 
on the grounds of its singularity, but money can stand in the place of that other object and 
thus mobilize forms of sharing12. The betel nut which would otherwise remain with him for 
selfish purposes is now released because money, which might have had any number of uses, is 
earmarked to cover the temporary absence of that second betelnut (cf. Zelizer 1997). Money 
on the skin allows people to share what they have while remaining at ease because wealth is 
secured to them. It allows itself to be hidden while revealing something else in its place. In the 
process money makes the betel nut appear more valuable than it is. But what exactly makes 
this possible? 
 
There are two aspects of Simon’s explanation to consider in more depth: 1) the divisibility of 
money, 2) its concealability. As both means and measure of value, money can be divided in 
purchases and therefore exchanged with anything, supposing one has enough of it (see 
Strathern 1999; chapter two). It is worth stating that a concern with divisibility is by no means 
exclusive to Melanesia, but in Euro-American discourse it is usually coupled with 
commodification (see Strathern 1992a; Gregory 1982, 1997). After all, this is what makes 
denominations of money fractal parts of a singular abstract currency, and thus convertible. It 
seems pertinent to my discussion of chapter one, and Zelizer’s critique of classical theorists of 
money who said that the “‘mathematical character’ of money filled social life with ‘measuring 
and weighting’, with an ‘ideal of numerical calculability’, which necessarily ‘blunted personal, 
social, and moral distinctiveness’” (1997: 200, quoting Simmel 1990 [1907]: 444-5). The inkling 
was to equate divisibility with abstraction, a common market and depersonalisation. The 
counterargument, of which Zelizer is a leading proponent, was to ask when “monetary 
transactions multiply, do they render social life cold, distant, and calculating?” (1997: 2). Yet, 
once again, the pocket calculations I have presented seem to suggest that while people 
calculate with their money, the aims and uses of these calculations challenges the idea that 
money necessarily fosters distanciation (see also Akin & J. Robbins 1999; Gregory 1982; 
Strathern 1999; Munn 1986; cf. Maurer 2005). 
 
                                                 
12
 As in M. Strathern (1999), transactions are also a method for separating persons from each other and 
defining them. Pockets make relations visible as the money leaving them becomes apparent, so money in 
one’s possession can affect a broad range of Others. 
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I discussed calculation with reference to gambling and divisibility throughout the thesis, but 
with pockets comes the possibility of concealment, another perennial concern for Melanesians 
but one which barely figures in Euro-American theories of money (but see Zelizer 1997; Lave 
1988). Gambling systematically reveals money, but it is only in the knowledge of how money is 
concealed that we can fully appreciate what gambling does to money. When money is 
concealed then pocket-users are confronted with the practical reality of denomination. The 
capacity for monies to act like currency and be fungible is deliberately hidden in pockets, with 
only a portion revealed to a recipient. The actual work of money as abstract measure is 
therefore never transparent because its true extent is hidden from the beneficiary. It is 
fungible only for the giver, and the recipient attempts to attain as much as the reality of 
denomination allows.  
 
There may be only one betel nut in Simon’s pocket to give away, and he appears generous, but 
in reality Simon still has plenty of betelnut in the form of money. For its possessor money 
offers peace of mind and enables increased gifting and generosity because of its ability to be 
partially concealed and partially revealed at the same time. The recipient does not know how 
much Simon still has in his pocket, but assumes he probably does have some, while having to 
acknowledge and react as if Simon has given away his last betelnut. This is the source of the 
power that Loui felt when he had all the money in his hand, but it was not sufficiently 
channelled because he did not use his pockets effectively; the same could be said for Michael’s 
gambling exploits in chapter one. 
 
Simon’s statement has power because of a common Melanesian assumption that it is 
impossible to speculate as to the intention of another's mind according to their speech, which 
was discussed in chapter two, and brought to light by J. Robbins & Rumsey (2008; see also 
Pickles forthcoming). They contrast this assumption with Euro-American language ideology 
where people ideally think that there should be an identity between speech and intent so that 
occasions where the two do not match are exceptional states of amorality or dishonesty. In 
the knowledge that no one can know what you are thinking from your speech, Simon plays 
with multiplicity and oneness in mentally converting the materiality of notes into betel nuts 
(see Shaffner 2012; Pickles 2009). Consider figure 6.2, in which a man (represented by the pair 
of trousers) gives a K2 note to someone else (represented by the hand). A line has been drawn 
between the trousers and the hand to represent the fact that while we are able to see both 
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interpretations of the transaction, in practice each is only party to their own reading. The 
diagram should be read as indicative rather than exhaustive. The following section aims to 
make plain that the process is at core creative and can easily rupture the bounds of the 
diagram, giving shape to shifting forms of invention in much the same way as changing 
gambling games rupture previous formalisations in the very moment that new ones are 
created (see also Wagner 1986: 51).  
 
For now let us concentrate on the giver, who makes a decision about what to give in relation 
to the money he has at his disposal in his small gifts pocket (bottom right), comparing his K2 to 
other small value notes. At the same time he is also placing the situation and status of their 
relationship outside the remit of their other pockets, he is saying something along the lines of 
‘this person before me is worth recognising with this kind of gift (K2), if they had been an 
affine they may have received from my back pocket (K20), my wife may have received from my 
stil-poket (K50). This is a multi-layered and spatially organized form of assessment which he 
has set up in order to prevent being caught out and having to overestimate the value of their 
relationship.  
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While the man decided to give their interlocutor K213, he still has the opportunity to make the 
gift appear like a more substantial gift than it is. The K2 note comes along with the words that 
the donor may give to accentuate the gift’s value. This is a further way that people play with 
multiplicity to encourage favourable valuations and thus convey messages of goodwill at as 
little cost to them as possible (as in marketing freebies in chapter three). People qualify almost 
every potentially give-able thing of value belonging to them as being of small value, as being 
liklik mani (lit. ‘small money’) or liklik kaikai (lit. ‘small food’). When things are actually given 
from one to another, the same applies, but with a subtle difference, the liklik means only a 
small amount but a large proportion of the total of what they have. For instance the giver in 
Figure 6.2 is likely to say something like nogat wanpela samtin lo givim yu na mi gat wanpela 
tu kina na mi laik givim yu (lit. ‘I don’t have one thing to give you and I [only] have this two kina 
and I want to give it to you’), or mi lus lo kas na las tupela kina mi laik givim yu (lit. ‘I lost at 
cards and am down to my last two kina, which I would like to give you’) even when they may 
well have either won or not played cards at all14. People receiving must always believe that the 
donor has gone above and beyond in honouring their obligations. It is an opportunity for the 
donor to exceed the recipients expectations, surpassing the usual by lowering the recipient’s 
perception of what is a normal sized gift.  
 
Thus people are always belittling themselves while boasting or demonstrating their high 
respect for others. The circularity of this is not lost on me: belittle yourself, show high respect 
for another, and therefore show yourself to be highly honourable. The gift goes through a 
reverse process: an amount of money is given, its value relative to the amount the giver has is 
set as high, the value of things in general and the K2 in particular is brought down in 
comparison to their relationship, and its value between the two transactors is increased as a 
result, and possibly requires a return gift of higher numerical value. What we might see as 
deception (but which is really just good etiquette) is only possible when the total of one’s 
possessions cannot be known, and thus pockets act as foils for the transmission of not only 
                                                 
13
 I concentrate on individual choices in the moment, but people do make retrospective judgements that 
assume that each gift was elicited by a previous action, and I see no conflict between these positions (See 
Strathern 1988). 
14
 This can only occur once players have managed to leave the location of a gambling game where the 
news will not travel with them, and is thus paradigmatically associated with towns. 
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money but value. In so doing, the K2 that passes between them leaves the first person with at 
least a hyped up if not a heightened value. It is a parallel play with money to the ones seen in 
gambling, where money’s visibility is used to effect value changes by using it to swallow up 
other monies (chapter one) or index fecundity and thus entice others (chapters three and five). 
 
Without knowledge of what the giver really has, and a general knowledge that gifts are always 
hyped up, recipients get the impression that there may be a lot more money that has been 
withheld from them. Pockets thus potentially magnify perceptions of extreme differences in 
wealth, since the actual amount people have can be vast or tiny in your mind. This is the kind 
of assumption of wealth that big-men faced in chapters four and five. Consider again figure 
6.2, but on the other side of the divide, where the recipient knows that the donor must have 
had more than they gave. They compare (‘:’) the K2 they receive with the inflated ideas they 
may have of the wealth being held by the donor. The amount they could have is in principle 
unlimited and thus represented as greater than or equal to K2 (‘≥K2’). How much they think 
they have received in proportion to what they think the other has is tempered (‘/’) by ‘(+ or -
)p’, the perception that the recipient has of their donor, i.e. how selfish they think he is, his kin 
relationship to the recipient, the recipient’s knowledge and experience of past transactions 
between them and between the donor and others, whether he is thought generous (‘+’) or 
mean (‘-‘)15. In agreement with the contributors to the J. Robbins and Rumsey’s (2008) special 
issue, I see the speculation made by the recipient in this case as one about both action (which 
in Melanesia really does speak what words cannot) and speech (the honesty of the claim that 'I 
have only K2’).   For Melanesians others' intent can be known through their acts (in particular 
their gifting and generosity) but the combination of speech and act makes it problematic to 
judge intent.  In his afterword to this special issue, it is telling that Webb Keane reverses the 
connection I make here, stating that “to walk around exposing one's thoughts to others in 
words is like walking around with no pockets, having no hiding places for things” (2008: 477). I 
agree that the opacity of others’ minds highlights pockets, but it also extends their usage in 
particular ways. He continues: 
 
“the authority or the capacity to keep something hidden would seem to be a 
source of power. The opacity claim, viewed in this context, is not so much about 
                                                 
15
 Note that I have not added a p coming across from the donor, because as I discussed earlier, words are 
not to be trusted. 
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whether we can or cannot know the thoughts of others, but whether others can 
keep us from knowing. Or at least whether they can lay claim to the right to be 
the ones to put those thoughts into words, to articulate that which perhaps 
everyone knows. We might all know at some level what others think, but not 
have the right to say so in words.” (ibid: 478). 
 
Pockets – which Keane highlights as a concern in many accounts from Melanesian societies 
(unfortunately without providing references (ibid: 475)) – help people retain ownership and 
control of their own thoughts and to reveal those thoughts through gifts in a way that serves 
them. 
 
Meanwhile, the friction between the perspectives of donor and recipient are apt to create 
both the outlandish assessments people have of the wealth of others, and an atmosphere of 
suspicion that surrounds those who use money (i.e. everyone). Recipients are therefore often 
left disappointed with what they received. The same kinds of dissatisfactions are frequently 
cited in the case of ceremonial displays (see O’Hanlon 1989), “cargo cults” (see Brunton 1971), 
big-men or big-shots (Martin 2010), and most notably in direct dealings with many a waitman 
(lit. ‘white-man’) (see Bashkow 2006). With this kind of fractious background and suspicion of 
others, to gamble becomes an important act, a mode of releasing money and demonstrating 
openness, and it is not surprise that Gorokans are (often) positively accused of being gambling-
mad. 
 
To talk of decisions, distributions, and the quantification of relationships is always to talk of 
value, and when the K2 gift is given in figure 6.2, it holds different values for donor and 
recipient. Therefore K2 is equal and not equal to other K2s when it emerges from the pocket, 
as was the K20 in chapter one. Success or failure in manipulating value is a matter of making 
one’s gift seem exceptional while others appear ordinary. I now show how this ability to 
change money’s value means the number and size of pockets evokes strong reactions in 
people. People respond by trying different strategies to eclipse a donor’s ability to use their 
pockets, opening up pocket users’ ‘systems’ to further innovation, and interlinking with 
innovation in gambling forms. 
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In Each Other’s Pockets 
 
While pocket calculations allow freedom to hide money; it is not simply that more pockets 
make life easier. If a person has too many pockets on display then others assume they wish to 
hide things and therefore cannot be trusted. With everyone having experienced both points of 
view, this is hardly surprising. For instance devout male churchgoers’ make a habit of wearing 
clean smart trousers16 of a single colour and with only a couple of inconspicuous pockets17. 
These were of the suit-trouser type, in which hands slide in easily implying straight-
forwardness; they do not corrugate knuckle skin like jeans (see Colchester 2003). Their shirts 
often had pockets too, but these were frequently and noticeably adorned with pens and/or 
papers (for diligent bible study). It would have been unseemly for a devotee to admit to having 
a stil-poket, which could be used to deceive their fellows. Female churchgoers overwhelmingly 
wore skirts or flowing dresses with no pockets and tended not to wear shorts under their 
dresses on Sundays (many still carried tight-looped string-bags, which were often purposefully 
empty). When not at worship, churchgoers’ were more likely to openly refuse claims made on 
the basis of customary obligation or kinship since their devotion to church partially disconnects 
them from these other spheres of obligation (see J. Robbins 2004).  As pastors emphasised, 
they should have nothing to conceal.  Or rather concealment itself is suspect as it shows you 
are still playing the game of custom in your own way.  Pastors give fashion advice to this effect, 
stressing the distinction between themselves and others by the kinds of (among other 
garments) trousers they wear. Meanwhile devotees vigorously proclaim that Faith shall inapim 
poket blo yu (‘satisfy your pocket’), one of many references made to material success brought 
through spiritual application (ibid).  
 
Gamblers on the other hand had numerous and obvious pockets, and for this they were often 
stigmatised, told they are only interested in acquiring ‘fast money’. At Kakaruk Maket I used to 
count the pockets of players. They averaged 5 per person, far higher than the 3 seen at 
                                                 
16
 For a discussion of ‘informal adornment’ and the appropriateness of certain kinds of Western clothing 
in different locations and across age groups in the Western Highlands, see O’Hanlon 1989: 86-87, 109-
110. 
17
 At least among the Four Square attendees I spent time with. 
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church18. Given the manipulation of money which went on while gambling, it is hardly 
surprising that gamblers brought this trait to their pocket-use as well. Gamblers had more 
need to use pockets to maximum effect – especially if they won – because they had to contend 
with greater demands for the money they had revealed. 
 
The siks-poket meri (lit. ‘six-pocket woman’, meaning woman of low renown, insinuating casual 
prostitute; these women were heavily associated with betel nut markets) was marked out for 
particular criticism; her fidelity is in question because of her evident desire to acquire and 
conceal items in multiple pockets. Said by church leaders to walk around in makeup, ready to 
sleep with any man for only small sums, she was a favourite object of scorn for church leaders. 
While clothes transmit more meaning than their pockets (see Colchester 2003; Küchler & Were 
2005b), in these ways pockets were singled out for critique. This illustrates the potential of 
pockets and their implied transactions to bring to the fore judgements which are otherwise 
inaccessible without seeing transactions in the flesh; transactions like gambling. In other words 
the propensity to be forthright in transaction is indexed by the amount and size of the visible 
signs of transaction. The siks-poket meri loses status by the very implements that should help 
her to transact successfully.  
 
People can be to some extent characterised by their pockets, but pockets and their garments 
also stand for relationships (see also Küchler & Miller). MacKenzie takes her cue from 
Strathern to suggest that string bags act as persons (1991: 150), and I found the same was true 
of clothing. String bags were often being transferred from their makers to others who 
recognised the object as a metonym of its maker and thus saw it as inalienable (see also 
Gregory 1982). Along with fashion advice, pastors often encouraged people to give a nice piece 
of clothing to their visitors, in order that they would be remembered.  Clothes are indeed very 
common and popular gifts; they hold part of the giver tight to the recipient’s skin, reminding 
them of their relationship, and people often talked about others in their absence as having 
given an item of clothing that they were wearing.  
 
Pockets take on extra significance as the vessel for distribution made possible by the person 
who has given them the garment. Imagine then putting your hand into your pocket to feel for 
                                                 
18
 Among gamblers I counted 166 pockets among 31 people. The churchgoers sample was smaller, 30 
pockets between 9 people; I am confident of their representativeness. 
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money to give to he/she who facilitated the act, and now putting your hand in another pocket 
of equal significance but containing more or less money. Here we see the giving of garments 
potentially eclipsing the power of the garment to control money. Pastors driving home the 
church message seem to recognize this when they preach of how recipients will remember 
them down the line. Others outside of the donor-recipient dyad will also identify relationships 
by recognising garments, so talk of my departure would usually revolve around persuading me 
to donate an item of clothing to the person left behind, who could then evoke their 
relationship with me to others, possibly receiving a gift as a result. The contingency of events 
therefore changes the principles employed in calculation. By taking this into consideration, we 
can see that pocket ‘systems’ are open to other forms of one-upmanship, and that continual 
invention pushes the frontiers for gifting.  We can see it in the shift from string bags to 
pockets; from shells to money; and, I think, from one gambling form to another. 
 
Pocket use and gambling preferences each create forms of logic in which possibilities are 
constrained, while in their very formalisation they contain the seeds of their own supersession. 
As aidia lead to new tactics and new games, so does pocket use get overshadowed by new 
ways of transmitting money (see Wagner 1986; cf. Sahlins 1981). Pockets and gambling as 
formalisations-in-process refocus the object of study toward calculations as they are made and 
remade (see O’Hanlon’s 1989; Strathern 1999). Melanesian forms therefore appear both 
resilient and changeable (see Wagner 1986; ____). Pocket and gambling calculations and the 
tropes emerging from them set up more conventions for the next generation of Melanesian 
inventions to subvert (probably as mobile phone banking, mobile lotteries and bank cards 
become more ubiquitous). Pockets work in conjunction with money, which for many 
Melanesians is their most pressing concern, and the need to both use pockets and override 
them effectively (by buying clothing or indeed gambling) produces an innovative Melanesian 
economy. It remains to be seen whether new ways of transferring wealth without being seen 
shall destroy the aura of creativity that currently surrounds gambling and pockets. One can 
only imagine what emerging opportunities for revelation and concealment like mobile phones, 
banking, lotteries, casinos and forms of invisible finance will engender. In the end therefore, 
the challenge lies in identifying the constraints within which new forms of creativity emerge. 
 
 
Conclusion: Pocketing the Difference 
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In the history of Melanesian anthropology it could be said that after M. Strathern’s Gender of 
the Gift (1988) there was a paradigm shift from production to exchange, where the primary 
concern became illuminating how people created their social world through exchange (see 
Carrier 1992; Mosko 2000). Robert Foster’s book (1995) could be seen as another watershed, 
shifting the focus from exchange to consumption, and the making of people at various scales 
through the consumption of (primarily) imported goods (see Sykes 1999; Gewertz & Errington 
2010). My analyses have drawn from both perspectives, but gambling was not reducible to 
either. It is neither conventionally exchange-like, nor straightforwardly consumptive (even at 
pokies). Instead gambling seems concerned with revealing money, turning exchange into 
consumption and consumption into exchange. Gambling bridges the two paradigms, and I 
would hope moves them forward.  
 
Given that gambling is both consumption and exchange, and that neither encompasses the 
other in gambling, it is perhaps worth thinking about whether more material could be 
invigorated if thought through gambling. I hinted as much when I discussed whether we could 
re-perceive Kula as card-game-like, and brideprices as collective bets. One possible question 
going forward could be: how might one reread ceremonial gift exchange if we understood it as 
a supplement of gambling, rather than the other way around? If consumption and exchange 
can be rethought through (game-like) formalisms that exist indigenously, might it be possible 
to dispense with overly imposed anthropological articulations of the relationship between 
these spheres? Is their separation even warranted at the level of analysis? These are inquiries 
for another day, but the fact it is possible to ask as much is testament to the undervalued and 
underestimated interstitial place that gambling occupies.  
 
Gambling (as interstitial motif for relating that plays on money) forced my research to refocus 
on the place of value as a mode of moving across uses and purposes. Value – in Goroka or 
anywhere – has never been inherent, not in notes, coins, betelnut, cigarettes, gold, or anything 
for that matter. In Goroka the slipperiness of value comes close to economists’ received notion 
of money’s value fluctuating with exchange rates and inflation in the dominant world economy 
(see Gregory 1997). But Gorokan value play is more ingrained, more daily, more fluctuating, 
more personal (see Munn 1986). It was possible for a particular piece of money to hold many 
values at once – not between markets but between husband and wife – depending on what 
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someone decides to do with it, where they put it, how they attempt to get more of it, who 
they know, and who knows they have it. Mine was an exploration of intentional value (see 
Sahlins 1981: 69), generalised. Within that fluidity lay shifting formalisms that shape and are 
reshaped by canny individuals whose concern is turning value to their advantage. 
  
Money likewise played an interstitial part, because it does particularly well at concealing the 
nature of its power through the difference that it perpetuates between itself as idea, and as 
effective value. It is in this tension that theories of money dwell, where adequatio intellectus et 
res provides imaginative space for some of the great theorists of the modern age: Marx, 
Simmel, Smith. As Maurer (2005) points out, the intellectual efforts of the anthropologist are 
much the same, we make ethnographic facts (or formalisms) from our experiences and equate 
them with ideas in our heads, projecting them back out as knowledge and expertise. I 
understand that this duality of money is an end in itself, so that rather than revealing an 
underlying facticity to reality through the data, I attempted to make the form of my 
intellectual enterprise reflect the form that money takes in the reality belonging to residents of 
Goroka. What resulted was a contingent mathematic of perception in the flawed sense that 
Gödel envisaged with his theory of mathematic falsification, a mathematic that depends on 
the reality of Goroka for its intellectus and its res. Gambling was a motif for relating, but those 
ideas and realities are changing, and as they do so, more patterns will appear fleetingly, 
offering a record of ideas in motion; each record shall change the ideas once again. And so the 
pattern changes changes. 
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Key to Maps 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 
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Guinea, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University 
Pages 271, 
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Brandewie, Ernest, 1966. An Internal Analysis of the Kinship System of 
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University 
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43 
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Folder 1, 
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University Press 
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